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ABSTRACT
In this dissertation, several novel defense methodologies for cyber-physical
systems have been proposed. First, a special type of cyber-physical system, the RFID
system, is considered for which a lightweight mutual authentication and ownership
management protocol is proposed in order to protect the data confidentiality and integrity.
Then considering the fact that the protection of the data confidentiality and integrity is
insufficient to guarantee the security in cyber-physical systems, we turn to the development
of a general framework for developing security schemes for cyber-physical systems
wherein the cyber system states affect the physical system and vice versa. After that, we
apply this general framework by selecting the traffic flow as the cyber system state and a
novel attack detection scheme that is capable of capturing the abnormality in the traffic
flow in those communication links due to a class of attacks has been proposed. On the other
hand, an attack detection scheme that is capable of detecting both sensor and actuator
attacks is proposed for the physical system in the presence of network induced delays and
packet losses. Next, an attack detection scheme is proposed when the network parameters
are unknown by using an optimal Q-learning approach. Finally, this attack detection and
accommodation scheme has been further extended to the case where the network is
modeled as a nonlinear system with unknown system dynamics.
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SECTION

1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. OVERVIEW
In the past a few decades, technology, science, and engineering has significantly
redefined the physical world. For example, with the new communication system such as
the internet and wireless networking, we are able to interact with objects and people from
almost anywhere on earth. The state-of-the-art transportation system allows us to travel to
the destination within unimaginably short time. Most recently, a new class of system,
named as cyber-physical system (CPS), has shown great potential of further rendering us
capabilities to experience the physical world in a more secure, economical and comfortable
fashion.
The CPSs are engineered systems that are constructed as networked interactions of
physical and computational cyber components [1]. Applications of CPS are found in areas
as diverse as automobiles, air transportation, civil infrastructure, power grid, embedded
medical devices, and consumer appliances. A CPS is a highly collaborative computer
system because the embedded devices monitor and control the physical processes through
a networked feedback loop. A major difference between a CPS and a regular control system
is the employment of communications, which adds re-configurability and scalability as
well as complexity and potential insecurity. Moreover, CPS has significantly more
intelligence in sensors and actuators as well as substantially stricter performance
constraints [2].
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Since a CPS is highly complex, spanning multiple scientific and technological
domains, they thus pose several fundamental challenges, which have been summarized in
[3] and presented in Figure 1.1. Six major challenges in CPS have been considered:
dependability, sustainability, reliability, predictability, interoperability, and security. To be
specific, dependability refers to the property of a system to perform without significant
degradation in its performance whereas sustainability means the ability of renewing the
system’s resources and using them efficiently. Reliability refers to the degree of correctness
which a system provides to perform its function while predictability refers to the degree of
foreseeing of a system’s behavior. On the other hand, interoperability refers to the ability
of the systems to work together, exchange information and use this information to provide
specified services. Finally, security in CPS, which is the main scope of this dissertation,
refers to the property of a system to control access to the system resources and protect
sensitive information from unauthorized disclosures.

Attributes

Reasons of relation

Composability Incorporating operating components
Scalability

Scaling in size and throughput

Interoperability

Predictability

Attributes

Reasons of relation

Accuracy

Quantitative outcome

Compositonality Behavior inference

Heterogeneity Combining different components
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Reasons of relation
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Reasons of relation
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Correct and trusted info

Robustness
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Guaranteed behavior

Confidentiality Secret info, privacy
Availability

Security

CPS
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Reliability

Denial of Service issue

Maintainability Able to keep operating
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Evolving circumstances
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Safety
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Sustainability

Reconfigurability Self-healing
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Figure 1.1. Challenges in cyber-physical systems [3].

Well use of resources
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The concern of security in CPS stems from the presence of a hierarchy of
communication networks that collects information for sensing, exploring, processing and
aggregating [4]. On one hand, those communication networks are often distributed over
wide geographic area and thus exposed to a variety of adversaries. On the other hand, many
components in CPS such as RFID sensors are low-cost embedded devices. As a result, the
resources including the power budget, computational and transmission abilities are quite
limited.
Therefore, the defense methodology for CPS is critical and necessary. As shown in
Figure 1.2, in order to guarantee the security of CPS, the defense system is required to
possess the following three capabilities: protection of information security, detection of
cyber states abnormalities, and detection of physical states abnormalities.

 Protection of information security
-- Methodology: protect data confidentiality and integrity
-- Tools: encryption & authorization algorithms

Cyber World
C1

C2

CN

 Detection of cyber states abnormalities
-- Methodology: explore the behavior of attackers  formulate
cyber changes under attacks  present defense strategies
-- Tools: Markov decision process & game-theoretic approach

PN

 Detection of physical states abnormalities
-- Methodology: characterizing dynamics of the physical system under
attacks  apply classic control theory to bring states back to normal
-- Tools: state-space analysis & observer-based attack detection

Physical World
P1

P2

Figure 1.2. Requirements of defense methodologies for CPS.
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The first requirement of the defense methodology is the ability to protect data
confidentiality and integrity in the communication networks. The majority of the efforts
are devoted to the development of light-weight encryption and authorization algorithms,
which has been summarized in [5][6]. In particular, although RFID systems has been
widely used in CPS due to their low cost and battery-free feature, the concern of disclosing
the data and location privacy has not been completely addressed. The main challenge is
that the computation capability of the RFID tags is too limited to implement complicated
encryption algorithms and communication protocols. Due to the shared nature of wireless
channels between the RFID tags and readers, various attacks can be launched by
unauthorized users to either collect information about the tagged items or create a
disruption of the system operation. Therefore, it is necessary for the readers and tags to
authenticate each other before any data exchange. A comprehensive survey that examines
several aspects related to RFID security has been presented in [7].
It is important to note that unlike the traditional information technology systems,
the protection of data confidentiality and integrity alone is far from enough for CPS
because certain attacks, especially those targeting at the availability of data, do not require
knowledge of the cryptographic mechanisms. For example, the wormhole attacker attracts
data traffic by establishing a link between two geographically distant regions of the
network and then delays or drops the attracted data [8]. The jamming attacks over wireless
networks may severely degrade the performance in terms of message delay and data
throughput by broadcasting radio interferences [9]. The replay attacker maliciously repeats
the messages delivered from the operator to the actuator and causes communication
unreliability, which has been successfully used by the virus attack of Stuxnet [10][11]. This
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explains the necessity for the defense methodology to meet the second requirement
introduced in Figure 1.2.
The second requirement of the defense methodology is the ability to detect the
cyber state abnormalities. In order to meet this, the defender needs to explore the behavior
of the attackers, formulate the cyber changes under attacks, and present an appropriate
strategy to bring the cyber system back to normal. For instance, the effort in [12] introduces
the DoS flooding attacks by a continuous-time Markov chain and utilizes the state space
method to compute security measures accurately. Different from [12], the authors in [13]
study the cyber defense by modeling the actions of the attacker and the defender as a
stochastic zero-sum game. In [14], the measure of vulnerabilities in cyber-physical systems
with application to power systems is defined and a security framework including anomaly
detection and mitigation strategies is provided. The authors in [15] evaluate the cyber
security by computing the expected probabilities of the attacker and using the probabilities
to build a transition model through game-theoretic approach. In [15], the cyber
vulnerability is evaluated dynamically by using hidden Markov model and by providing a
mechanism for handling sensor data with different trustworthiness.
In particular, selecting the network traffic flow as the cyber states provides a
feasible to way to deal with the previously mentioned cyber-attacks [8-11] since it is
observed that these attacks tend to deviate the amount of traffic flow from the normal value.
Flow control has been studied in the literature [16-18]. For example, the authors in [16]
model the high-speed network as fluid-flow queues with a fixed propagation delay for each
channel. In [17], a receiver-based flow control scheme is proposed that achieves the given
optimal utility. The authors in [18] propose a new utility max-min flow control framework

6
using classic sliding mode control. However, to the best of our knowledge, minimal effort
has been spent on studying the flow control from the perspective of network security when
the network is attacked by injecting or dropping traffic flow.
The third requirement of the defense methodology is the ability to detect the state
abnormalities of the physical system. This can be done through characterizing the dynamics
of the physical system under attacks by extending the classical state-space description. For
instance, in [20], the system dynamics include an extra term to model the deception attack.
In [21], the system state under attack is represented with an additive term which in turn is
used to simulate the false data injection attack. The authors in [22] characterize the
deception attacks using a set of objectives and propose policies to synthesize stealthy
deception attacks. In [23], the estimation and control of linear systems when sensors or
actuators are corrupted by an attacker is provided, together with a secure local control loop
that can improve the resilience of the system.
However, there are many weaknesses in the reported work [12-15][20-23]. First of
all, these approaches only focus on either the cyber system or the physical system and fail
to take the interactions between the cyber defense policy and the system controller
performance into consideration. Second, the representations [8-11] can only describe a
single type of attack due to the fact that attacks affect the system dynamics in a variety of
ways. Last but not least, it is difficult to implement the representation developed in the
literature so far since the system dynamics under attacks are considered known. For
instance, the physical system dynamics becomes uncertain due to random delays and
packet losses caused by certain cyber-attacks [24].
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To conclude, in order to guarantee the security of CPS, the defense methodology is
required to be capable of protecting the information security and detecting cyber state
abnormalities as well as the physical state vector abnormalities. Such a comprehensive
defense framework, which is lacking in the existing literature to the best of our knowledge,
is the main objective of this dissertation.
1.2. ORGANIZATION OF THE DISSERTATION
In this dissertation, a comprehensive defense framework and several novel defense
methodologies for CPS has been proposed. This dissertation is presented in five papers,
and their relationship to one another is illustrated in Figure 1.3. The common theme in
these five papers is the development of defense methodologies for cyber-physical systems.

Paper I: H. Niu, E. Taqieddin, and S. Jagannathan, EPC Gen2v2
RFID Standard Authentication and Ownership Management
Protocol, IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing, vol. TBA, no.
99, pp. TBA, 2015.

Protection of data
confidentiality and
integrity
Insufficient to
guarantee security

C1

P1

Cyber World
C2

CN

Physical World
P2
PN

Paper II: H. Niu and S. Jagannathan, Optimal Defense and
Control of Dynamic Systems Modeled as Cyber-physical
Systems, Journal of Defense Modeling and Simulation:
Applications, Methodology, Technology, vol. 12, no. 4, pp. 423438, 2015.

General framework
to detect
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In the first paper, the objective is to protect data confidentiality and integrity for a
particular cyber-physical system – mainly in RFID systems. To this end, a lightweight
mutual authentication and ownership management protocol is proposed. The protocol is
compliant with the latest EPC Gen2v2 standard. The protocol is designed to fit within the
computational abilities of the tag as well as the scarce energy resources. The details of the
protocol are given along with formal security proof of its correctness. Further, the protocol
is implemented on EPC compliant tags and is shown to add minimal overhead to the
standard message exchanges.
Next, since the protection of the data confidentiality and integrity is insufficient to
guarantee the security in CPS, in the second paper, we propose a novel representation for
developing security schemes wherein the cyber system states affect the physical system
and vice versa. Subsequently by using this representation, an optimal strategy via Qlearning is derived for the cyber defense in the presence of an attack. Since the cyber system
under attack will affect the physical system stability and performance, an optimal controller
by using Q-learning is considered for the physical system with uncertain dynamics. As an
example, cyber-attacks that increase the network delay and packet losses are considered
and the goal of the proposed cyber defense and optimal controller is to thwart the attack
and mitigate the performance degradation of the physical system due to increased delays
and packet losses.
In the third paper, we further apply the framework proposed in the second paper by
selecting the traffic flow as the cyber system states. To be specific, we first propose a novel
attack detection scheme that is capable of capturing the abnormal traffic flow in the
communication links due to a class of attacks. Further, it is shown that the stability of the
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physical system can be affected by the condition of the network due to delays and packet
losses induced by the attacks. An observer-based detection scheme is developed both for
the network and physical system. Attacks on the networks as well as on the physical system
can be detected and upon detection, the physical system can be stabilized by adjusting the
controller gains. Several attacks are considered in the simulation to show the applicability
of the proposed scheme.
Subsequently, in the fourth paper, the work in the third paper is extended to the case
where the CPS dynamics becomes unknown due to the unknown network parameters.
Accordingly, an adaptive observer is proposed to estimate the unknown system dynamics
and an optimal Q-learning based controller is developed to stabilize the flow in the
presence of disturbances. The detection residual generated by the adaptive observer is in
turn utilized to determine the onset of an attack when it exceeds a predefined threshold.
For the physical system, we consider a stochastic dynamic system which incorporates
uncertain network-induced delays and packet losses in the system dynamics. The proposed
detection scheme includes an optimal Q-learning based event-triggered controller that is
capable of detecting attacks on both sensors and actuators.
Finally, the last paper considers the case where the network traffic flow is modeled
as a nonlinear system with unknown dynamics. A one-layer neural network (NN) based
estimator is adopted in order to approximate the unknown system dynamics. Similar to
Paper IV, the network attack detection residual generated by the adaptive observer is
utilized to determine the onset of an attack. Upon detecting the attack, another NN-base
approximator is introduced to estimate the attack input. For the physical system, we
develop an attack detection scheme by using an optimal or approximate dynamic
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programming-based event-triggered controller in the presence of network delays and
packet losses. Moreover, attacks on the sensor or actuators of the physical system can be
detected and further estimated with the proposed attack detection scheme.
1.3. CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE DISSERTATION
This dissertation provides contributions to the area of defense methodologies for
the cyber-physical systems. The proposed uniform representation for CPS can be used in a
variety of applications including autonomous systems. In particular, the cyber defender is
able to make thorough decisions by selecting appropriate cyber state vector and output and
customizing the payoff function that is of interest. Therefore, the proposed effort
overcomes these deficiencies mentioned in Section 1.1.
The contributions of Paper I include the development of a novel lightweight
authentication and ownership transfer protocol for passive RFID systems. We also
demonstrate how the proposed protocol is compliant with the EPC Gen2v2 standard. The
protocol is analyzed by using strand space and implemented and evaluated on hardware,
which, to the best knowledge of the authors, is the first hardware based evaluation for
ownership transfer protocols.
For the second paper, the main contribution is the novel and comprehensive
representation of the CPS that captures the interrelationship between the cyber and the
physical elements. The optimal strategies for the defender and the attacker are also
developed based on the proposed framework.
On the other hand, the contributions of the third paper include the design of the
flow controller with randomly delayed measurement in the presence of attacks and the
development of novel observer-based network attack detection and estimation scheme
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along with detectability condition. A controller is also designed for the physical system to
maintain the stability of the physical system which can be utilized to maintain the healthy
condition of the communication networks in terms of the delays and packet losses using
adversary models.
The contributions of the fourth paper include the design of the optimal flow
controller in the presence of disturbances and cyber-attacks, where the network parameters
are considered unknown. A novel observer-based network attack detection and estimation
scheme along with detectability condition is also provided. The contribution of the fourth
paper also includes the development of sensor/actuator attack detection scheme with an
event-triggered controller for the physical system with uncertain system dynamics.
Finally, for the last paper, the main contributions include the development of a
novel observer-based network attack detection and estimation scheme for nonlinear NCS
with unknown system dynamics. It is demonstrated that the proposed scheme works in the
presence of a class of attacks with specific adversary models. The contributions on the
physical system include the development of an event-triggered controller in the presence
of network-induced delays and packet losses and a sensor/actuator attack detection and
estimation scheme.
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PAPER

I. EPC GEN2V2 RFID STANDARD AUTHENTICATION AND OWNERSHIP
MANAGEMENT PROTOCOL
Haifeng Niu, Eyad Taqieddin, and S. Jagannathan
Providing security in passive RFID systems has gained significant attention due to
their widespread use. Research has focused on providing both location and data privacy
through mutual authentication between the readers and tags. In such systems, each party is
responsible of verifying the identity of the other party with whom it is communicating. For
such a task to succeed, the tags and readers are initialized with shared secret information
which is updated after a successful authentication session. Ownership management, which
includes transfer and delegation, builds upon mutual authentication. Here, the use of
security in RFID is extended to encompass the more practical case where a tagged item is
shifted from one owner to another. As such, we propose a new authentication and
ownership management protocol that is compliant with the EPC Class-1 Generation-2
Version 2 standard. The protocol is formally analyzed and successfully implemented on
hardware. The implementation shows that the use of such protocol adds security with little
added overhead in terms of communication and computation.
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1. INTRODUCTION

Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) systems are deployed in numerous
automated asset management applications.

Examples of such applications include

libraries, warehouses, and border control to name a few. In a RFID system, the
identification information of the tracked objects is stored in a nonvolatile memory on
passive tags. These tags are queried by readers which transmit an RF signal to energize
the tags so as to get the backscattered information. The readers are connected to backend
servers which store and process the data.
An important aspect to be considered in RFID systems is the data and location
privacy. Given that the communication between the tags and readers is wireless, various
attacks may be launched by an unauthorized user to either collect information about the
tagged items or cause a disruption of the system operation. As a result, the communicating
parties, a tag and a reader, must authenticate each other before any data exchange.
Moreover, the data should be concealed from unauthorized access through encryption. As
such, both the reader and the tag need to share secret information.
Besides authentication, ownership management (i.e.; transfer or delegation) (OT)
is also an important aspect of RFID security as most tagged items will change owners at
least once during their lifetime. For example, the ownership of the tagged item is
transferred from the manufacture to the retailer, and then to the customer. Special attention
to the security must be paid because this process is relatively vulnerable to attacks due to
the exchange of secret keys or passwords. Further, it is desired that the ownership
management protocol would protect the privacy of the new owner from tracking by the
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previous owner(s) and to guarantee that the new owner will not be able to retrieve the
previous secret keys used by the old owner.
To add security features to the passive tags, the EPC Class-1 Generation-2 standard
(EPC Gen2v1) [1] introduces the access and kill password. The access password is used
whenever the reader wishes to read/write data in a tag’s memory. On the other hand, the
kill password along with the kill command is issued to stop the tag from responding to any
subsequent queries. These basic security mechanisms are easily defeated because the
passwords are XORed with a random number that is sent in plaintext, which can easily be
retrieved.
Recently, the EPC Class-1 Generation-2 standard version 2 (EPC Gen2v2) [2], has
been ratified. Backward-compatible with the old version, the new one provides a series of
features intended to improve security of the tag by allowing the manufacturers to customize
the cryptographic authentication methods to verify identity and provenance, as well as
avoid unauthorized access. Similar to the previous standard, EPC Gen2v2 supports the use
of a pseudo random number generator (PRNG), a cyclic redundancy check (CRC) function,
and XOR operation.
A security protocol is usually considered as “EPC compliant” if it solely uses one
or more of these functions. However, these functions by themselves are not cryptographic
functions. Other measures should be taken to provide an acceptable level of security
considering their computational capabilities since there are only 500 – 5000 gate elements
on the tag, of which 200 – 2000 can be used for security-related functions [3]. The
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), for example, requires about 3000 gate elements to
be implemented. Hash functions like MD5 and SHA-256 require even more gate elements,
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8000 – 10000 [4]. Therefore, securing information among RFID devices is a major
challenge due to the limited storage and computational capabilities on the passive tags.
1.1. RELATED WORK
A comprehensive survey [5] examines several aspects related to RFID security.
Mainly, the importance of mutual authentication and secret information sharing is
emphasized. In [6], a classification of RFID authentication protocols, based on the
cryptographic/logical functions, is presented. These protocols range from full-fledged
protocols in which symmetric, asymmetric, and hash functions are supported [7]-[12] to
the least computationally demanding class called the ultra-lightweight, where basic bitwise
logical and shift operations are employed [13]-[16].
In [17], an EPC compliant mutual authentication protocol based on CRC exchange
followed by update on secret information after each authentication session is proposed to
provide privacy, anonymity, and to resist replay and denial of service (DoS) attacks.
However, [18] and [19] indicated that [17] did not achieve its intended goals. The work of
[18] detailed the steps to successfully impersonate a valid tag either temporarily or
permanently and how to run a DoS attack. These attacks are shown to be practical due to
the short length of the data units exchanged. In [19], the impersonation attack is extended
to include the back-end database as well as the tags. The analysis shows how the location
of the tag can be identified and tracked.
The authors in [20] proposed a new protocol called Azumi to overcome the security
flaws of [21] and claim that it is capable of defending against location tracking, DoS
attacks, counterfeit reader or tag, and man-in-the-middle (MitM) attacks. However, it is
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shown that the work in [20] is vulnerable to tag impersonation and secret disclosure attacks.
An enhanced version Azumi+ was proposed in [22] as a solution.
Several research efforts considered the problem of ownership management. One of
the earliest ownership transfer protocols appeared in [23]. However, the old owner privacy
cannot be guaranteed due to the way the shared keys are updated, leading to a desynchronization attack. Around the same time, the authors in [24] proposed a scalable,
delegated pseudonym protocol enabling ownership transfer. However, as pointed out in
[25], the keys shared by several tags become a weakness that reduces security. In [26], a
protocol based on the use of hash functions, symmetric cryptography, and the XOR
operation is proposed. The protocol is shown to be vulnerable to tracking and DoS attacks
by manipulating the value of the random number sent to the tag [27]. Moreover, in [28],
an attacker can add noise to the final message exchange resulting in the tag holding
incorrect secret information due to which any subsequent authentication would fail.
Another protocol appeared in [29] referred to as product-flow ownership-transfer
protocol (POP). This protocol supports querying, disabling, or updating the secret keys on
the tag. However, this protocol does not provide privacy to the new owner because the old
owner will still be able to access the tag by exploiting his knowledge of the shared secret
keys. In addition, it is prone to de-synchronization attacks similar to [30], [31].
As for ownership delegation protocols, for example, the work in [30] assumes that
the channel from the tag to the reader is secure and that any ownership transfer/delegation
will be securely accomplished. This is an impractical assumption and cannot be relied
upon. Another variant of [26] was proposed in [33] as an ownership delegation protocol.
Delegation is possible because the message containing the new key uses the old key as a
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variable. As such, the old owner will be able to keep track of the key updates and modify
its keys accordingly.
The ownership management protocols mentioned above [23]-[30], as well as in
[32]-[35], are not EPC compliant due to the nature of the cryptographic functions used in
computing the messages. An EPC compliant lightweight protocol is given in [36] wherein
PRNG and XOR functions are used on the tag side. However, the protocol is sensitive to
replay and MitM attacks. Another EPC compliant ownership transfer protocol is proposed
in [37] where the authors add a modular division operation to the functions of the tag
because such a function would not require a large number of gate elements. However, a
potential attacker can disguise as an owner who can update the secret keys in the same way
as the new owner does, thus eliminating the security.
The other ownership transfer protocols [37]-[41] conforming to EPC standards use
CRC as the encryption method and cannot guarantee security because of the complete
linearity property of CRC. In fact, as analyzed in [19] and [39][42], the attacker is able to
trace, impersonate and eventually disclose all the information stored in tags with very few
interactions. In summary, an EPC compliant secure authentication and owner management
protocol is yet to be developed for passive tags.
1.2. CONTRIBUTIONS
In this paper, a lightweight mutual authentication and ownership management
protocol is proposed. The protocol is compliant with the EPC Gen2v2 standard. The basic
supported operations, along with permutation, are used as basic operations to provide the
cryptographic functionality.
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The protocol is designed to fit within the computational abilities of the tag as well
as the scarce energy resources. The details of the protocol are given along with formal
security proof of its correctness. Further, the protocol is implemented by using EPC
compliant tags and is shown to add minimal overhead to the standard message exchanges.
This paper is an extended version of work published in [43]. We extend our previous work
by making the following improvements. 1) In addition to the basic ownership transfer
scheme introduced in [43], the protocol presented in this work also supports ownership
delegation. 2) A mathematical proof of both authentication and secrecy with strand space
theory is provided. 3) A detailed description on how the proposed protocol is implemented
in hardware is offered. 4) More experiments are conducted to evaluate the performance of
the proposed protocol, such as time consumption analysis for multiple-tag ownership
transfer and resistance evaluation to the brutal force attack.
The main contributions of this work include: 1) the development of a novel
lightweight authentication and ownership transfer protocol for passive RFID systems by
taking into account both delegation and ownership transfer into consideration, 2) the
demonstration of how the proposed protocol is compliant with the EPC Gen2v2 standard,
3) the security analysis of the protocol by using strand space, and 4) hardware
implementation and evaluation, which, to the best knowledge of the authors, is the first
hardware based evaluation for ownership transfer protocols.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the detailed description
of proposed protocol is given followed by the security analysis given in Section 3 and a
comparison with pervious work in Section 4. The hardware implementation and evaluation
is given in Section 5. The paper is concluded in Section 6.
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2. PROPOSED PROTOCOL

In addition to the limited functions supported by the EPC standard, the available
power on the tag for various computations and transmissions needed as part of the security
protocol implementation is an important constraint. Moreover, the limited available time
for executing the steps for the authentication and ownership management protocol is an
added challenge. Finally, the protocol has to be implemented in a practical setting in which
hundreds or thousands of tags are present with several tags simultaneously performing
exchange and this should be completed within the allowed timeslot.
To enhance the functionality of the protocol, the ultra-lightweight permutation
operation (Per) [16] is added to the existing functions on the tag. This operation offers
diffusion of the bits and helps overcome any problem occurring because of the nature of
bitwise operations. The operation is defined as follows:
Definition 1 [16]: For two n-bit strings, X and Y , in the form

X  x1 x2  xn , xi {0,1}, i  1, 2,...n; Y  y1 y2  yn , yi {0,1}, i  1, 2,...n .
The Hamming weight of Y , wt (Y ) , is m (0  m  n) and
yk1  yk2    ykm  1, ykm1  ykm2    ykn  0,

where
1  k1  k2    km  n, 1  km1  km2    kn  n .

Then, the permutation of X according to Y , denoted as Per ( X , Y ) , is given by
Per ( X , Y )  xk1 xk2  xkm xkn xkn1  xkm2 xkm1 .
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The following assumptions are made in designing the protocol:
1) The link between the readers is secure. Also, the link between any reader and the trusted
third party (TTP) is assumed to be secure. This is a reasonable and quite common
assumption as the readers are built with more powerful processors which can take
advantage of complex encryption algorithms to guarantee secure data transmission.
2) The link between the tag and any other entity is considered insecure.
3) The current owner and the tag share a secret key that is only known to them.
2.1. INITIALIZATION
The tag is initialized with the following values:
1) K: secret key shared with both current and new owners, as well as delegates, if any.
2) KM: master key only shared with the tag owner. A reader with KM is able to modify
key K, but a reader with key K does not have access to KM.
3) KTTP: key shared between the tag and the TTP.
4) EPC: electronic product code, the static identifier of a tag.
5) RIDi: The ID of the reader i currently owning the tag.
6) IDS: In the protocol, index pseudonym (IDS) is exchanged instead of using the tag
identifier (ID). The IDS is a pointer to a database entry in which the information of the
tag is stored. Such an entry may include the identifying information and the keys related
to that tag. We use the IDS instead of concealing the EPC in the messages, for the
following two reasons: 1) The EPC value is constant and its use in multiple runs of the
protocol may reveal information about the tag and its secret values. 2) Tracking the
EPC by the old owner is possible.
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Note that for compliance with the EPC standard, all data units in the protocol are
96 bits long. For the convenience of implementation, these 96-bit data are broken into six
16-bit words. For example, a 96-bit parameter A is broken into six words, denoted as

A(1), A(2),... A(i),... A(6), where A(i) is the ith 16-bit subunit. As a result, all the
computations are executed six times in order to get the complete 96-bit data.
The current owner is initialized with K, KM, IDS, RIDi and EPC. As mentioned
earlier, the proposed ownership management protocol takes both delegation (details in
Section 2.3) and complete ownership transfer (Section 2.4) into consideration. However, it
is important to notice that before either delegation or complete ownership transfer take
place, mutual authentication is needed to verify the authority of all parties involved.
2.2. PHASE I: MUTUAL AUTHENTICATION
A general scenario for an authentication session starts with the reader querying a
tag. In response, the tag sends an index pseudonym (IDS). A sequence of exchanges
follows such that the reader securely sends random numbers to the tag by using the shared
key, the tag authenticates the reader and vice versa, and the keys and IDS are updated. The
transactions that take place are shown in Figure 2.1.
The purpose of the authentication phase is to: 1) prove the possession of shared
secret key to each other without disclosing it; 2) pass the nonces that are used to update the
keys. To achieve this, the reader generates two 96-bit random values (rnd1, rnd2) as the
nonces, then computes A, B, and C in a way described in Figure 2.1. Particularly, in the
computation of A and B, the secret key is part of the input of PRNG function so that the
key is protected while the tag can verify the readers’ possession of the key by doing the
same computation. Furthermore, message C is used to check if the tag has retrieved the
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correct nonces (rnd1, rnd2) from messages A and B. It is very important to note that the
PRNG is a nonlinear function, meaning that if an attacker flips one bit of RID2, the tag
will get a totally different (and incorrect) rnd1. Moreover, since rnd1 is used to retrieve
rnd2 from B, therefore rnd2 derived by the tag will be incorrect, As a result, even if the
attacker flips the same bit of B, it will not get C’ that equals to C.

Old Owner
Secret

Tag
Secret

K,KM, EPC, RID1

Generate random number rnd1, rnd2,
calculate A, B, C:
A(i) = rnd1(i) ⊕ PRNG(K(i) ⊕RID1(i)) ⊕
PRNG(K(i) ⊕ RID2(i)) )
B(i) = rnd2(i) ⊕ PRNG(rnd1(i)⊕K(i))
C(i)= PRNG(rnd1(i) ⊕ RID1(i)) ⊕
PRNG(rnd2(i) ⊕ RID2(i))
Where i=1~6.

A, B, C

D
Calculate D’:
D’(i) = PRNG(K*(i) ⊕ IDS*(i))
i=1 to 6
If D = D’, tag is authorized

K, KM, EPC, RID, IDS

Retrieve rnd1, rnd2, calculate C’:
Generate rnd1, rnd2, calculate A, B, C:
rnd1(i) = A(i) ⊕ PRNG(K(i) ⊕RID1(i)) ⊕
PRNG(K(i) ⊕ RID2(i)) )
rnd2(i) = B(i) ⊕ PRNG(rnd1(i)⊕K(i))
C’(i)= PRNG(rnd1(i) ⊕ RID1(i)) ⊕
PRNG(rnd2(i) ⊕ RID2(i))
If C = C’, update K and IDS, calculate D:
K*(i) = Per(rnd1(i), K(i)) ⊕ K( (i+1)mod
6)
IDS*(i) = Per(rnd2(i), K(i)) ⊕ K(i)
D(i) = PRNG(K*(i) ⊕ IDS*(i)), i = 1 to 6

Figure 2.1. Mutual authentication and keys update [43].

If C equals to C’, then it is believed that the reader does have the secret key and the
tag has retrieved rnd1 and rnd2 successfully. Then the new key and IDS are computed in a
way specified in Figure 2.1. Similarly, we use message D to: 1) prove the tags’ possession
of the secret key; 2) inform the reader that the tag has computed the new key and IDS.
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Upon receiving message D, the reader will compute D’ in the same manner and
determines whether D equals to D’ or not. If that is true, then the tag is authenticated.
Consequently, the reader and the tag update to the new computed key and IDS for future
uses. It should be noted, however, that both the reader and the tag should maintain a copy
of the old key and IDS to avoid desynchronization problems (more explanation can be
found in Section 4).
2.3. PHASE II, CASE 1: DELEGATION
At this point, RID1 is ready to delegate its rights over the tag to RID2. For that
purpose, we introduce the use of the ticket. This is used by the delegate reader to prove to
the tag that it is a valid reader and that it had received sufficient credentials from the current
owner to allow it to access the tag. In the proposed delegation protocol, both RID1 and the
tag compute the ticket as shown in Figure 2.2.

Old Owner
Secret

K,KM, EPC, RID1

Ticket = KM ⊕ EPC ⊕ rnd1 ⊕ rnd2

Tag
Secret

K, KM, EPC, RID, IDS

Ticket = KM ⊕ EPC ⊕ rnd1 ⊕ rnd2

Figure 2.2. Ticket computation on an old owner and tag.

RID1 uses a secure link with RID2 and passes to it the EPC, IDS, K, and ticket. A
valid ticket allows RID2 to query the tag and to run mutual authentication sessions with it.
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Figure 2.3 shows how the delegate RID2 uses the ticket to query and update the tag. Note
that the ticket value becomes an integral part of the message computations.

New Owner (Delegate)
Secret

Tag
Secret

K, ticket, EPC, RID2

K, KM, EPC, ticket, IDS

Query, RID2
IDS
Generate rnd1, calculate A, B:
A(i) = rnd1(i)⊕PRNG(K(i) ⊕RID2(i)) ⊕
PRNG(K(i))
B(i) = PRNG(ticket(i) ⊕rnd1(i))
where i = 1~6

Calculate C’:
C’(i) = PRNG(K*(i) ⊕ IDS*(i)), i = 1
to 6
If C = C’, tag is authorized

A, B

C

Retrieve rnd1, calculate B’:
rnd1(i) = A(i)⊕PRNG(K(i) ⊕RID2(i)) ⊕
PRNG(K(i))
B’(i) = PRNG(ticket(i) ⊕rnd1(i))
If B = B’, update K and IDS, calculate D:
K*(i) = Per(rnd1(i), K(i)) ⊕ K( (i+1)mod
6)
IDS*(i) = Per(rnd1(i), K(i)) ⊕ K(i)
C(i) = PRNG(K*(i) ⊕ IDS*(i)), i = 1 to 6

Figure 2.3. Ownership delegation.

In the case of delegation, RID1 may wish to restore its sole ownership of the tag.
This means that it has to revoke the ticket such that RID2 will not pass the test of equality
between B and B’. When that happens, no update will take place and the tag will not run
further session with the revoked reader. The proposed approach for this is to modify the
value of K M such that the ticket given to RID2 will not match with the computed value.
Note that the value of the ticket is updated with every session because the values of rnd1
and rnd2 are changed.
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Delegation is suitable for those cases where certain “guest readers” need to access
the tag temporally. In other cases, however, the old owner needs to give up the ownership
completely and transfer it to the new owner. This process is presented in the following
section.
2.4. PHASE II, CASE 2: COMPLETE OWNERSHIP TRANSFER
In this case, we propose the use of a TTP to guarantee the correctness of the
protocol. The need for the TTP arises from the fact that the old owner holds the same values
shared between the new owner and the tag. This means that any update taking place by
RID2 may be mirrored by RID1. This violates an important property of ownership transfer
which is backward privacy.
However, it is worth to note that the EPC Gen2v2 standard introduces a new
“untraceable” command, which allows the tag to reduce its operating range for all readers.
This function, to some degree, may give a practical solution of releasing the use of TTP by
reducing the operating range so that only the new owner can reach the tag. As a result, the
old owner cannot repeat the key update process and thus the backward privacy is
guaranteed.
In this protocol, the goal is to change the value of K M stored on the tag such that it
matches that stored on RID2. After that, RID1 will have no access to the tag anymore. This
proposed approach adds an extra functionality that we may use the reverse process in case
we wish to satisfy the ownership repossession property. As presented in Figure 2.4, the
outline of the protocol includes those steps:
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New Owner

TTP

Secret

Secret

K, EPC, RID2

Store KM*

KM*

Tag
Secret

KM, KTTP, EPC, RID2

Generate rnd1, update KM, Calculate A, B
KM*(i) = PRNG(Per(KM(i), rnd1(i))),
A(i) = rnd1(i)⊕PRNG(KTTP(i)),
B(i) = PRNG(KM (i) ⊕ rnd1(i)), i = 1~6

KTTP, KM, EPC, IDS

A, B

Retrieve rnd1, calculate B’:
rnd1(i) = A(i)⊕PRNG(KTTP(i)),
B’(i) = PRNG(KM (i) ⊕ rnd1(i)), i = 1~6
If B = B’, update KM:
KM*(i) = PRNG(Per(KM(i), rnd1(i)))
Try to Authenticate each other. OT is complete if success

Figure 2.4. Complete ownership transfer [43].

1) TTP generates a random number rnd1 and uses it to update K M to K M * . This will
become the new master key shared between the tag and the new owner, RID2.
2) TTP sends K M * to RID2 using the secure channel.
3) The challenging part for the TTP becomes to send K M * to the tag. For that, we propose
the use of messages A and B shown in Figure 2.4. Similar to what we have done in the
authentication phase, the secret key is set as the input of the nonlinear PRNG function
while the nonce is XORed with the PRNG output so that the key will not be disclosed
and the nonce can be passed to the tag safely. Message B is used for the tag to verify
TTP’s possession of the secret key and to check the correctness of the nonce.
4) The tag retrieves rnd1 from A and verifies that B is equal to B’.
5) The value of rnd1 is used by the tag to update K M * in a manner similar to that used by
the TTP.
6) The new owner and tag need to challenge each other to verify that both have the same
value of K M * .
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2.5. EXAMPLE OF AUTHENTICATION AND OWNERSHIP TRANSFER
To illustrate the operations that take place, we give a numeric example. Assume
that the tag is initialized with the following values:
K = 0xF702A7DE0826C3F829A1E411;
KM = 0x5998C1D7782AB07071536E71;
KTTP = 0xD4B087E2874D2702DE62DE89;
RID1 = 0x8C00CACD2BD37051AE008186;
RID2 = 0xF51EF5A0B4BF61ADA7B4B2F6.
According the protocol, the reader generates two random numbers to be used in the
computation of messages A, B, and C. Assuming that the random numbers are
rnd1 = 0x18F86BF86469F341C132C052;
rnd2 = 0x474BEA6DA7CD08D146A9414E.
The reader will then send
A = 0xC8D9BBBC295F1707A0D1B9D7;
B = 0xB2430574BF1375B0B3186233;
C = 0xB09F6C3B632DD765C2F767D4.
Upon receipt of these values, the tag retrieves rnd1 and rnd2 from messages A and B, and
then computes C’ to compare it with C. If they match then the tag computes new values for
K and IDS and uses these updated values to compute D.
K* = 0xB7E16E19AB54DF2527093616;
IDS* = 0xB8A64333A6C0C36F650BA775;
D = 0x2453BE3D512DB598394CD738.
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The reader verifies the value of D by comparing with D’. If they match then the tag
and reader both have successfully authenticated each other and updated their secret key
and IDS values.
The ownership transfer phase follows a similar manner. Messages A and B are used
between the TTP and the tag to convey a random number and to prove to the tag that the
messages originate from an authentic source, the TTP. To illustrate, assume that the TTP
generates rnd1 as
rnd1 = 0x411895D3C7772A68D368159E.
Then A and B will be
A = 0x330B34429236E6B83E1BD20C;
B = 0x4DC01DE6C69F8F6E88E025D0.
The tag retrieves rnd1 and then updates KM to
KM* = 0x232F1EBB84FED34E175A0797.
The same key is already in the possession of the new owner through the secure
channel with the TTP. Thus, the tag and the new owner can communicate with each
securely using the new key. Note that the old owner will not be able to compute KM* since
it does not have the rnd1 value.

29
3. SECURITY ANALYSIS

In this part, we use the strand space analysis to prove the correctness of the protocol.
A strand is a sequence of events that a single principal may engage in, while a strand space
is a set of strands [44]. Here, “principal” stands for any participant that may be involved in
the protocol such as old/new owner, tag, attacker, or TTP [44]. In the following analysis,
we use some of the definitions and lemmas provided in [44]. We analyze the security of
the authentication phase only. The analysis of the other two phases is either part of or
identical to that of the authentication phase.
Let Tname Tname be the set of names such as RID1 and RID 2 R ID1 , R ID2 ,and

Key Keyx is the set of keys known by the principal x . Let m be a message and

K

IDS

IDS

is a key,

then we represent the encryption of message m using K as mk {m}K . Also, K 1 is the
corresponding decryption key of K . Now, for simplicity, we rewrite messages A, B, C
and D :
A  rnd1  {K , RID1}K A1  {K , RID 2 }K A 2 ;

(1)

B  rnd2  {K , rnd1}KB ;

(2)

C  {rnd1, RID1}KC1  {rnd 2, RID 2 }KC 2 ;

(3)

D  {K * , IDS *}KD ,

(4)

where K A11 , K A21 , K B 1 , KC11 , KC 21 and K D 1 are unknown to all the principals because of
the one-way property of PRNG function. We can show that under the following
Assumption 1, this presentation is equivalent to the original one in Figure 2.1 in the sense
of security.
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Assumption 1: If y  PRNG( x) and y is known to a principal P , then the
probability that P is able to compute the value of x is negligible.
According to EPC Gen2v2 standards [2], the PRNG function shall meet the
following randomness criteria:
1) The probability P that any RN16 has value RN16  j , for any j , should be bounded by

0.8 / 216  P  1.25 / 216.
2) For a tag population of up to 10,000 tags, the probability that any two or more tags
simultaneously generate the same sequence of RN16s shall be less than 0.1%.
3) An RN16 drawn from a Tag’s PRNG 10ms after the rise time shall not be predictable
with a probability greater than 0.025% if the outcomes of prior draws from the PRNG,
performed under identical conditions, are known.
In our protocol, the 96-bit random number consisting of six 16-bit random numbers
is used which means that the probabilities defined in the above criteria are much smaller
(new probability P ' equals to P 6 , not just 6P ). Therefore, this assumption is reasonable.
Taking the computation of message A as an example, we can conclude that even if a
penetrator managed to get the value of both PRNG( K  RID1 ) and PRNG( K  RID 2 ) (in fact
he can only know the XOR results of them), by Assumption 1, he still cannot compute the
value of K , RID1 and RID 2 .
Next, we will introduce the definition of the proposed ownership transfer strand
space SOT .
Definition 2: An infiltrated strand space  ,  is an SOT space if it is the union of
three kinds of strands:
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1) Penetrator strands s  , the set of keys known by P is KeyP ;
2) “Initiator strands” s  Init[ K , rnd1, rnd 2, RID1 , RID 2 ] with trace:
 {RID1RID 2 }, {IDS}, {ABC},  D  ,

where A, B, C, and D are defined in (1) to (4) and the sign “+” means sending out a
message while “-” means receiving. The principal associated with this strand is the old
owner. We will use Init[] to denote the set of all the strands shown above. The set of
keys known by Init is KeyI .
3) Complementary “responder strands” s  Resp[ K , rnd1, rnd 2, RID1 , RID 2 ] with trace:
 {RID1RID 2 }, {IDS}, {ABC},  D  .

The principal associated with this strand is the tag. Similarly we will use Resp[] to
denote the set of all the strands shown above. The set of keys known by Resp is KeyR .
Figure 3.1 shows the strand space representation of the proposed ownership transfer
protocol. In the next two parts, we prove the two aspects of correctness respectively:
authentication and secrecy.
3.1. AUTHENTICATION
In [45], G. Lowe introduces four reasonable meanings of the word “authentication.”
They are, from the weakest to the strongest, aliveness, weak agreement, Non-injective
agreement and agreement. In this paper, we prove that the proposed protocol satisfies the
strongest definition: agreement.
Definition 3 (Agreement [45]): A protocol guarantees to an initiator A agreement
with a responder B on a set of data items if, whenever A completes a run of the protocol,
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apparently with B , which apparently has previously been running the protocol with A as a
responder. If the two agents agreed on the data values corresponding to all the variables in
the data items, and each such run of A corresponds to a unique run of B .

Initiator

Responder
Query, RID1, RID2

IDS
Generate rnd1,rnd2
Calculate ABC

A,B,C
Retrieve rnd1, rnd2
Calculate C’

Calculate D’

If C=C’
Update K, IDS
Calculate D

D
If D=D’
Update K, IDS

Figure 3.1. Strand space representation of the proposed protocol.

It should be noticed that this definition only guarantees to an initiator agreement
with a responder. To complete the proof of the authentication, it is also necessary to prove
that the protocol guarantees to a responder agreement with an initiator. We will start with
the proof of the latter one. Additionally, since the first two data exchanges {RID1RID 2 , IDS}
are broadcasted in the form of cleartext and do not contain any secrets, we will not include
them in the following analysis.
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Proposition 1: Suppose
1)  is a SOT strand space,  is a bundle in  , and s is a responder strand in s  Resp[]
2) K A11 , K A21 , K B 1 , KC11 , KC 21 and K D 1 are unknown to all the principals. K  KeyP .
3) rnd1 and rnd 2 originate uniquely in  .
If all the variables agree ( C  C ' and D  D ' ), then  contains a unique initiator’s
strand t  Init[] .
This proposition is illustrated in Figure 3.2. We will use two lemmas to prove this
proposition. Throughout the remainder of this section, we will fix an arbitrary  and let 
, s , K A11 , K A21 , K B 1 , KC11 , KC 21 , K D 1 , rnd1 and rnd 2 satisfy the hypotheses of
Proposition 1.
Lemma 1: Let n be the node from which rnd1 and rnd 2 uniquely originate in  . If
C  C ' , then n belongs to Init[] and term(n)  {ABC} . In addition, to distinguish, we

will later designate this particular node n as ni1 .
Proof: Let n  be the node that proceeds nr1 immediately. ( n  may be a penetrator
doing replay attack.) Then term(n )  {ABC} . From (3) together with the assumption that
KC11 and KC 2 1 are unknown, we have rnd1, rnd 2, and K  {ABC} and thus

rnd1, rnd 2, K  term(n )

(5)

Now if we can show “ K  term(n) ” then we are able to conclude that n  Init[] .
This is because 1) K  Key P which implies that n  P ; 2) Although K  Key R , rnd1 and
rnd 2 do not originate from Resp[] according to (5). Based on the definition of node n , it

follows that n  Resp[] . Therefore, the problem becomes to prove K  term(n) .
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Now we assume K  term(n) ; from (5) we know K  term(n ) , then there exists
at least one node n ' that proceeds n  from which K uniquely originates and hence

K  term(n ') . Since K  Key P , it follows that n ' lies either in the responder’s or the
initiator’s strand. However, according to the definition of SOT strand space, the form of K
is either rnd1  {K , RID1}K  {K , RID 2}K or rnd2  {K , rnd1}KB where rnd1 and rnd 2 are
A1

A2

fresh. In other words, rnd1 and rnd 2 also originate from n ' , which contradicts with the fact
that rnd1 and rnd 2 originate from n . Therefore, we have K  term(n) and hence n  Init[] .

Responder

Initiator

ni1

A,B,C

A,B,C

...

n

+

nr1
Retrieve rnd1, rnd2
Calculate C’

nr2

Calculate D’

D

ni2

D
...

If C=C’
Update K, IDS
Calculate D

nr3

If D=D’
Update K, IDS

Figure 3.2. Illustration of Lemma 1 and 2.

Moreover, “ rnd1 and rnd 2 originate from n ” also gives the conclusion that the sign
of term(n) is positive (Lemma 2.8 in [44]). Together with n  Init[] and the structure of
SOT , we can get that term(n)  {ABC} .
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Lemma 2: Upon receiving D if the node n is able to update K and IDS , then n
belongs to Init[] and ni1 (defined in Lemma 1) proceeds node n . In addition, we designate
this particular node n as ni 2
Proof: If the node n in Init[] is able to update K and IDS , then D  D ' . Since

D  {K * , IDS *}KD where K D 1 is unknown to all principals, it follows that node n must have
K * and IDS * in the form of cleartext. Then there are two possibilities:
1) rnd1, rnd 2, K  term(n) in the form of cleartext. Node n computes K * and IDS * by
itself.
2) Node n receives the cleartext K * and IDS * from another node n ' . Then
term(n ')  {K * , IDS *} . From the form, we can tell that n ' does not belong to a regular

strand, hence n '  P . Therefore we have K  KeyP which contradicts with the
assumption.
Therefore, only case i) holds and thus n  Init[] . From rnd1, rnd 2  term(n)
together with the fact that rnd1 and rnd 2 originates uniquely from node ni1 , it follows that
ni1 proceeds n . Proposition 1 now follows immediately from Lemmas 1 and 2. Note that

the uniqueness is also proved by the conclusion of “ ni1 proceeds node n ” because ni1 is the
node that rnd1 and rnd 2 uniquely originate from. Next we will prove the other side of the
authentication: agreement property for the SOT initiator.
Proposition 2: Suppose
1)  is a SOT strand space,  is a bundle in  , and s is a initiator strand in s  Init[]
2) K A11 , K A21 , K B 1 , KC11 , KC 21 and K D 1 are unknown to all the principals.
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3) rnd1 and rnd 2 originate uniquely in  .
If the all the variables agree ( C  C ' and D  D ' ), then  contains a unique
responder’s strand t  Resp[] .
Similarly, we will use two lemmas to prove Proposition 2.
Lemma 3: Let n be the node in which D originates from in  . If D  D ' for the
node ni 2 (defined in Lemma 2), then n belongs to Resp[] . In addition, we designate this
particular node n as nr 3
Proof: The proof of this lemma is almost identical to the proof for Lemma 2.
Basically we will show that {K * , IDS *}  term(n) in the form of cleartext. Then it follows
that K  term(n) . Thus we eliminates the case that n  P . Again since the sign of term(n)
is positive, together with the form of SOT we are able to conclude that n belongs to Resp[].
Lemma 4: There exists a unique node n in Resp[] proceeding nr 3 , such that

term(n)  {ABC} , where ABC is given in Lemma 1. In addition, we designate this
particular node n as nr1 .
Proof: In Lemma 3 we have shown that {rnd1, rnd 2, K}  term(nr 3 ) . Let n be the
minimal

member of node nr 3 in Resp[] . Then by the definition of

minimal

[44], we have

{rnd1, rnd 2, K}  term(n) . Since rnd1 and rnd 2 uniquely originate in  from node ni1
which is proven in Lemma 1, then we have this relationship
{rnd1, rnd 2, K } 
ni1  n

(6)
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Therefore the sign of term(n) is negative. Given that n  Resp[], exploring all the
forms of responder strands, we have term(n)  {ABC} . Since { ABC} is computed directly
based on rnd1 and rnd 2 , it follows that { ABC} also originates uniquely from node ni1 .
Hence { ABC} in term(n) is the same term that originated from ni1 .
Proposition 2 follows directly from Lemma 3 and 4. And together with Proposition
1, we have completed the proof of authentication.
3.2. SECRECY
Definition 5 (Secrecy [46]): A message m is considered secret if in every bundle of
the protocol the penetrator cannot receive m in clear text. In other words, there exists no
node n such that term(n) = m.
Proof of secrecy for the proposed protocol is straightforward because of special
treatment with the secret key K . From (1) to (4) we can see that, in all messages, every
sub-term

containing

K is

in

the

form

of {K , }Kˆ

where K̂ belongs

to

{K A11 , K A21 , K B 1 , K D 1} and is unknown to all principals. Therefore, under Assumption 1,

we can guarantee the secrecy of K .
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4. COMPARISON WITH RELATED PROTOCOLS

The previous section confirmed the correctness of the protocol. Given the proven
authentication process and secrecy of data, the protocol is guaranteed to resist the tag
impersonation, reader impersonation, replay, and MitM attacks. Such resistance of attacks
is an essential requirement in authentication and ownership management protocols.
However, there are several other distinctive requirements for any authentication
and ownership management protocol. These requirements include forward and backward
privacy, desynchronization and windowing avoidance, and location privacy. To perform a
comparison between the proposed ownership management protocol and the previous work,
we give an analysis of the protocol in terms of these requirements.
1) Backward privacy: An important aspect to consider with ownership transfer is the
privacy of the new owner. The old owner should not be able to update the secret keys
in order to have copies of the keys of the new owner. In the proposed protocol, the use
of TTP guarantees that only the new owner can update the keys. The access of the old
owner is permanently revoked upon ownership transfer.
2) Forward privacy: Similarly, the new owner of the tag should not be able to deduce the
keys that were used by the old owner. If such a case arises, then all previous transactions
can be decrypted, which violates the privacy of the old owner. In the proposed protocol,
the key update operations depend on the PRNG function which is irreversible. This
guarantees that the no message exchanges prior to the ownership transfer would be
decrypted.
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3) Desynchronization avoidance: The desynchronization problem cannot be completely
prevented because the adversary can always choose to block the last conformation
message and consequently one party updates the keys while the other one does not. Our
solution is that the TTP should always keep a copy of the previous secret keys and the
corresponding tag IDS in case of confronting desynchronization attacks. In that case,
the new owner will not be able to authenticate the tag and then TTP should attempt to
resend the key update message until the ownership transfer succeeds.
4) Windowing avoidance: The windowing problem occurs when the new and old owner
share possession of the same keys within the same timeslot. Both parties would have
access to the tag and problems may arise if, for example, the ownership transfer is
interrupted. In such a case, both parties would have access to the tag and can act as its
owners. In the proposed protocol, the old owner and the new owner never possess the
master key at the same time.
5) Location privacy: Instead of using the unique and life-long static identifier EPC, the
proposed protocol uses IDS which is updated after every successful authentication. As
a result, the adversary cannot identify the location of the target tag.
A comparison with previous related work is shown in Table. 4.1, where a “Y”
means the scheme satisfies the requirement while an “N” indicates the opposite. From the
table it can be concluded that among the non-EPC-compliant protocols, Kapoor’s [27] has
the best performance but it still suffers from the windowing problem and is not suitable for
low-cost RFID tags due to the use of hash functions. On the other hand, the existing EPC
compliant protocols either fail to provide backward privacy or are vulnerable to replay
attack because of using CRC as the encryption method. In contrast, the proposed protocol
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not only conforms to the EPC standards, but also satisfies the security requirements.
Furthermore, our protocol also supports delegation, which is desirable in many scenarios
where temporal ownership sharing is needed.

Table 4.1. Comparison with previous related work [43].
Schemes
EPC compliant
Support delegation
Resist replay attack
Location privacy
Backward privacy
Desynchronization
Windowing

[24]
[27]
[34] [34] [37]
Osaka Kapoor Song Seo Chen
N
N
N
Y
Y
Y
N
N
N
N
Y
Y
N
N
N
Y
Y
N
Y
Y
N
Y
Y
N
Y
N
Y
N
Y
Y
N
N
N
Y
Y

Our
scheme
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
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5. HARDWARE IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION

In this section, the proposed authentication and ownership management protocol is
implemented and evaluated in hardware. Since the new EPC Gen2v2 protocol was ratified
very recently, there is no reader available in the market supporting the new standard yet.
Our solution is to use a Gen2v1 RFID tag and emulate the Gen2v2-only commands
(“Authenticate”, “KeyUpdate”) by using the “BlockWrite” and “Read” commands. Note
that “BlockWrite” command allows the reader to send as long as 256 words of data to the
tag and therefore is capable of emulating the above Gen2v2-only commands. As these
commands take similar amounts of bits, theoretically the differences in terms of processing
time and energy consumption are negligible.
5.1. IMPLEMENTATION DETAILS
The mutual authentication and OT is executed through the use of
command/response set defined by the EPC Gen2v2 standard as shown in Figure 5.1. The
current (old) owner sends “select” and “query” command (and “QueryAdjust”,
“QueryRep” commands, if necessary) in order to identify the target tag from a large
population of tags. As a result, the target tag replies with a new 16-bit random number
RN16 and transfers its state from “ready” to “reply”. Note that before identifying the target
tag, a probabilistic collision management method is adopted as specified in the standards
while after identifying the target tag, RN16 works as a kind of session ID indicating a
specified tag to avoid collision. Then the reader issues an ACK command containing the
same RN16 and the tag replies with its IDS and other information, which can be found in
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the EPC Gen2v2 standard specifications. Upon receiving the “Req_RN” with the correct
RN16 and access key, the tag backscatters the new RN16 and enters the “open” state.

Tag

Reader

“Ready” state
Select

Set inventoried flag

Query/QueryAdjust/QuerRep

Adjust slot number,
enter “reply” state

New RN16
ACK
IDS

Enter “acknowledged” state

Req_RN
New RN16

Enter “open” state

Authenticate
Response

Enter “secure” state

KeyUpdate

Figure 5.1. Mutual authentication under EPC Gen2v2 standard [43].

Next, we make use of the “Authenticate” and “KeyUpdate” commands, which are
newly introduced in EPC Gen2v2, to complete the mutual authentication phase. As
specified in [2], the “Authenticate” command should contain fields listed in Table 5.1. In
particular, we define the contents of “message” field in the “Authenticate” command as
described in Table 5.2. The “command ID” is used to indicate that this command will send
the necessary security parameters (RID, A, B…) and start the authentication phase.
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Table 5.1. Authenticate command [2][43].
Command RFU, SenRep… Length Message RN CRC
# of bits
8
…
12
variable 16 16
Comments 11010101
Details in EPC Gen2v2 standards[2]

Table 5.2. “Message” field in “authenticate” command [43].
Command ID RID1 RID2 A B C
# of bits
8
96
96
96 96 96
Comments
00000001
Details in Figure 2.1

The value D is contained in the response message of the “Authenticate” command,
as described in Table 5.3. A non-zero value in the “status” field indicates that the tag has
retrieved the nonces and computed the new key and IDS. Upon receiving a response with
the “status” of success, the reader will compute D’ in the same manner of computing D.

Table 5.3. Response message of the “authenticate” command [43].
Command Status Length Message RN16 CRC
ID
# of bits
8
2
10
96
16
16
Comments 00000010
D
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If D equals to D’, then the tag is authenticated. Consequently, the reader issues a
“KeyUpdate” command to the tag for confirmation. As a result, the tag commits to the
newly computed key and IDS for future uses.
The implementation details of the delegation phase and the ownership transfer
phase under EPC Gen2v2 framework are omitted as it is similar to what we have presented
in the authentication phase.
A common RFID platform presented in [44] is chosen to implement and analyze
the proposed protocol. Operating in the UHF frequency range, this platform is designed
based on the Wireless Identification and Sensing Platform (WISP), developed by Intel
Research Seattle [44]. Similar to the WISP tags, the program running in the modified
WISP tags is also written strictly conforming to the EPC Gen2v1 standard [1]. Therefore,
the tag can communicate with most of the off-the-shelf UHF RFID readers.
On the modified WISP tag, shown in Figure 5.2, a “bow tie” antenna and a fourorder Dickson charging pump are adopted to convert the RF signal to DC power to support
the whole on-board circuitry. The 16-bit microprocessor MSP430F2132 has an ultra-low
power consumption (only 600µA at 1.8V and 4MHz). It can execute an instruction in as
little as 0.25µs.
Further, the 1Mbit EEPROM 24AA1026 embedded only on the modified WISP
tags ensures enough space for storing the data such as secret keys. Therefore, these features
including its ability of re-programming, relatively strong computation capacity, and large
memory space make it a decent platform to evaluate customized protocols. In fact, the
WISP tag was utilized to demonstrate the feasibility or performance of security protocols
[49], [49]. Figure 5.3 shows the software structure of our experimental platform.
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Figure 5.2. Modified WISP: Class-1 Generation-2 UHF passive RFID tag platform.

Authentication and Ownership
Management Protocol
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Low Level Reader Protocol
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Laptop

Authentication and
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Protocol

IAR
Workbench
For MSP430

Ethernet

Reader

Tag

Laptop
(For Debug &
Download)

Figure 5.3. Software structure of the evaluation platform.

On the reader side, the protocol is implemented with Java in Eclipse, above the
“Reader library” and “LLRP [50]” layers. On the tag side, we implement the proposed
protocol in a higher level in order to stay compliant with the EPC standards. The IAR
Workbench for MSP430 is used for debugging and downloading the program. The reader
used in the experiments is Impinj Speedway Revolution R220, with transmission power set
to 30dBm with a receiving sensitivity set to -70dBm.
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5.2. OT OPERATION TIME, WITH SUFFICIENT ENERGY
First, it is of interest to measure the execution time for a complete ownership
transfer process when there is sufficient energy on the tag. To do this, the tag is placed as
close as 0.5m away from the reader antenna to ensure it can harvest enough energy.
Note that no matter how complicated one protocol is, it can be broken into steps
that belong to one of the four categories: a) computation on tags, b) computation on readers
(here consider TTP as a reader), c) data exchange between tags and readers ( T  R ), d)
data exchange between two different readers ( R  R ). The results are presented in Table
5.4.
In our case, both the computation on readers and data exchange between two
different readers can be negligible. From the results presented in Table 5.4. It can be seen
that the total time of on-tag computation plus the data exchange between the reader and the
tag is Ttag = 146.14ms, which is quite close to the actual measured total time Ttotal =
167.28ms.

Table 5.4. Measured time and instruction cycles.
Notation
NTR
TTR
Tauth
Ttran
Ttag
Ttotal

Definition
Number of T  R rounds
Time for each T  R round
Time of computation during authentication phase
Time of computation on tag during OT phase
Ttag = NTR* TTR+ Tauth+ Ttran
Actual measured total time

Value
3
43.16ms
12.39ms
4.27ms
146.14ms
167.28ms

Cycles
37170
12810
-
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In fact, the time spent for the on-tag computation is only 16.66ms (49980
instruction cycles @ 3MHz) for the authentication and ownership transfer phase and 10.83
for the delegation phase (32490 instruction cycles @ 3MHz), which confirms the ultralightweight property of the proposed protocol.
5.3. OT OPERATION TIME, WITH INSUFFICIENT ENERGY
Since passive RFID tags are powered by the RF signal emitted by the reader
antenna, the energy being harvested decreases when moving away from the antenna. It is
also of interest to measure the execution time when there is insufficient energy. For this
purpose, the tag is placed at different distances away from the reader antenna and the
corresponding number of successful ownership transfer sessions per minute is taken. In
contrast, the experiments are repeated using the same tag running the protocol, with all the
computations eliminated. In other words, the control group only executes instructions to
perform the same number of data exchanges.
From Figure 5.4, it can be seen that when the distance is within 1m, the number of
successful ownership transfer session per minute is almost constant because enough energy
has been harvested within this short distance. As the distance increases, the number of
successful ownership transfer sessions goes down due to failure of data exchange when
there is insufficient power.
As a consequence, the reader will either start over a new ownership transfer session
or request for a retransmission, which both consume longer time. When the distance is
larger than 3m, the proposed protocol with or without computation can only be executed
for a very limited number of sessions due to the lack of energy.
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Figure 5.4. Number of successful OT sessions per minute.

However, the most important conclusion is that, if one compares the two curves
with each other, the number of sessions executed per minute for the proposed protocol with
computation is only slightly less than that the one without computation, which shows that
the on-tag computation involved due to the proposed protocol is insignificant.
5.4. OT OF MULTIPLE TAGS, WITH SUFFICIENT ENERGY
In most applications, there may be more than one tag whose ownerships should be
transferred. The previous analysis focused on a single tag ownership transfer. However, it
is of interest to investigate the performance when multiple tags are exchanged, given that
collisions or interference may happen.
In this experiment, we place the tags at a distance of 0.5 m from the reader antenna.
The maximum number of tags in this test is 13 in order to ensure that each tag receives
sufficient energy from the reader antenna. We initially start with one tag and add more tags
until we reach the maximum of 13 tags. For each set of present tags, we measure the
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number of successful ownership transfer sessions. For comparative purposes, we also
examine the performance with and without the cryptographic computations of the protocol.
The results are shown in Figure 5.5. From Figure 5.5, it is evident that as the number of
tags increases, the number of successful ownership transfer session decreases. This drop is
due to the added extra time caused by the reader when it isolates one specific tag from all
the tag population. However, the drop is not that significant in terms of performance. For
example, in the case of the protocol without the computations the drop in the successful
sessions is about 5.6% and for that with the computation the reduction reaches 2.7%.

Figure 5.5. Number of successful OT sessions per minute for multiple tags.

The added time when multiple tags are present has a minimal effect on the
performance, especially when compared with the average time for one complete ownership
transfer process. This is because as specified in [2], once the reader has identified one
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certain tag, it will append a unique handle (called “RN16”) at the end of each following
message exchange such that the other tags will not respond back, in order to reduce time.
This inherent property in the standard results in a favorable performance that meets the
requirement to serve multiple tags with the least possible delay.
5.5. LOCATION PRIVACY
As mentioned before, we propose the use of IDS to protect location privacy by
updating the IDS after each authentication session. Therefore, it is of interest to examine
the degree of difference between the old and updated IDS. To do this, we ran 200
consecutive authentication sessions and recorded each IDS as IDSi, where i = 1, 2, …, 200.
We consider HDavg ,cons , as the running average of the Hamming distance between
the current IDS and all previous values. This is computed as
N 1

HDavg ,cons  ( N  1)1  H ( IDSi , IDSi 1 )

(7)

i 1

where H(x, y) is the Hamming distance of two 96-bit binary number x and y. This metric
measures the difficulty for the attacker to deduce the pattern of IDS generating function
from the past message exchanges. The results are plotted in Figure 5.6 against the actual
Hamming weight values recorded for each of the 200 authentication sessions. We see from
the Figure 5.6 that the running average of the Hamming distance for all pairs of IDS
converges to 48, indicating a good degree of randomness. This tells us that any new IDS
value will have around 48 bit positions, on average, that differ from the previous IDS value.
This is further supported by looking at the actual Hamming weight in Figure 5.6.
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Figure 5.6. Hamming weight of IDS values and average of Hamming distance.

For consecutive pairs, we see a fluctuation in the Hamming weight above or below
the overall average for consecutive pairs, which is essential to deny an attacker the chance
of tracking the tag. The Hamming weight for the IDS values ranges from 36 to as high as
67. As a result, the attacker cannot determine the presence of the tag by analyzing the
values of IDS. Next the reader impersonation aspect is considered.
5.6. READER IMPERSONATION
In this scenario, the attacker impersonates an owner attempting to deceive the tag
to believe that the attacker is authentic. Assuming the IDS of the tag has been disclosed,
the attacker generates two random numbers (rnd1, rnd2), guesses a secret key, computes
the values of A, B, and C, and sends them to the tag. Upon receiving A and B, the tag
retrieves rnd1 and rnd2 using the authentic secret key, then computes the value of C’. The
tag is compromised if C equals to C’. Note that the attacker does not necessarily have to
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possess the exact authentic key to make C’=C. In some circumstances, if the protocol is
not well designed, some other different values other than the authentic key could also result
in C’=C, this is normally referred to as a collision.
If such a scenario happens, the tag will update its secret keys and IDS although the
actual owner has not initiated the session. Thus, the owner and the tag will be
desynchronized. Therefore, it is of interest to examine how long it takes the attacker to
compromise the tag. Note that it is unrealistic to measure the elapsed time if the length of
all data units is 96 bits as it takes too long. To solve this, we truncate the data length to 16
bits, measure the elapsed time, and based on that, estimate the theoretical time for when
the data units are 96-bit long. We repeat the attack 50 times and compute the average time
for compromise. The results are shown in Figure 5.7, where we see when the length of all
data is 16 bits; the average time to compromise the tag is 18 hours, on average.

Figure 5.7. Compromise time for 50 iterations of the brute force attack.
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As shown before, in an authentication round, the computation takes much less time
than the wireless messages exchange. Therefore, if we assume that the time for computing
96-bit long numbers (A, B…) is very close to that for computing 16-bit long numbers, we
roughly estimate that the time for the attacker to compromise the tag through brute force
when the data units are 96-bit long is (18 / 216 )  (296 )  2.11025 hours.
Therefore, it is safe the say that the proposed protocol is able to resist against the
reader impersonation attacks.
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6. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK

In this paper, a new EPC Gen2v2 compatible protocol by using limited
cryptographic functionality was presented for mutual authentication and ownership
management. This was done by employing the ultra-lightweight permutation operation
and the PRNG function. Such use of a simple operation adds a minimal level of
computation and energy consumption while, at the same time, supports the cryptographic
goals of the protocol.
The protocol was examined both from a security point of view as well as with a
hardware implementation. The analysis indicated that the transactions in the protocol do
not expose the secret key information nor does the protocol depend on previously used
secret keys, thus guaranteeing that replay or disclosure attacks are not possible. The
comparison with previous work shows that the proposed protocol not only conforms to the
EPC standards, but also satisfies the security requirements. The hardware implementation
supports our initial goal of adding security to the existing EPC Gen2v2 based tags such
that the system would be secure both in the case of being used by a single owner or in the
more practical cases of having multiple owners during the lifetime of a tagged item.
The next steps in this work include examining the use of various ultra-lightweight
or lightweight functions that would possibly fit on the very limited number of gate elements
on the tag.

55
7. REFERENCES

[1]

EPC Radio-Frequency Identity Protocols, Class-1 Generation-2 UHF RFID
Protocol for Communications at 860 MHz–960 MHz, Version 1.2.0, EPC Global,
2008.

[2]

EPC Radio-Frequency Identity Protocols, Class-1 Generation-2 UHF RFID
Protocol for Communications at 860 MHz–960 MHz, Version 2.0.0, EPC Global,
Nov., 2013.

[3]

A. Juels and S. Weiss, “Authenticating pervasive devices with human protocols,”
In Proc. Advances in Cryptology (CRYPTO 2005), Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, vol. 3621, pp. 293–308, 2005.

[4]

M. Feldhofer and C. Recberger, “A case against currently used hash functions in
RFID protocols,” in RFID Sec, 2006.

[5]

A. Juels, “RFID security and privacy: A research survey,” IEEE Journal on Selected
Areas in Commun, vol. 24, no. 2, pp. 381-394, Feb. 2006.

[6]

H.-Y. Chien, “SASI: A new ultralightweight RFID authentication protocol
providing strong authentication and strong integrity,” IEEE Transactions on
Dependable and Secure Computing, vol. 4, no. 4, pp. 337-340, Oct.-Dec. 2007.

[7]

M. Morshed, A. Atkins, and Y. Hongnian, “Privacy and security protection of RFID
data in e-passport,” The 5th International Conference on Software, Knowledge
Information, Industrial Management and Applications (SKIMA), Sept. 2011.

[8]

M. Wang, Y. Tang, F. Shi, and J. Pan, “An effective RFID authentication protocol,”
the 2nd International Conference on Consumer Electronics, Communications and
Networks (CECNet), pp. 141-144, 2012.

[9]

Y. S. Lee, T. Y. Kim, and H. J. Lee, “Mutual authentication protocol for enhanced
RFID security and anti-counterfeiting,” the 26th International Conference on
Advanced Information Networking and Applications Workshops (WAINA), pp.
558-563, March 2012.

[10]

M. Feldhofer, S. Dominikus, and J. Wolkerstorfer, “Strong authentication for RFID
systems using the AES algorithm,” Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and
Embedded System, M. Joye and J.-J. Quisquater, Eds. New York: Springer-Verlag,
2004, vol. 3156, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. 357–370.

[11]

Y. Oren and M. Feldhofer, “A low-resource public-key identification scheme for
RFID tags and sensor nodes,” the 2nd ACM Conference on Wireless Network
Security (WiSec '09), pp. 59-68, 2009.

56
[12]

M. Braun, E. Hess, and B. Meyer, “Using elliptic curves on RFID Tags,”
International Journal of Computer Science and Network Security, Vol. 8, No. 2, pp.
1-9, 2008.

[13]

M. David and N. Prasad, “Providing strong security and high privacy in low-cost
RFID networks,” Security and Privacy in Mobile Information and Communication
Systems (MobiSec 2009), pp. 172–179.

[14]

P. Peris-Lopez, J. Hernandez-Castro, A. Tapiador, and A. Ribagorda, “Advances
in ultralightweight cryptography for low-cost RFID tags: Gossamer protocol,” 9th
International Workshop on Information Security Applications, 56-68, 2009.

[15]

P. D’Arco and A. De Santis, “On ultralightweight RFID authentication protocols,”
IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing, vol. 8, no. 4, pp. 548563, July-Aug. 2011.

[16]

Y. Tian, G. Chen, and J. Li. “A new ultralightweight RFID authentication protocol
with permutation,” IEEE Communications Letters, Vol. 16, No. 5, pp. 702-705,
May 2012.

[17]

H.-Y. Chien and C.-H. Chen, “Mutual authentication protocol for RFID
conforming to EPC class 1 generation 2 standards,” Computer Standards &
Interfaces, vol. 29, no. 2, pp. 254-259, 2007.

[18]

D. Han and D. Kwon, “Vulnerability of an RFID authentication protocol
conforming to EPC class 1 generation 2 standards,” Computer Standards &
Interfaces, vol. 31, pp. 648-652, 2009.

[19]

P. Peris-Lopez, J. Hernandez-Castro, A. Tapiador, and A. Ribagorda,
“Cryptanalysis of a novel authentication protocol conforming to EPC-C1G2
standard,” Computer Standards & Interfaces, vol. 31, pp. 372-380, 2009.

[20]

P. Peris-Lopez, J. Hernandez-Castro, A. Tapiador, and J. van der Lubbe,
“Cryptanalysis of an EPC class-1 generation-2 standard compliant authentication
protocol,” Engineering Application of Artificial Intelligence, vol. 24, pp. 10611069, 2011.

[21]

C.-H. Chen and Y.-Y. Deng, “Conformation of EPC class 1 generation 2 standards
RFID system with mutual authentication and privacy protection,” Engineering
Application of Artificial Intelligence, vol. 22, pp. 1284-1291, 2009.

[22]

M. Safkhani, N. Bagheri, and M. Naderi, “Strengthening the security of EPC c-1 g2 RFID standard,” Wireless Personal Communications, Vol. 72, No. 2, pp 12951308, 2013.

57
[23]

J. Saito, K. Imamoto, and K. Sakurai, “Reassignment Scheme of an RFID Tag’s
Key for Owner Transfer,” In T. Enokido, L. Yan, B. Xiao, D. Kim, Y. Dai, and L.T.
Yang, editors, Embedded and Ubiquitous Computing – EUC 2005 Workshops,
LNCS volume 3823, pp. 1303–1312, Springer, Berlin, November 2005.

[24]

D. Molnar, A. Soppera, and D. Wagner, “A Scalable, Delegatable Pseudonym
Protocol Enabling Ownership Transfer of RFID Tags,” SAC, vol. 3897, pp. 276290, 2006.

[25]

S. Fouladgar, and H. Afifi, “A Simple Privacy Protecting Scheme Enabling
Delegation and Ownership Transfer for RFID Tags,” Journal of Communications
2, no. 6, 2007.

[26]

K. Osaka, T. Takagi, K. Yamazaki, O. Takahashi, “An efficient and secure RFID
security method with ownership transfer,” International Conference
on Computational Intelligence and Security, vol. 2, pp.1090-1095, 2006.

[27]

G. Kapoor and S. Piramuthu, “Single RFID tag ownership transfer protocols,”
IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, Part C: Applications and
Reviews, Vol. 42, No. 2, pp. 164-173, March 2012.

[28]

H.-B. Chen, W.-B. Lee, Y.-H. Zhao, and Y.-L. Chen, “Enhancement of the RFID
security method with ownership transfer,” Proceedings of the 3rd International
Conference on Ubiquitous Information Management and Communication, pp. 251254, 2009.

[29]

S. Koralalage, S. Mohammed Reza, J. Miura, Y. Goto, and J. Cheng, “POP method:
an approach to enhance the security and privacy of RFID systems used in product
lifecycle with an anonymous ownership transferring mechanism,” Proceedings of
the 2007 ACM symposium on Applied computing, pp. 270-275, 2007.

[30]

C. Lim and T. Kwon, “Strong and robust RFID authentication enabling perfect
ownership transfer,” Conference on Information and Communications Security –
ICICS’06, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 4307, pp. 1–20, 2006.

[31]

A. Fernandez-Mir, R. Rasua, J. Roca, and J. Ferrer, “A Scalable RFID
Authentication Protocol Supporting Ownership Transfer and Controlled
Delegation. RFID,” Security and Privacy, LNCS, Volume 7055, pp.147-162, 2012.

[32]

T. Dimitriou, “rfidDOT: RFID delegation and ownership transfer made simple,”
Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Security and privacy in
communication networks. article , no 34, 2008

[33]

H. Lei and T. Cao, “RFID protocol enabling ownership transfer to protect against
traceability and DoS attacks,” The First International Symposium on Data, Privacy,
and E-Commerce, 2007. pp. 508-510, 2007.

58
[34]

B. Song. RFID Tag Ownership Transfer. In Workshop on RFID Security
RFIDSec’08, Budapest, Hungary, July 2008.

[35]

L. Kuseng, Z. Yu, Y. Wei, and Y. Guan, “Lighweight mutual authentication and
ownership transfer for RFID systems,” inProc. IEEE INFOCOM 2010, pp. 1–5,
2010.

[36]

Y. Seo, T. Asano, H. Lee, and K. Kim, “A lightweight protocol enabling ownership
transfer and granular data access of RFID tags,” Proceedings of the Symposium on
Cryptography and Information Security, pp. 1–7, 2007.

[37]

R. Doss, Z. Wanlei, and Y. Shui, “Secure RFID tag ownership transfer based on
quadratic residues,” IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, vol.
8, no. 2, pp. 390-401, 2013.

[38]

C.-L. Chen and C.-F. Chien, “An ownership transfer scheme using mobile RFIDs,”
Wireless Personal Communications, 2012.

[39]

H. Li, J. Hu, L. He, and L. Pang, “Mutual Authentication and Ownership Transfer
Scheme Conforming to EPC-C1G2 Standard,” 8th international conference on CIS,
Guangzhou, 2012.

[40]

X. Fu and Y. Guo, “A Lightweight RFID Mutual Authentication Protocol with
Ownership Transfer,” Advances in Wireless Sensor Networks Communications in
Computer and Information Science Volume 334, pp 68-74, 2013.

[41]

C. Chen, Y. Huang, and J. Jiang, “A secure ownership transfer protocol using
EPCglobal Gen-2 RFID,” Telecommunication System, Volume 53, Issue 4, pp 387399, 2013.

[42]

J. Munilla, G. Fuchun, and S. Willy, “Cryptanalysis of an EPCC1G2 standard
compliant ownership transfer scheme,” Wireless Personal Communications, pp. 114, 2013.

[43]

H. Niu, E. Taqieddin, and S. Jagannathan, “A Gen2v2 compliant RFID
authentication and ownership management protocol,” IEEE 39th Conference on
Local Computer Networks (LCN), 2014.

[44]

F. J. Thayer, J. C. Herzog, and J. D. Guttman, Strand spaces: Why is a security
protocol correct? Proc. 19th IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pages 96–
109. IEEE Computer Society, 1998.

[45]

G. Lowe, A heirarchy of authentication specifications. 10th Computer Securiy
Foundations Workshop Proceedings, pages 31-43. IEEE Computer Society Press,
1997.

59
[46]

Y. Li and J. Pang, “An Inductive Approach to Strand Spaces, Formal Aspects of
Computing,” vol. 25, issue 4 , pp. 465-501, 2013.

[47]

H. Niu and S. Jagannathan, “High memory passive RFID tags with multimodal
sensor design and application to asset monitoring in-transit,” IEEE International
Instrumentation and Measurement Technology Conference, May 2013.

[48]

A. P. Sample, D. J. Yeager, P. S. Powledge, A. V. Mamishev and J. R. Smith,
“Design of an RFID-based battery-free programmable sensing platform,” IEEE
Transactions on Instrumentation and Measurement, vol. 57, no. 11, pp. 2608-2615,
Nov. 2008.

[49]

M.-J. Chae, D. J. Yeager, J. R. Smith, and K. Fu, “Maximalist cryptography and
computation on the WISP UHF RFID tag,” In Proceedings of the Conference on
RFID Security, 2007.

[50]

C. Pendl, M. Pelnar, and M. Hutter, “Elliptic curve cryptography on the WISP UHF
RFID tag,” 7th International Workshop, RFIDSec 2011, Amherst, USA, June 2628, 2011.

[51]

EPCglobal, “Low Level Reader Protocol (LLRP) Version 1.1 Ratified Standard,”
Oct, 2010.

60
II. OPTIMAL DEFENSE AND CONTROL OF DYNAMIC SYSTEMS MODELED
AS CYBER-PHYSICAL SYSTEMS
Haifeng Niu and S. Jagannathan
With the increasing connectivity among computational cyber-connected elements
and the physical entities, a unified representation that captures the interrelationship
between the cyber and the physical systems becomes increasingly important. In this paper,
we propose a novel representation for developing cyber security schemes for physical
systems wherein the cyber system states affect the physical system and vice versa.
Subsequently by using this representation, an optimal strategy via Q-learning is derived for
the cyber defense in the presence of an attack. Since the cyber system under attack will
affect the physical system stability and performance, an optimal controller by using Qlearning is considered for the physical system with uncertain dynamics. As an example,
cyber-attacks that increase the network delay and packet losses are considered and the goal
of the proposed cyber defense and optimal controller is to thwart the attack and mitigate
the performance degradation of the physical system due to increased delays and packet
losses. An illustrative example is given where the proposed theory is evaluated on the yawchannel control of an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV). Simulation results show that on the
cyber side, both the attacker and the defender gains their greatest payoff whereas on the
physical system side, the optimal controller is able to maintain the linear system in a stable
manner when the cyber state vector meets a certain desired criterion.

61
1. INTRODUCTION

Cyber-physical systems (CPS) refer to engineered systems constructed as
networked interactions of physical and computational cyber components [1]. Examples of
CPS can be found in areas as diverse as automobiles, air transportation, civil infrastructure,
power grid, embedded medical devices, and consumer appliances. Recently, with the
development of information technology (IT) such as IT management and networking
growth, the security in CPS has received attention. Moreover, as cyber and physical
capabilities are becoming increasingly intertwined, a comprehensive framework that
models the cyber system, the physical plant dynamics, and their interrelationship is also
increasingly needed.
In general, there are two types of the representations for the security analysis of
CPS in the existing literature: one that models the effect on the cyber systems under a
certain specific attack [2-6] and the other includes the effect of cyber-attacks on physical
systems [7-12]. The former effort explores the behavior of the attacker as well as the
defender, formulates the cyber changes under attacks, and presents appropriate strategies
that bring the cyber system back to normal. For example, the effort in [2] introduces the
Denial of Service (DoS) flooding attacks by a continuous-time Markov chain and utilizes
the state space method to compute security measures accurately.
Different from [2], the authors in [3] study the cyber defense by modeling the
actions of the attacker and the defender as a stochastic zero-sum game. In [4], the measure
of vulnerabilities in cyber-physical systems with application to power systems is defined
and a security framework including anomaly detection and mitigation strategies is
provided. The authors in [5] evaluate the cyber security by computing the expected
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probabilities of the attacker and using the probabilities to build a transition model through
game-theoretic approach. In [6], the cyber vulnerability is dynamically evaluated by using
hidden Markov model which provides a mechanism for handling sensor data with different
trustworthiness. However, this type of representation mainly focuses on the cyber system
and neglects the fact that the states of the physical system also affect the cyber defense
strategy.
In contrast, others [7-12] concentrate on characterizing the dynamics of the physical
system under attacks by extending the classic state-space description in order to include
the attacks. For instance, in [7], the system dynamics include an extra term to model the
deception attack. In [8], the system state under attack is represented with an additive term
where the additive term is used to simulate the false data injection attack. Unlike [8], the
authors in [9] characterize the deception attackers by a set of objectives and propose
policies to synthesize stealthy deceptions attacks in both linear and nonlinear estimators.
In [10], the estimation and control of linear systems when sensors or actuators are corrupted
by an attacker is provided, together with a secure local control loop that can improve the
resilience of the system. On the other hand, the authors [11] define the control input under
attacks as the product of the given input and a coefficient to characterize the effect induced
by the DoS attacks. A class of human adversaries, who are called correlated jammers, is
considered in [12]. By modeling the coupled decision making process as a two-level
receding-horizon dynamic Stackelberg game, the authors propose a control law and
analyze the performance and the closed-loop stability under attacks.
However, there are many weaknesses [13] in the above reported works. First, the
representation can only describe a single type of attack due to the fact that attacks affect
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the system dynamics in a variety of ways. In particular, the author in [13] proposed a
unified framework that is able to detect attacks however it still has the two drawbacks
mentioned next. Second, it is difficult to implement the representation developed in the
literature so far since the system dynamics under attacks are considered known. For
instance, due to random delays and packet losses caused by certain cyber-attacks, the
physical system dynamics can be uncertain. Last but not the least, these representations
fail to take the interactions between the cyber defense policy and the system controller
under consideration.
In summary, to the best knowledge of the authors, little effort has been carried out
in the literature to develop a representation that precisely characterizes the interplay
between the cyber and the physical systems. Such a representation is necessary because
inadequate decisions can be made for the cyber defense if the physical states are ignored.
Likewise, the physical plant may not be stable if the controller is designed without
considering the impact due to the changes in the cyber system.
Therefore, in this paper, we propose a framework for cyber-physical systems to 1)
study optimal defense to mitigate attacks and 2) to derive an associated optimal control
policy for physical systems. First, we introduce a mathematical representation for the
cyber-physical system, in which it was shown that the activities of the cyber system affect
the states of the physical system and vice versa. Then based on this representation, we
derive the optimal strategies for the defender and the attacker by considering them as two
players in a zero-sum game. Since the cyber state influences the behavior of the physical
system, next, an optimal controller for the physical system in the presence of uncertainties
induced by the cyber system is revisited based on [14]. In addition, a condition on the cyber

64
state vector is derived under which the physical system is stable. Finally, an illustrative
example is given in which we show that on the cyber side, both the attacker and the
defender gain their greatest payoff while on the physical side, the optimal controller is able
to maintain the plant stable when the state vector of the cyber system meets a certain
condition.
Thus, the main contributions of this work include: 1) a novel and comprehensive
representation of the cyber-physical system that captures the interrelationship between the
cyber and the physical elements; 2) the development of the optimal strategies for the
defender and the attacker; 3) the application of the optimal controller [14] for the physical
system in the presence of uncertain dynamics induced by the cyber system; and 4) the
demonstration of how the proposed theory can be applied to the control of the yaw-channel
of an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) in the presence of an attack.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The proposed representation for the
cyber-physical systems is introduced in Section 2. In Section 3, the optimal defense and
attack policies are derived and presented, followed by the optimal controller design for the
physical system introduced in Section 4. The illustrative example including policy
derivation as well as the simulation results are presented in Section 5 and this paper is
concluded in Section 6.
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2. PROPOSED REPRESENTATION FOR CYBER-PHYSICAL SYSTEMS

In this section, the proposed framework for the cyber-physical systems is
introduced. Figure 2.1 depicts the proposed representation for the optimal defense scheme.

Defense d

Attack a

Cyber System
xc k 1  f (a k , d k , xc k )
yc k  h( xc k , x p k )

Control u

Xc
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Physical System
x p k 1  A( xc ) x k p  B( xc )u k  D( xc ) wk
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Cyber System
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Physical System

Figure 2.1. Proposed representation of a cyber-physical system.

2.1. CYBER SYSTEM
Consider the cyber system described by a nonlinear discrete-time system given by
xc (k  1)  f  a(k ), d (k ), xc (k ) 

where xc 

Nc

(1)

is the state of the cyber system, N c being the dimension of the state vector

of the cyber system, a 

is malicious action taken by the attacker, and d  is the defense

strategy taken by the cyber system.
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The cyber state xc represents a set of network performance metrics such as latency,
throughput, packet loss rate, and so on. Since it was shown in the literature that most attacks
on the cyber system will cause an increase in network delay and packet losses [15], in this
paper, we mainly consider these two as the cyber state vector in the controller design
(Section 4) and in the illustrative example (Section 5). In some cases, xc also needs to
include a few network security metrics such as the number of successive failed
authentications or the changes of IP addresses. It is obvious that the cyber state can be
affected by the action of both the attacker and the defense strategy and a relationship is
described by the function f .
In particular, we propose a more concrete representation of the cyber state as
Na Nd

xc (k  1)  Ac (k ) Fc  xc  k   Dc (k )   ai d j fij  xc (k )  ,
i 0 j 0

(2)

where Ac  a0 , a1 ,..., aN  is a vector consisting of all N a number of possible attacks, each
a

ai  0,1

stands for a type of attack (except for a0 ) wherein ai  1 implies the i th attack has

been lunched and ai  0 otherwise. In particular, we let a0  1 if and only if there is no active
T

attack at that moment. Similarly, Dc  d0 , d1 ,..., d N  is a vector describing the status of the
d

defense strategies and d0  1 if and only if there is no active defense. Finally,
F   f00 , f01 ,..., f0 Nd ;...; f Na 0 , f Na 1 ,..., f Na Nd  is a matrix of functions and each element
fij :

Nc 1



Nc 1

describes the effect to the cyber state xc brought by the ongoing

attack/defense pair (ai , d j ) . In other words, at each sampling time instant k , the active
attack/defense pair (ai , d j ) corresponds to a function f ij which characterizes the system
dynamics for the following sampling interval.
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An assumption is made in that when there are two or more attacks (and defense)
simultaneously being lunched, the effect of each attack (and defense) to the cyber system
state is independent.
As depicted in Figure 2.1, the cyber system output in the proposed representation
is described as
yc (k )  h  xc (k ), x p (k ) 

where yc 

,

is the output of the cyber system and x p 

(3)
Np

is the state of the physical

system with N p being the dimension of the state vector. The output yc , which is a function
of xc and x p , is a quantized value indicating the condition of the cyber system. A simple
example is presented in Remark 1 whereas more complicated forms can be found in
Remark 2.
One can assess the health condition or even the specific attack on the system by
exploiting the cyber state xc as well as the physical system state x p . For example, if the
network is reported with a significant drop in throughput and a considerable mean delay in
a short time, then it is possible that the system is experiencing a denial of service (DoS)
attack. The importance of introducing the cyber output yc stems from the fact that the states
needs to be organized and interpreted in order to be useful for the administrator to make
suitable defense strategies.
It is important to note that the physical system state x p is also necessary at the cyber
system in order to obtain a comprehensive and accurate estimation of the system condition.
For example, if an attacker manages to get the administrative privilege without being
detected by cracking the password or exploiting the security bugs, then he/she is able to
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give malicious instructions that may lead to the failure of the physical system. In this case,
only the abnormality in the physical system state (not the cyber state) could be detected.
Therefore, by including the physical system state when assessing the condition of the cyber
system, the administrator can still trigger the alert mechanism and launch the defense even
if no abnormities in the cyber systems have been observed. Therefore, by using both xc and
x p in yc , the cyber defense decision becomes more insightful and reliable. The relationship

between yc , xc , and x p is characterized by the function h .
Remark 1: A simple example of the cyber output yc is presented here, in which yc
is defined as
1, if xc  X cd and xd  X dd
yc  
,
0, otherwise

where X cd and X dd are the set of desired values of the cyber state xc and physical state x p
respectively. Therefore, in this example, yc  1 represents a healthy system while yc  0
represents a compromised one.
Remark 2: The function h may take various forms on the basis of the system
security requirement. The selection of h is critical to the system security level, considering
that the output of h is used to assess the system health condition and determine the defense
strategies that will be launched. The objective of selecting function h is that it should make
use of the observed states and precisely predict the ongoing or even potential attacks. A
few examples of function h can be given as follows:

  xc  xc _ min  
  xc  xc _ max   
 N  N 1 ,
1) Threshold form: yc   sgn   x  x
   sgn   x  x
   / 2 , where yc 
p
p
_
min
p
p
_
max








c



p



xc _ min , xc _ max ( x p _ min , x p _ max ) are the predefined lower, upper threshold vectors for each
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cyber (physical) state respectively and sgn() is the sign function. As a result, the
corresponding row of yc becomes “-1” if a state is smaller than the lower limit, “0” if
within the interval, and “1” if higher than the upper limit. This form of function h
provides a straightforward assessment of whether the states are in the desired zone or
not.
2) Linear form: yc (k )  c xc (k )  p x p (k ) where yc 

; c 

1 Nc

and  p 

1 N p

denote the

coefficient vectors for each state. By making use of these weighting factors, this form
maps the state vector onto a scalar that provides an approximate description of the
system healthy condition.
3) Quadratic form yc (k )  xcT (k )c xc (k )  xTp (k ) p x p (k ) , where yc 
p 

N p N p

, c 

Nc  Nc

and

represent the weighting matrices for each state. Similar to the linear form,

this quadratic form also maps the state vector onto a scalar except that it takes the
correlation between each state into consideration.
In this paper, the attacks considered will increase the network delay and packet
losses which in turn will make the linear time-invariant system as an uncertain stochastic
time-varying system. The goal of the cyber defense and optimal controller is to mitigate
the increase in random delays and packet losses and performance degradation of the
physical system.
2.2. PHYSICAL SYSTEM
As shown in the right block in Figure 2.1, the physical system is described as a
linear discrete system in the presence of a disturbance given by
x(k  1)  A( xc ) x(k )  B( xc )u (k )  D( xc ) w(k )
y k (k )  Cx(k )

,

(4)
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where x p 

np

is the state of the physical system, u 

disturbance input, y 

r

is the output, and A 

mu

n p n p

is the control input, w

, B

n p mu

, C

r n p

mw

and D 

is the
n p mw

denote the system matrices.
It is important to note that unlike the classical linear discrete system, the system
matrices described by (4) are a function of the cyber state xc . In other words, the state of
the cyber system will influence the dynamics of the physical system. For instance, a large
network-induced delay or packet loss can degrade the system performance or even results
in instability. Therefore, this framework is able to capture the cyber system activities
because when a cyber-attack occurs, the physical system matrices {A( xc ), B( xc )...} change.
In conclusion, the cyber state vector, whose update is subject to the attack/defense
decisions, changes the physical system dynamics. As a result, the control input needs to be
adjusted to drive the physical states back to the desired value. The changes in the cyber and
physical states, in turn determine the cyber output and hence the attack/defense decisions.
A summary of the interrelationship between the cyber and the physical systems is shown
in Figure 2.2.

Cyber System

Physical System

Cyber State xc

Physical System Dynamics A,B...

Cyber Output yc

Physical Stats xp

Attack/Defense Decision

Control input u

Figure 2.2. Inter-relationship between the cyber and the physical system.

71
Hence, the objective is to design an optimal policy by using a cost function for the
physical system with unknown system dynamics induced by the cyber system. Therefore,
by 1) including the physical system state in the assessment of cyber health condition and
2) considering the influence on the physical system dynamics induced by the cyber states
when designing the optimal controller, the proposed optimal defense/control scheme offers
a coupled” design which is able to capture the influence of the cyber and the physical
systems.
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3. OPTIMAL ATTACK/DEFENSE POLICY FOR CYBER SYSTEMS

In this section, the optimal attack and defense policies for the cyber system are
derived while in the next section, we derive the optimal controller for the physical system
with the presence of the delay and packet loss. We also derive the condition for the delay
and packet loss under which the physical controller can be stabilized. The optimal
controller gain will be computed and applied to the physical system once the delay and
packet loss satisfy the condition. Otherwise appropriate defense strategy needs to be
launched in order to drive the cyber states (delay and packet loss) to meet the criterion.
In this section, we first model the interactions between the attacker and the defender
as a two-player zero-sum Markov game [16]. Then after defining the instant payoff as well
as the expected discounted payoff function, we introduce two lemmas to show the existence
of the solution of the game and the optimal policy. Next, the Q-function is proposed and it
is shown in Theorem 1 that using the Minimax-Q algorithm [17], the Q-function converges
to the game value. As a result, the optimal strategies for the defender and the attacker in
order to gain their greatest discounted payoff are also derived.
Consider the cyber system with dynamics described by (2) and an output function
in quadratic form of the state vectors, i.e. as
Na Nd

xc (k  1)  Ac (k ) Fc  xc  k   Dc (k )   ai d j f ij  xc (k ) 
i 0 j 0

,

(5)

yc (k )  xcT (k ) c xc (k )

where the cyber state vector xc consists of delay and packet loss for illustrative purpose.
Then the system can be modeled as a Markov decision process in which the state at the
next sampling interval, xc (k  1) , is determined by the state at the current instant, xc (k ) ,
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together with the action pair  Ac (k ), Dc (k )  launched by the defender and the attacker. The
defender and the attacker update their defense strategies based on the condition indicated
by yc , which is a quantified value computed based on the delay and packet loss of the cyber
system. In other words, the defender and the attacker launch appropriate actions so as to
drive the delay and packet loss into preferred values.
Let

Y

be the set of all possible values of yc . Since it is based on the value of yc that

the defender and the attacker decide which action should be taken, the problem becomes
deriving the optimal action for each single value of yc , which is impractical and
unnecessary due to the tremendous computation. Therefore, we divide Y into several
subsets and study the optimal strategies for each subset rather than for each element.
Suppose that

Y

is divided into N yd disjoint subsets (i.e., Y  Y1 Y2 ... YN and Yi Yj  
yd

for i  j ) and each subset corresponds to a level of health status. As illustrated in Figure
3.1,

Y

is divided into eight subsets.

Healthier
Failed

Y8

Secure

Y7

Y6

Y5

Figure 3.1. Each subset of

Y4
Y

Y3

Y2

Y1

Y0

corresponds a level of health condition.
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Subset Y0 is the secure state (with the smallest delay and packet loss) and subset Y8 is
the failed state of the system (with the largest delay and packet loss). The defender decides
which action should be taken based on the subset that current yc is in. For example, if yc  Y4
, the defender may choose to load the defense more frequently to drive yc into a more
secure subset. As a result, the delay and packet loss are reduced and the physical system
becomes more robust and resilient. Obviously, the more subsets

Y

is divided into, the more

accurate the model is. However, more computation is needed as the optimal strategies need
to be derived for each subset. Next, the definition of instant reward and discounted payoff
are introduced in order to obtain the optimal strategy for each subset Yi .
Let r ( Ac (k ), Dc (k ), Yi (k )) be the instant payoff (reward or cost) at time instant k in
region Yi (k ) for the action pair  Ac (k ), Dc (k )  . Let the instant payoff of the attack and the
defender be ra and rd respectively and assume the game is zero-sum, we then have the
relationship
r ( Ac (k ), Dc (k ), Yi (k )) : ra ( Ac (k ), Dc (k ), Yi (k ))  rd ( Ac (k ), Dc (k ), Yi (k )) .

(6)

Specifically, we let the instant reward be defined as
r ( Ac (k ), Dc (k ), Yi (k ))  xcT (k )c xc (k )  xTp (k ) p x p (k )  d Dc (k )  a AcT (k ) ,

(7)

which consists of the cost of the cyber state, physical state, defense, and attack. The defense
cost is defined as d Dc (i) where d  d ,1 , d ,2 ,..., d , N  and each element d ,i 
d



is the

corresponding cost of launching defense di . Likewise a  a,1 , a,2 ,..., a, N  is the vector
a

describing the cost of launching attacks. Next, we will derive the optimal strategy for the
attacker and the optimal defense can be obtained in the same manner.
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After introducing the definition of the instant payoff, we now consider the expected
discounted payoff function over multiple stages. Let  A   Ac (1), Ac (2),...Ac (k )... and
D  Dc (1), Dc (2),...Dc (k )... be the policies for the attack and defense respectively, where
Ac (k ) and Dc (k ) stand for the actions at the time instant k . A policy, which is a sequence of

decisions over time, is the mathematical description of a plan of the player for the game
[18]. Now define the expected discounted cost function V for each subset Yi as


V ( A ,  D , Yi )     k E  r (k ) |  A ,  D , yc  Y i  ,
k 0

(8)

where   [0,1) is the discount factor. As a result, the objective of the attacker becomes
finding the appropriate policy  A in each subset Yi such that the expected discounted
payoff function V is maximized. Correspondingly, the defender aims to find the appropriate
defense policy  D for each Yi to minimize V .
 A  arg max Va ( ' A )
 'A

That is to say, we need to solve

Vd ( 'D ) . Next, the following two lemmas are introduced
and  D  argmax
'D

before we derive the optimal policies.
Lemma 1. [19] The discounted zero-sum game always possesses a unique solution
yielding the optimal game value.
Lemma 2. [20] The policy



*
A

,  D* 

is guaranteed to be optimal if V ( A* , D* , Yi )

satisfies the following fixed-point Bellman equation given by


V ( A* ,  D* , Yi )  min max r ( Ac , Dc , Yi )    p(Yi ' | Yi , Ac , Dc )V ( A* ,  D* , Yi ')  ,
D
A
Yi '



(9)

where p is the probability of transitioning from current state Yi to the next state Yi ' after
taking action pair  Ac , Dc  .
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Based on these two lemmas, we use iterative Q-learning method to search for the
game value V ( A* , D* , Yi ) in (9). Now define the Q-function for each region Yi as
Q( Ac , Dc , Yi )  r ( Ac , Dc , Yi )    p(Yi ' | Yi , Ac , Dc )V ( A ,  D , Yi ')
Yii Y

.

(10)

Accordingly, the optimal action dependent value function Q* of the game is defined as
Q* ( Ac , Dc , Yi )  r ( Ac , Dc , Yi )    p(Yi ' | Yi , Ac , Dc )V ( A H * ,  D* , Yi ')
Yii Y

.

(11)

From (9) to (11), one can conclude that if the action pair sequence   A ,  D  is
optimal, the optimal Q-function Q* ( Ac , Dc , Yi ) is equal to the game value function
V ( A* , D* , Yi ) . In other words, we have
V ( A* ,  D* , Yi )  min max Q* ( Ac , Dc , Yi )  Q* ( Ac* , Dc* , Yi ) .
D

(12)

A

The Minimax-Q algorithm proposed in [17] is adopted to obtain Q* ( Ac , Dc , Yi ) since
it provides strong convergence guarantees according to the following theorem.
Theorem 1. Let the Q-function Q( Ac , Dc , Yi ) and the optimal action dependent value
function, Q* ( Ac , Dc , Yi ) , be defined as in (10) and (11) respectively. Then Q( Ac , Dc , Yi )
converges to the optimal value Q* ( Ac , Dc , Yi ) after an infinite number of iterations with the
following tuning law given by
Qi 1 ( Ac , Dc , Yi )  1   (i)  Qi ( Ac , Dc , Yi )   (i)  r ( Ac , Dc , Yi )  a (Yi ')  ,

where  (i) 







i 1

i 1

(13)

is the learning rate that satisfies   (i)   and  2 (i)   , and a (Yi ) is

called the state value function [17] calculated by
a (Yi )  min  Q  Ac , Dc , Yi  a ( Ac , Yi )
Dc

Ac

,

(14)
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where  a ( Ac , Yi ) denotes the probability for the attacker to take action Ac given yc  Yi . The
proof of Theorem 1 is similar to the theorem in [21].
In addition, since  a ( Ac , Yi ) is unknown, linear programming is employed to
approximate it at each iteration. An appropriate update law for  a ( Ac , Yi ) is given by [21]



 a ( Ac , Yi ) : arg max min  Q  Ac , Dc , Yi  a ( Ac , Yi )  .
 (Y ,  )  D  A



a

i

c

(15)

c

A flowchart of the proposed method to obtain the optimal defense/attack strategy
is shown in Figure 3.2.

Start
Initialization:
1) Divide Y into appropriate number of subsets Yi;
2) Let the Q-function Q(Ac,Dc,Yi)=0 for all Ac, Dc, and Yi;
3) Let the state value function Θa(Yi)=0, for all Yi;
4) Let the action distribution vector πa(Ac,Yi)=1/Na for all Ac.

Randomly pick up an action Ac or use greedy search [16]

Calculate cyber state xc and output yc with (4);
Find Yi such that yc  Yi

Update:
1) Update action distribution vector πa(Ac,Yi)=1/Na with (13);
2) Update state value function Θa(Yi) with (12);
3) Update Q-function Q(Ac,Dc,Yi) with (11).
No
Δ Q(Ac,Dc,Yi)<ε, for all Ac, Dc, and Yi?
Yes
Optimal controller

Figure 3.2. Flowchart of the optimal policy for the defender/attacker.
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4. OPTIMAL CONTROLLER DESIGN

In this section, we introduce the optimal control scheme for the physical system
based on the previous work [14]. First, we model the linear discrete-time system with
dynamics that is unknown and altered by the cyber state vector, which includes packet
losses and time delays since these are two important metrics for the network that may cause
deterioration or potential instability of the system [22]. We then introduce the optimal
control gain and show that the system is stable only when the cyber state vector satisfies a
certain criterion. The cyber system needs to launch the appropriate defense if its state vector
fails to satisfy the criterion. The development of the system dynamics as well as the Qfunction update law is taken from the paper [14]. In summary, we show that the cyber state
vector affects the optimal controller design and meanwhile the states of physical system
also have an impact on designing the defense for the cyber system.
In cyber-physical systems, there are two types of network-induced delays: the
sensor-to-controller delay and the controller-to-sensor delay. With the assumption that the
former is negligible, the linear continuous system can be described as [14]
x  t   Ax  t     t  Bu  t    t   ; y t   Cx t  ,
I nn if the control input is received at time t

where  t   

n n
0

if the control input lost at time t

(16)

and  is the delay which is discrete-

value. It is important to note that the data information needed to be discretized before
transmitting into the communication network. Moreover, to avoid the infinite-dimensional
issue, authors assume that the delays are bounded. Let Ts be the sampling time, the system
b

can be discretized as

xk 1  As xk    k i Bik uk i ; yk  Cxk
i 0

,

(17)

79
where b is the maximum number of delayed control input during the sampling interval;
xk  x  kT  ; As  e AT ; B0k   k e

T

0

;

 ik1  i 1T

Dik   k

 i iT

A T  s 

dsB  1 T   0k  ; Bik  

 ik iT

e AT  s  dsB   T   ik1   ik     ik  iT 

e AT  s  dsD   T   ik1   ik     ik  iT  i  1, 2,..., b

1, if uk i was received during [kTs , (k  1)Ts )
if uk i was lost during [kTs , (k  1)Ts )
0,

 k i  

zk  [ xkT ukT1

 ik1  i 1T

ukTb ]T

;

1, x  0
0, x  0

 x   

;

and

. Let the augmented state zk be defined as:

, then the system dynamics become [14]
zk 1  Azk zk  Bzk uk , ykn  Cz zk ,

(18)

where the system matrices are a function of the unknown random delays, and packet losses
or the cyber state vector which are given by [14]
 As

0
0
Azk  



 0

and ykn  [ ykT ukT1

 k 1 B1k

 k i Bik

 k b Bbk 

0

0

Im
0

0

0

Im

0

0
ukTb wkT1

Im
wkTb ]T

0

 k B0k 
C





 Im 


 , Bzk   0  , Cz  








 0 






where I m , I l are

m m






,


I l 

Im
Im

and l  l identity matrices.

The





T
T
objective is to minimize the cost function J k  E,    xm Sxm  um Rum   where S and R are

 mk



symmetric positive semi-definite and symmetric positive definite constant matrices
respectively. Applying the augmented state vector, the cost function can be represented as
 

J k  E    zmT S z zm  umT Rz um   where Sz  diag{S , R / b,..., R / b} and Rz  R / b . The cost function
 ,
 mk

T
is known to be quadratic and is given as J k  E,  zk Pk zk  where Pk  0 . Define the Q-function





as Q( zk , uk )  E,  r ( zk , uk )  J k 1   E,  zT , uT  H k  zT , uT    zT , uT  E,  H k   zT , uT  ,
T

k

k

k

k

T

k

k

k

k

(19)
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where r ( zk , uk )  zmT Sz zm  umT Rz um . Therefore E,  H k  can be expressed in terms of the system
matrices as
 H zz
H k  E  H k    kuz
 ,
Hk

 S  E AT P A
E  AzkT Pk 1 Bzk  
H kzu   z  ,  zk k 1 zk 
 ,


T
H kuu   E  BzkT Pk 1 Azk 
Rz  E  Bzk Pk 1 Bzk  
 ,
  ,


.

(20)

Consequently, the optimal control gain is represented in terms of H k as
K k   H kuu  H kuz . Moreover, with the linear in the unknown parameters (LIP) assumption,
1

the Q-function can be written as Q( zk , uk )  wkT H k wk  hkT wk , where hk  vec( H k ) , wk

 [ zkT , uT ( zk )]T

,and wk  (wk21 ,..., wk1wkq , wk22 ,..., wkq 1wkq , wkq2 ) is the Kronecker product quadratic polynomial basis
vector. Therefore, the Q-function can be estimated as Qˆ ( zk , uk )  hˆkT wk in which hˆ is the
estimate value of the target parameter vector h .
Now define the residual or temporal difference error as ehk 1  Jˆk 1  Jˆk  r  zk , uk  , then
we can rewrite the residual dynamics as
ehk 1  r ( zk , uk )  hˆkT1Wk where Wk  wk 1  wk .

(21)

Next, we define an auxiliary residual error vector as hk  k 1  hˆkT k 1 where
k 1  [r ( zk 1 , uk 1 ) r ( zk 2 , uk 2 )

and k 1  [Wk 1 Wk 2

r ( zk 1i , uk 1 j )]
Wk 1 j ] .

Similarly, the dynamics of the auxiliary vector are derived as: hk 1  k  hˆkT1k . The
update law of the target matrix H k is given by
1
hˆk 1  k  Tk k   h Thk  Tk  .

(22)
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It is shown in [17] that with the update law (22), there exists a positive constant  h
satisfying

0   h  1 such that both the state vectors zk and the adaptive parameter

estimator errors are asymptotically stable in the mean.
Finally, we show the sufficient condition on the cyber state in term of the delay and
packet loss that need to satisfy in order to maintain the system to be stochastically stable.
Consider the systems with slowly-varying parameters, since the initial stabilizing control
and disturbance inputs are given, the linear discrete-time system can be represented as
zk 1  Azk* zk [23]. Applying the linear transformation, the expectation of Azk* can be written as
 As   k B0k K  k 1 B1k

K
0

*
Azk  
0
Im



0
0


 E  As




  E  Azk**   









 k b Bbk 
0
0

0
0

Im

0

  k B0k K  E   k b Bbk 

0

K

0

0

0

0

Im

0

0

0

0

0

0.
0

Im 

According to the definition of stability for stochastic linear time-varying system
**
[24], if eigenvalues of E  Azk  are within a unit radius n-dimensional sphere (or disc) for all

**
instants, then the system is stable. Since the eigenvalues of the right bottom block of E  Azk 

k
are ones, the left upper block has to satisfy the condition: i [E, ( As   k B0 K )]  1 for any i and

k and  ( M ) denotes the eigenvalue of the matrix M . Since K and L are the initial fixed

stabilizing control and disturbance input gains for the linear discrete-time system, we have
i ( As  Bs K )  is  1 with Bs  0 e AT  s  dsB .
T

(23)

k
Then E, ( As   k B0 K ) can be represented as

E ( As   k B0k K )  As  E( k ) E( B0k ) K   I  min{1 ,  2 } As  min{1 ,  2 }As  1Bs K

 ,





AT  s 
A T s
A T s
A T s
ds) /  e   ds and  2  E ( k ) E ( e   ds) /  e   ds .
where 1  E ( k ) E ( e
0




T

k
0

T

T

T

k
0

k
0

(24)
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Combining (23) with (24), we have
i [ E ( As   k B0k K )]  1  min{1 ,  2 }  i ( As )  min{1 ,  2 }is .
 ,

Therefore, in order to maintain stability, the expected values of the delays and
packet losses should satisfy
min{1 , 2 }  1  1  min{1 ,  2 }is  / i ( As ) ,

(25)

where 1 and  2 are functions of the delay and packet losses defined by (24). When this
inequality is not satisfied, the cyber system needs to launch an appropriate defense to
reduce the delay and packet losses in order to prevent instability; otherwise the physical
system needs to be halted as it becomes unstable.
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5. AN ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE

In this illustrative example, the proposed framework is verified on a small-scale
UAV helicopter with remote controller. The objective of the controller design is to stabilize
the yaw rotation rate with the presence of two types of cyber-attacks. The attacker aims to
maximize the payoff, which are given in terms of the network delay and packet losses in
this case, such that the yaw channel becomes unstable. The defender, on the other hand,
aims to limit the delay and packet losses under a certain threshold. We will show that on
the cyber side, both the attacker and the defender gain their greatest payoff while on the
physical system side, the optimal controller is able to maintain the yaw rate stable when
the cyber state vector expressed as delay and packet loss meets the derived condition.
5.1. PHYSICAL SYSTEM SETUP
In this illustrative example, we consider the control of the yaw rotation of a smallscale unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) helicopter. A yaw rotation, as illustrated in Figure
5.1, is a movement around the yaw axis of a rigid body that changes the direction it is
pointing [26]. The yaw rotation control is one of the most challenging tasks in controlling
small-scale UAVs because even a small control input or disturbance can cause the vibration
of the light-weight body [26]. Since it is verified in [27] and [28] that the yaw-channel
dynamics for small-scale helicopters can be physically decoupled from other channels, it
is reasonable to assume that the yaw-channel dynamic is a single-input-single-out (SISO)
system. Furthermore, after applying the prediction-error method [29], an accurate fourthorder model is proposed in [26] as
x  Ax  Bu; y  Cx ,
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where

x   x1 , x2 , x3 , x4 

T

consists of the first to the fourth derivatives of the yaw rotation rate;

y is the yaw rotation rate that can be measured by a gyro; and
 2.66
 31.03
A
 6.11

 17.17

6.05 
 0.63 

 6.22 
3.52 17.10 3.09 
 , C  [15.32 10.32 0.73 4.73].
,B  
 29.20 
6.96 9.76 96.38 



25.73 37.18 33.08 
 14.64 
21.94

3.83

Attack

Defense

Wireless Network
Actuator (Motor)

Remote
UAV
Controller

Delay and
Packet Loss

UAV Yaw-channel
Sensor (Gyro)

Figure 5.1. Illustration of a yaw
rotation.

Figure 5.2. Diagram of the UAV with remote
controller.

The other parameters of the physical system are introduced as follows. The total
simulation time is 200 steps with the sampling time of 100ms and the positive constant  h
equals to 106 . In the first 50 steps, zero-mean exploration noises with variance of 0.006
and 0.003 are added for the odd and even steps respectively, in order to meet the persistency
of excitation (PE) condition. The objective of the controller is to stabilize the yaw rotation
rate y by driving the state vector x to zero.
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5.2. CYBER SYSTEM SETUP
As illustrated in Figure 5.2, we suppose that the UAV is controlled by a base station
through a wireless network that suffers from cyber-attacks. As stated earlier, we choose
packet losses  and time delays  as the cyber state vector in order to evaluate the effect
on the network induced by the attack/defense activities, i.e.,

xc   , 

T

. Furthermore, smurf

attack and slow read attack [30-32] are considered.
Smurf attack is an example of amplification distributed denial of service (DDoS)
attack that exploits the unprotected networks to generate significant traffic load on the
victim network [30-31].
Slow read attack, on the other hand, tries to exhaust the server’s connection pool
by sends legitimate application layer request but reads the response slowly [32]. Based on
these characteristics, we model the delay and packet loss rate to increase exponentially
under the smurf attack and linearly under the slow read attack, which are illustrated in
Figure 5.3 (a) and Figure 5.4 (b).
Furthermore, the corresponding strategies that are capable of defending smurf
attack and slow read attack are denoted as d1 and d 2 , respectively. We assume that when
the appropriate defense strategy is loaded, the packet loss rate and the time delay decrease
in a linear manner, which are illustrated in Figure 5.3 (c) and Figure 5.3 (d). In addition,
the delay and packet loss rate are modeled to decrease slowly and linearly once the attack
is stopped regardless of the action of the defender. For simplicity, we mainly focus on the
case where only one attack and one defense are active at a sampling instant. However, it is
also briefly shown that the proposed representation can be easily expanded to apply
multiple attacks and defenses.
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The cyber output is defined as yc  xcT (k )c xc (k )      x p  x pt  , where


c   1
0

0

2 

;

x pt is the threshold of the physical states;  () is defined in Section 4. According to this

definition, when the physical states are within the threshold, the cyber output is a quadratic
function of the cyber state vector only.

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

Figure 5.3. Models of delay/packet loss rate under (a) smurf attack, no defense; (b)
slow read attack, no defense; (c) smurf attack with the corresponding defense; (d) slow
read attack with the corresponding defense.

Next, as presented in the flowchart in Figure 3.2, we divide the cyber output

Y

into

four subsets, i.e., Y  Y0 Y1 Y2 Y3 where Y0 , Y1 , Y2 , Y3 correspond to the “healthy”,
“sensitive”, “dangerous”, and “failed” condition respectively. Moreover, we define the
instant reward in the form of (7) with d  0, d ,1 , d ,2  and a  0, a,1 , a,2  . In other words,
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the costs for “not launching any defenses”, “launching defense d1 ”, and “launching defense
d 2 ” are 0,  d ,1 , and  d ,2 , respectively.

Table 5.1. Summary of system information used in the illustrative example.
Attacks

Ac   a0 , a1 , a2  ,

where a0 demotes “no attacks; a1 demotes smurf attack;
and a2 denotes slow read attack.
T
Dc   d0 , d1 , d2  , where d 0 demotes “no defenses; d1 demotes the defense

Defenses
Cyber states

against smurf attack; and d 2 denotes the defense against slow read
attack.
T
xc   ,  , where  is the packet loss rate and  is the delay.

xc (k  1)  a0 d0  xc (k )   0   a0 d1  xc (k )   0   a0 d 2  xc (k )   0  
a1d0   xc (k )   a1d1  xc (k )  1   a1d 2   xc (k )  

System
Dynamics

Cyber
output
Subsets of
cyber
output
Payoff

a2 d0  xc (k )   2   a2 d1  xc (k )   2   a2 d 2  xc (k )  3 

where 0 , 1 , 2 , 3  21 characterize the packet loss rate/delay linearly
decrease or increase rate;   1 characterizes the exponentially
increasing rate.
 0 
yc  xcT (k )  1
 xc (k )     x p  x pt , where 1 , 2 ,  , yc 
 0 2 



Y  Y0

Y1 Y2





.

Y3 .

r ( Ac (k ), Dc (k ), Yi (k ))  xcT (k )c xc (k )  d Dc (k )  a AcT (k ) , where

d  0, d ,1 , d ,2  and a  0, a,1 , a,2  .

It is important to note that we make Y0 be the region with “healthy” condition by
setting the cost for launching the defense close to the upper values of Y1 . As a result, if the
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cyber output falls into subset Y0 , the defender tends not to launch the defense as it costs
more than the payoff brought by the state. Subset Y1 , on the other hand, is modeled as the
“sensitive” region where the defender is more likely to launch the defense to avoid the
output going into subset Y2 , which is the “dangerous” state in this model. Likewise, if the
output falls into region Y2 , there is a very high chance that the defenses needs to be launched
to avoid the system going into Y3 , which is the “failed” region.
The system information for this particular example is summarized as in Table 5.1.
The simulation is performed with the algorithm described in Figure 3.2 and numerical
values shown in Table 5.2.

Table 5.2. Numerical values used in the simulation.
 (k )  1/ k ;   0.5 ; Na  Nd  3 ;   1.2 ; 1  2  1 ;
0  1;1.1 , 1  50;48 , 2  3;2.9 ; d  [0,5000, 4500] ; a  0,1500,1000 ;

Y0  [0,5000) , Y1  [5000,7200) , Y2  [7200,12800) , Y3  [12800, ) .

5.3. SIMULATION RESULTS
In the simulation, the optimal defense/attack policies for the cyber system and the
optimal controller are derived in the presence of delay and packet losses. Since the delay
and packet losses are generated from the cyber system, they are determined directly by the
policy launched by the defender. After deriving the optimal defense/attack policies, two
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scenarios are considered in the simulation. In the first scenario, we let the defender launch
the cyber defense policy based on the probability distribution given by the derived optimal
policy. By contrast, in the second scenario, the defender selects the defense actions at
random.
5.3.1. Results of Deriving the Optimal Attack/Defense Policies. First, we shall
show the simulation results of deriving the optimal attack/defense. After about 2000
iterations, the Q-values for all action pairs converge to fixed values. To avoid redundancy,
we only show the Q-values for the attacker and the defender in region Y1 in Figure 5.4 (a)
and Figure 5.4 (b), respectively. From Figure 5.4 it can be concluded that the expected
discounted payoff for the attacker in region Y1 is higher if he chooses action a0 rather than
a1 and a2 . Likewise, the expected discounted payoff values suggest the defender in region
Yi to load action d 2 more frequently than d 0 and d1 . Furthermore, the percentages of the Q-

values for each action in the regions are computed and listed in Table 5.3.
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Figure 5.4. Q-values in region for (a) the attacker; (b) the defender.
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It can be concluded from Table 5.3 that when yc  Y0 , the attacker shall take action
a2 more often as it increases the delay and packet losses in a faster way. The defender, on

the other hand, shall take no actions, which corresponds to our previous analysis that Y0 is
the region with “acceptable” health condition. With the increase in yc , the attacker shall
slow down the speed to avoid being detected by the defender, as one can conclude from
the Q-value distributions in region Y1 in the table. Correspondingly, the defender starts
loading the defense more often in this sensitive region. If the attacker manages to drive yc
into region Y2 or even Y3 , he shall stop attacking and let the system recover and go back to
region Y1 where he obtains the largest expected payoff. It is important to note that we
deliberately design the system as a secure one by letting the recovery speed of the cyber
states when appropriate defense is loaded much faster than the degrading speed when the
system is under attacks. As a result, the attacker gains the greatest payoff only when yc is
large enough yet not to the degree of being detected by the defender.

Table 5.3. Percentages for each action in the region.
Attacker

Y0
Y1
Y2
Y3

Defender

a0

a1

a2

d0

d1

d2

No
attacks
0.02
0.53
0.69
0.71

Smurf
Attack
0.58
0.08
0.13
0.13

Slow read
attack
0.34
0.39
0.18
0.16

No
defense
0.71
0.11
0.04
0.03

Defending
smurf attack
0.09
0.25
0.37
0.40

Defending slow
read attack
0.20
0.64
0.59
0.57
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The proposed model and analysis is verified through the following simulation. We
start the system with the cyber state initialized to zero and stop after 1000 iterations. During
iteration, the attacker and defender will 1) determine which region yc is in and take actions
according to the probabilities given by Table 5.3; 2) update the states; and 3) calculate the
accumulated payoff. The evolution of the states is shown in Figure 5.5.
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Figure 5.5. Evolution of the states (a) delay; (b) packet loss rate.

From Figure 5.5 it can be concluded that after a rapid increase at the beginning, the
delay and the packet loss rate remains relatively stable so that the attacker gains the largest
expected payoff in terms of the delay and packet losses. This is achieved by loading much
more a0 (no attacks) than a1 (smurf attack) and a2 (slow read attack), as suggested by the
probabilities in Table 5.3. Due to the stochastic property of this game, we observe that
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occasionally, the attacker loads the “inappropriate” attack ( a1 ) and detected by the
defender, resulting in a significant drop in the states. Figure 5.6 shows the evolution of the
output, where one can conclude that as previously analyzed, the output stays in the
“acceptable” region at most times, goes to the “dangerous” region occasionally, and never
reaches the “failed” region. The averaged payoff for the attacker is shown in Figure 5.7.
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Figure 5.6. Evolution of the output.

-2000
0

200

400
600
Iteration

800

1000

Figure 5.7. Evolution of average payoff.

From Figure 5.7 we can see that after about 100 iterations, the averaged payoff
tends to be stable at around 8000, which is the greatest averaged payoff for the attacker.
This example shows that by applying the optimal policies the attacker is able to obtain the
greatest payoff meanwhile the defender is able to keep the health condition under the
“dangerous” level.
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In addition, the simulation is repeated for the case where the two attacks/defenses
can be loaded simultaneously. As a result, a table similar to Table 5.3 is obtained except
that two extra columns are added, which are the probability distributions of simultaneously
loading two attacks  a1  a2  and two defenses  d1  d2  . To verify the results, we use the
method mentioned earlier, in which we observe the output yc by letting the attacker and
defender select their action based on the derived probability distributions. The results are
shown in Figure 5.8.
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Figure 5.8. Evolution of the output.

From Figure 5.8 one can conclude that the output stays in the “acceptable” region
at most times and never goes to the “dangerous” or the “failed” region. This results agree
with our previously analysis and verify that the proposed representation can be used in the
case where multiple attacks can be loaded simultaneously.
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5.3.2. Scenario I: Defender Chooses the Optimal Policy. In this scenario, we let
the defender launch the defense policy based on the probability distribution given by the
derived optimal policy. As a result, the delay and packet losses have been limited to
relatively low values so that the system always stays out of the failed region, which is as
verified in Figure 5.5 (a). Consequently, equation (25) is satisfied in this scenario. The
simulation results of the regulation errors for the physical system are shown in Figure 5.9,
where the state regulation errors converge to zero thus the closed-loop system is stable.
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Figure 5.9. Regulation errors in Case I where the cyber defense is optimal.

Therefore, we show that on the cyber side, both the attacker and the defender gains
their greatest payoff while on the physical side, the optimal controller is able to maintain
the plant stable when the cyber state vector meets the derived criterion.
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5.3.3. Scenario II: Defender Chooses a Random Policy. In the second scenario,
the cyber defense is selected at random rather than based on the optimal probability
distribution given in Table 5.3 As a result, the attacker manages to comprise the system in
some cases and the cyber states go far beyond the limit, as verified in Figure 5.10 in which
the time delay is plotted.
Consequently, equation (25) cannot be satisfied and thus the system becomes
unstable. The regulation errors in this scenario are plotted in Figure 5.11, where it can be
seen that the errors do not converge. In summary, the simulation results verify that that the
decisions made on the cyber system have an effect on the convergence of the physical
system. The system is stable when applying the optimal control in the physical plant and
optimal defense policy in the cyber system. If the states go abnormal such that (25) is not
satisfied, appropriate actions needs to be launched on the cyber system to bring them back
to normal or the physical plant has to be shut down to avoid further damages.
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6. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK

With the increasing meshing among the cyber-connected elements with the
physical entities, the representation for such cyber-physical system becomes more
complicated. In this paper, we have proposed a representation that captures the
interrelationship between the cyber and physical systems such that the states in the physical
system affect the decision made on the cyber systems and vice versa. Based on this
representation, the optimal defense and attacks are given to gain the greatest payoff. An
optimal controller from the literature is revisited to maintain the stability of the physical
system in the presence of the uncertainties induced by the cyber state vector. Since the
proposed representation is in a general form, it can be used in a variety of applications
including autonomous systems. In particular, the cyber defender is able to make thorough
decisions by selecting appropriate cyber state vector and output and customizing the payoff
function that is of interest. Meanwhile, there are some recent works focusing on modelling
and controlling for multi-agent networks or cyber-physical systems [33-35]. For example,
the work in [33] characterizes a binary notion of security and characterizes security levels
in terms of the graph matrix and its spectrum, which is complementary to control-theoretic
modeling of attacks in cyber-networks and networked control systems. Based on these
works, as future work, we can consider studying the impact of different attacks on the
network performance to generate a more accurate model for the cyber system dynamics.
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III. FLOW-BASED ATTACK DETECTION AND ACCOMMODATION FOR
NETWORKED CONTROL SYSTEMS
Haifeng Niu and S. Jagannathan

In networked control systems, the communication links are vulnerable to a variety
of potential malicious attacks. In this paper, we first propose a novel attack detection
scheme that is capable of capturing the abnormality in the traffic flow in those
communication links due to a class of attacks. Further, it is shown that the stability of the
physical system can be affected by the condition of the network due to delays and packet
losses induced by the attacks. An observer-based detection scheme is developed both for
the network and physical system. Attacks on the networks as well as on the physical system
can be detected and upon detection, the physical system can be stabilized by adjusting the
controller gains. Several attacks are considered in the simulation to show the applicability
of the proposed scheme.
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1. INTRODUCTION

Networked control systems (NCS) are ubiquitous with applications ranging from
large-scale industrial systems to critical infrastructure such as electric networks. In NCS,
the digital controllers receive measured data from sensors and transmit control commands
to the actuators through a communication network. However, the data flow between
different system components are vulnerable to a variety of potential system disturbances
and malicious attacks, which have been recently discussed and summarized [1].
The defense methodology in NCS can be due to [2]: 1) protection of information in
the cyber system and 2) attenuation of disturbances and detection of states abnormalities
in the physical system. The majority of the effort in the former category is devoted to the
development of encryption algorithms on the communication channel [2]. However, it is
only a partial solution for securing NCS because certain attacks, especially those that target
information availability such as denial of service (DoS) attacks, do not require the data to
be decoded. Moreover, the delay induced by the encryption methods could lead to
performance degradation of the control system.
Other effort [3-7] in the former category explore the behavior of the attacker as well
as the defender, formulate the cyber changes under attacks, and present an appropriate
strategy to bring the cyber system back to normal. For instance, the effort in [3] introduces
the Denial of Service (DoS) flooding attacks by a continuous-time Markov chain and
utilizes the state space method to compute security measures accurately. Different from
[3], the authors in [4] study the cyber defense by modeling the actions of the attacker and
the defender as a stochastic zero-sum game. In [5], the measure of vulnerabilities in cyberphysical systems with application to power systems is defined and a security framework
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including anomaly detection and mitigation strategies is provided. The authors in [6]
evaluate the cyber security by computing the expected probabilities of the attacker and
using the probabilities to build a transition model through game-theoretic approach. In [7],
the cyber vulnerability is evaluated dynamically by using hidden Markov model and by
providing a mechanism for handling sensor data with different trustworthiness.
On the other hand, the latter category concentrates on characterizing the dynamics
of the physical system under attacks by extending the classical state-space description. For
instance, in [8], the system dynamics include an extra term to model the deception attack.
In [9], the system state under attack is represented with an additive term which in turn is
used to simulate the false data injection attack. Unlike [9], the authors in [10] characterize
the deception attacks using a set of objectives and propose policies to synthesize stealthy
deception attacks in both linear and nonlinear estimators.
In [11], the estimation and control of linear systems when sensors or actuators are
corrupted by an attacker is provided, together with a secure local control loop that can
improve the resilience of the system. On the other hand, the authors in [12] define the
control input under attacks as the product of the given input and a coefficient to characterize
the effect induced by the DoS attacks. A class of human adversaries, referred to as
correlated jammers, is considered in [13]. By modeling the coupled decision making
process as a two-level receding-horizon dynamic game, the authors propose a control law
and analyze the performance and the closed-loop stability under attacks.
Despite interesting ideas by the above mentioned effort [8-13] for the security of
the overall NCS, there are many weaknesses [14]. First, the representation can only
describe a single type of attack due to the fact that attacks affect the system dynamics in a
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variety of ways. In particular, in [14] a unified framework that is able to detect attacks is
proposed whereas it still has the two drawbacks mentioned next. Second, it is difficult to
implement the representation developed in the literature so far since the system dynamics
under attacks are considered known. For instance, due to random delays and packet losses
caused by certain cyber-attacks, the physical system dynamics will become uncertain [15].
This problem has been addressed by the authors [15][16] by using Q-learning and zerosum game theoretic formulation.
However, the cyber-attacks may not be detected in a timely manner until a
significant deviation in the physical system state vector is observed. For instance, it is wellknown that a large delay and packet loss rate can result in the instability of the physical
system [16]. Instead of waiting for the detection of abnormal state vector in the physical
system, it is better to identify the problematic communication link that is likely to be
congested with excessive data by the attacks, which is not covered in our previous work
[15]. Therefore, in this paper, we propose a detection scheme that is capable of capturing
the abnormal traffic flow in the communication links for certain class of cyber-attacks
given the network and physical system dynamics under consideration.
We begin by introducing the state–space representation of traffic flow under cyberattacks with random delayed measurements for the communication network. Next, we
derive the observer-based controller that stabilizes the flow during healthy conditions
without attacks within the desired level by using linear matrix inequality (LMI) in the
presence of delayed information. By using the observer and measured outputs, network
attack detection residual is generated which in turn is utilized to determine the onset of an
attack in the communication network when the residual exceeds a predefined threshold.
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Then the detectability condition is introduced and the performance of the attack detection
scheme is discussed.
Next, we introduce an attack detection scheme for the physical system that is
capable of detecting attacks in both the communication network and physical system. A
new controller gain will be selected upon the detection of attacks in order to stabilize the
physical system. Finally the proposed scheme is evaluated by considering four types of
cyber-attacks in the simulation. The results verify that the proposed scheme for the
networks is able to detect certain types of attacks while revealing inherent limitation. The
simulation results on the physical systems verify that the attacks on both the network and
the physical system can be detected and the physical system can be stabilized by applying
the obtained controller gains. The results of the hardware implementation on an RFID
network confirm that both the jamming attack and the blackhole attack can be detected by
the proposed detection scheme.
The contributions of the paper include: 1) the design of the flow controller with
randomly delayed measurement in the presence of attacks; 2) the development of novel
observer-based network attack detection and estimation scheme along with detectability
condition; 3) the design of the observer and the detection scheme using measured outputs
of the physical system for detecting attacks on both network and the physical system; 4)
the controller design for the physical system to maintain the stability of the physical system
which can be utilized to maintain the healthy condition of the communication networks in
terms of the delays and packet losses; and 5) demonstration of the proposed scheme in both
simulation and hardware implementation, in the presence of a class of attacks with specific
adversary models.

105
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the statespace stochastic flow model under cyber-attacks. The observer and controller design is
presented in Section 3, followed by the adversary model and cyber-attack detectability
provided in Section 4. In Section 5 we present the detection scheme and controller design
for the physical system. The simulation as well as the hardware implementation results and
analysis are given in Section 6 and conclusions in Section 7.
 stands for the
The notations used in the paper are briefly introduced. Prob 

probability of the event occurring “  ”. E  x denotes the expectation of the stochastic
variable x , max M  represents the largest eigenvalue of matrix M , diag v stands for the
square diagonal matrix with the elements of vector v (or with the sub-blocks of matrix v )
on the main diagonal and the “*” in matrices denotes the symmetric terms.
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2. STOCHASTIC FLOW MODEL

Figure 2.1 shows the diagram of a typical NCS, in which both the controller
commands and the sensor data are transmitted through a wired or wireless communication
link. In this section, we propose a stochastic state-space representation in discrete-time for
the traffic flow at the bottleneck link in the presence of attacks. It is verified both
theoretically and experimentally [17] that the performance measures such as the delay and
transmission rate are determined by the bottleneck node and therefore a mild assumption
widely reported in the literature [18][19] is asserted.

Actuator

Plant

Sensor

Communication
Network
Bottleneck
Node

Controller

Figure 2.1. Diagram of a typical NCS.

Let the input rate at sampling time

kT

be k packets per second and uk be the

adjustment from the previous input rate, that is
k  k 1  uk .

(1)
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The transmission or output rate k , which slightly fluctuates around the standard
transmission rate 0 , is modeled by a stable autoregressive–moving-average (ARMA)
process given by [19]
k  0   k ,

(2)



(3)

where
k 

where “

d

m
l
i 1 i k i

 dk 1 ,

” represents a bounded disturbance with d M being its bound, l and m are

predefined constants obtained during system identification. Compared with other
transmission rate models such as the random walk model [19], the advantages with the
ARMA process is that it is analytically tractable and capable of capturing a wide range of
possible behavior.
Let the traffic flow in the bottleneck node at time

kT

be k . Then we have

k 1  k  T k  Tk  k ,

(4)

where k is the number of the packets introduced by the attacker with k  0 implies that
the attacker has injected data while k  0 implies that the attacker has dropped data. More
detailed representation of the attack models can be found in Section 4.
Let the desired flow at the bottleneck node be 0 and re-write (4) as
k 1  0  ( k  0 )  T (k  0 )  T k  k .

(5)

Now define the shifted flow  k and input rate k as
k  k  0 , k  k  0 .

(6)

Then the flow dynamic in (5) become
k 1  k  T k  T k  k .

(7)
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Define the state vector xk   k , k ,  k , ,  k m1 T [19] and combine (1), (3) and (7) to get
  k 1  1
 
 
 k 1  0
  k 1  0


  k  0

 

 
 k  m  2  0

T

T

0

1

0

0

0

l1

lm 1

0

1

0

0

0

1

0    k  0 
0 
1 
0 
0
0   k  1 
 
 
1 
0
lm    k  0 
    uk    d k    k

0    k 1  0 
0 
0
  

 
 
  

 
 
0   k  m 1  0 
0 
0 

(8)

or
xk 1  Axk  Buk  Ddk  W k ,

(9)

where A , B , D and W represent the appropriate dimensioned matrices from (8).
It has been reported in the literature [20] that the network state can be easily
measured when the servers at the output queues are Rate Allocating Servers and the
transport protocol supports the Packet-Pair probing technique. Therefore, in this paper, the
network state described by input rate, output rate, and the current flow in the link are
considered accessible. Suppose the current traffic flow in the link and the output rate can
be known after a delay of  k T , where k {0,1, } is a stochastic variable. Define the output
vector

y

as

yk  diag   k  ,1,  k  ,1 ,1  xk 

k

 diag  

k

 i  , 0,  k  i  , 0,

, 0  xk i

(10)

i 1

where   x   1 for x  0 and   x   0 for other values of x .
Moreover, as illustrated in Figure 2.2, considering the fact that the backward
transmission delay is much smaller than the forward delay due to the lack of queuing time,
we make the following weak assumption.
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Assumption 1 [21]: Assume  k  0,1 , i.e., the feedback delay for the output rate
and buffer length measurement is one sampling interval at most and  k is a Bernoulli
distributed white sequence with
Pr k  1  E k  :  .

Then the output vector

y

(11)

in (10) becomes

(1   k )  k   k  k 1 


 k

yk  (1   k ) k   k  k 1 




 k  m 1


(12)

 diag 1   k  ,1, 1   k  ,1 ,1  xk  diag  k , 0,  k , 0,

, 0  xk 1

Define a diagonal matrix with the random variable  k as k

diag k ,0, k ,0

,0

and we further let  diag  ,0,  ,0, ,0 . Then (12) can be re-written as
yk  ( I  k ) xk  k xk 1 .

(13)

Now we are ready to introduce the flow observer and controller. Controller will be
utilized for the system (9) in the absence of network attacks first.

Source

Bottleneck
...

Destination
...

Feedback for buffer length

Feedback for output rate

Figure 2.2. Illustration of the delayed measurement.

110
3. FLOW OBSERVER AND CONTROLLER DESIGN

The benefit of the observer is twofold. On one hand, due to the stochastic delay in
measurement, the state cannot be known instantaneously. An estimated state, which is
generated by the observer, will be utilized by the controller. On the other hand, by using
the measured and estimated outputs, an estimation error or attack residual is generated for
detection. The observer is described as
 xˆk 1  Axˆk  Buk  L( yk  yˆ k )

,


 yˆ k  ( I  k ) xˆk  k xˆk 1

(14)

and the flow controller is given by using the observer state as
uk  Kxˆk ,

(15)

where L and K denote the observer and controller gain matrices, respectively, with
appropriate dimension to be designed later.
Define the state estimation error as
ek  xk  xˆk

.

(16)

Then the state and the estimation error dynamics become
xk 1   A  BK  xk  BKek  Ddk  W k ,

(17)

ek 1  L(  ) xk   A  L  I    ek  L      xk 1  Lek 1  Ddk  W k .

(18)

Combining (17) and (18) yields
 xk 1   A  BK
 e   L (   )
 k 1   
 xk  
I

 
 ek   0

 BK
0
0   xk   D 
W 

 
A  L  I     L       L   ek   D 
W

d k    k .






x
0
0
0
0
0
  k 1   
 
I
0
0   ek 1   0 
 0 

(19)
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Now define the augmented state vector as X k   xk ek xk 1 ek 1 T . Then (19)
becomes
X k 1  AX k  Ddk  W k ,

where A , D , and

W

(20)

represent system matrices from (20).

Next we will first introduce the definition of stochastic stability in the mean-square
sense together with the H  performance constraints since the closed-loop dynamic system
of the source-destination pair described in (20) contains stochastic variable  . Then we
will introduce the design of the controller and observer gain matrices L and K such that the
system (20) is stabilized and satisfies the H  performance constraints in the absence of
attacks. We solve the gain matrices L and K by using linear matrix inequalities (LMI).
Finally, we will demonstrate that with the obtained L and K , the estimation error is bounded
when the attacks are absent.
3.1. STABILITY IN THE HEALTHY CASE
Before obtaining the gain matrices, the following definitions and lemmas are
needed in order to proceed.
Definition 1 [21]: The closed-loop system (20) is said to be exponentially meansquare stable with

dk  0

and k  0 , if there are constants



E Xk

2

   E  X  .
2

k

0

0

and    0,1 such that
(21)

Before we introduce the theorem on stability in the absence of attacks, the following
definition and lemmas are needed.
Definition 2 [22]: The closed-loop system (20) in the absence of attacks meets the
H  performance constraints when its state satisfies
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for all nonzero d k , where




k 0



E GX k

2

    E d 


2

2

(22)

k

k 0

is a prescribed positive scalar, G is the given input-output gain

matrix.
Lemma 1 [23]: Let V  X k  be a Lyapunov function for the system (20). If there
exists real scalars 1  0 , 2  0 ,   0 and 0    1 such that
1 X k

2

 V  X k   2 X k

2

,

(23)

and
E V  X k 1  | X k   V  X k    ,

(24)

then the sequence X k satisfies



E Xk

2

  

2

X0

2

k 

1


.
1 (1   )

(25)

Lemma 2 [24]: Let A be a real n  n matrix and B  diag b1 , bn  be a diagonal
stochastic matrix. Then



E BABT

where





 

 E b12



 E bn b1


E b1bn 

 A,

2
E bn 


 

is the Hadamard product, i.e.,  A  Bij  Aij  Bij .
 M1

Lemma 3 (Schur Complement): Let matrix M  

T
 M 2

M2 
 where M1 , M 2 , and M 3
M 3 

are matrices with appropriate dimensions. Then M is positive definite (PD) if and only if
1 T
both M 3 and matrix  M1  M 2 M 3 M 2  are PD.
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Lemma 4: For a given observer gain matrix L and controller gain matrix K , the
closed-loop system (20) is exponentially mean-square stable in the absence of disturbances
and attacks if there exist positive definite matrices P1 , P2 , P3 , and P4 , such that
Q2

 Q1

Q1T 
  0,
Q31 

(26)

where Q1 ~ Q3 are defined as
 A  BK

0
Q1  
 0

 L

 BK

A  L  I  
0
0

0 

0
 L 
0
0 

 L
0 
0

 Q11 
Q 
 12  ,
Q13 
 
Q14 

(27)

where   diag   (1   ),0,  (1   ),0,...,0 ,
Q2  diag P2  P1 , P4  P3 , P2 , P4  ,

(28)

Q3  diag P1 , P3 , P1 , P3  ,

(29)

and

Proof: Let the Lyapunov function be defined as
Vk  xkT P1 xk  xkT1P2 xk 1  ekT P3ek  ekT1P4ek 1 ,

(30)

where P1 , P2 , P3 ,and P4 are PD matrices. For the rest of the paper, we let Vk V  xk  for short.
Then from (17) and (18) it follows that
E Vk 1  Vk




   A  BK  x  BKe  P   A  BK  x  BKe 
   A  L  I     e  Le  P   A  L  I     e

 E xkT1 P1 xk 1  ekT1P3ek 1  xkT P2 xk  ekT P4 ek  xkT P1 xk  xkT1P2 xk 1  ekT P3ek  ekT1P4ek 1
T

k

k

1

k

k

T



k

 E L       xk  xk 1 

k 1



T

3



k

P3 L       xk  xk 1 

 Lek 1



 xkT P2 xk  ekT P4 ek  xkT P1 xk  xkT1 P2 xk 1  ekT P3ek  ekT1 P4 ek 1



.

(31)
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Applying Lemma 2, we have



E  xk  xk 1 

T

 L    

T









P3 L       xk  xk 1 



  xk  xk 1  E      LT P3 L       xk  xk 1 
T

T

(32)

  Lxk  Lxk 1     I    P3   Lxk  Lxk 1 
T

  Lxk  Lxk 1  P3  Lxk  Lxk 1  .
T

Substitute (32) into (31), it follows that





E Vk 1  Vk  X kT Q1T Q3Q1  Q2 X k

X kT X k

.

(33)

1
Vk
max P ,

(34)

Therefore, according to Lemma 3, we have
E Vk 1  Vk  X kT X k  1 X kT X k  

where P diag P1 , P3 , P2 , P4  and
0  1  min min  , max P .

(34)

Thus, (34) together with Lemma 1 completes the proof.
Next, Theorem 1 introduces the selection of controller and observer gain matrices
L and K in

order to both stabilize the system and meet the performance constraints.

Theorem 1: Given a positive scalar  1 , the system (20) without attacks i.e. k  0 ,
is exponentially mean-square stable and satisfies the H  performance constraint, if there
exist real matrices L , K and positive definite matrices P1 , P2 , P3 , and P4 satisfying
 S2

 S1

S1T 
 0.
 S31 

(36)

with S1 , S2 , and S3 defined as
Q
S1   1
G

D
where G  G 0 0 0 ,
0 

(37)
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,

(38)

and S3  diag Q3 , I  .

(39)

S2  diag Q2 ,  12 I

Proof: It is clear that (35) implies (25), and by Lemma 4, it follows that the system
is exponentially mean-square stable. Now consider the following term



E Vk 1  E Vk   E  Gxk 

T

Gxk   12 E d kT d k 





 E Vk 1  Vk  xkT GT Gxk   12 d kT d k  E{ X kT X k   Dd k  PQ
1 11 X   Q11 X  P1  Dd k 
T

T

(40)

  Dd k  P1  Dd k    Dd k  P3Q12 X   Q12 X  P3  Dd k 
T

T

T

1

  X T  X  
E      
d
 d k  
  k 

  Dd k  P3  Dd k   xkT GT Gxk   12 d kT d k k }
T

1

where

D


  GT G

 T
T
 D PQ
1 11  D P3Q12




.

T
2
D  P1  P3  D   1 I 
T

T
PQ
1 11  D P3Q12

T

Now we are left to prove   0 where

D Q Q 

Q T Q Q  G T G
  diag Q2 ,  12 I   1 3 1

DT Q3Q1







T
D Q3 D 



T

Q
 diag Q2 ,  12 I   1
G



D  Q3
0  



T

T

3 1

 Q1
I   G

(41)

D
 S2  S1T S3 S1
0 

According to Lemma 3, (36) implies (41). Therefore, we have





E Vk 1  E Vk   E  Gxk   Gxk    12 E d kT d k   0 .
T

(42)

By summing up (42) from 0 to  with respect to k , it follows that




k 0



E GX k

2

    E  d   E V  .
2
1



2



k

k 0

(43)

Since the system is exponentially mean-square stable, inequality (43) becomes




k 0



E GX k

2

    E d  .
2
1



k 0

2

k

(44)
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So far we have shown in the absence of attacks, the closed-loop system (20) is
exponentially mean-square stable and satisfies the H  performance constraint, as long as
the matrices L , K and matrices P1 , P2 , P3 , and P4 satisfy inequality (36). Therefore now we
are at the stage to solve for such matrices, which are presented in the next section.
3.2. CONTROLLER AND OBSERVER GAIN SELECTION
It is important to note that inequality (36) in Theorem 1 is not in the form of LMI
due to the term S31 and thus cannot be solved directly. The following theorem from [21][25]
converts (36) into a solvable LMI and provides the controller and observer gain matrices
to stabilize the system while satisfying the H  performance constraints.
Theorem 2 [21][25]: Given positive scalars  1 and  2 , the system (20) is
exponentially mean-square stable and satisfies the H  performance constraint, if there
exist real matrices M1 , M 2 and PD matrices P11 , P12 , P2 , P3 ,and P4 satisfying the following
LMI
 S2

 S1

S1T 
 0,
 S3 

(45)

where S3  diag P1 , P3 , P1 , , I  , S2 is defined by (38),
 P1 A  BM1

0


0
S1T  
 M 2

G


0

P1  U T diag P11 , P12 U

and

 BM1

0

P3 A  M 2  I   

0

0

0

0

M 2

0

0

0

0

0
P1 D PW
1 

 M 2  P3 D P3W 
0
0
0 

0
0
0 

0
0
0 
0
0
0 

,

U  diag [0,1; 1;0], diag 1,...,1 .

Moreover, the controller and observer gain matrices are given by
K  P111M1

and L  P31M 2 .

(46)

117
The proof is similar to that of ([21], Theorem 3) and thus omitted. Next, the
following corollary verifies that with the controller and observer gain matrices generated
by Theorem 2, the states of closed-loop system (20) are bounded in the presence of bounded
disturbances without any attacks.
Corollary 1: Consider the closed-loop system (20) with the disturbance bounded by
d M in the absence of attacks i.e. k  0 . Let the controller and observer gain matrices be

generated by Theorem 2, then the estimation error is bounded in the mean square such that

  ,

E ek

2

(47)

with


max P 
X0
min P 

2



where 

 D Q Q   D Q Q  and 
T

T

3 1

T

3 1

2




,
min    2 max  


 21  DT Q3 D d M2

(48)

is a positive real number satisfying

min P  min   2max   0 .

(49)

Proof: Select the Lyapunov function defined in (30) and combine the system
dynamics (20) yields
T

XT   
Q1T Q3T D   X kT 
E Vk 1  Vk   k  


 d k   DT Q3Q1 DT Q3 D   d k 
 X kT X k  2 DT Q3Q1 X k d k  DT Q3 Dd k2


  D Q Q  X  
 D Q Q   D Q Q  X  

 X kT X k   2 X kT DT Q3Q1

T

 X kT X k   2 X kT

T

T

k

1
2

3 1

k

1
2

T

3 1

  min    2 max   X k

3 1

T

2


 D Q Dd

 DT Q3 D d k2
T

3

(50)

2
k

2
  21  DT Q3 D d M
.

By further applying (49) in (50) we have
     2 max  
1
T
2
E Vk 1  1  min
Vk   2  D Q3 D d M .

P


max



(51)
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Next apply Lemma 1 to (51) to obtain



E Xk

2





max P
X0
min P

2

1 


k
 21  DT Q3 D d M2
min    2 max   max P

. (52)

max P
min P min    2 max 


Therefore it follows that

   E X    .

E ek

2

2

(53)

k

Remark 1: Corollary 1 introduces the bound of the estimation error when there is
no attack and can be utilized to design an attack detection scheme when the estimation
exceeds this bound. With the presence of bounded attacks, k  M , by following the

   '

same procedure, one can show that the estimation error is also bounded with E ek
where  '   .

2
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4. NETWORK ATTACK DETECTION

In this section, we first introduce the adversary models of three typical flowtargeted network attacks. Next, we develop the network attack scheme based on the
observer designed in the previous section. The detectability condition is also given under
which certain types of attacks can be detected.
4.1. ADVERSARY MODEL
Cyber-attacks are multifarious but they all target at one or more of the three
fundamental properties of information and services: confidentiality, integrity, and
availability, often known as CIA [26]. Confidentiality-targeted attacks are usually
defended by encryption techniques and therefore in this paper, we only concern about
attacks that impair the integrity and availability. Specifically, in the context of flow
management, this paper deals with attacks that either inject false data or drop/block
authentic data. Three types of such attacks are considered as examples.
Jamming Attack: The jamming attacker aims at creating traffic congestion by
placing jammers that consistently inject data into the link. Assuming the attacking strength
(number of jammers) increases linearly, then this type of attack can be modeled by [27]
k  1  e  k ,

(54)

where k , k and  is the time, percentage of injected data, and the network-related
coefficient, respectively. Jamming attack is plotted in Figure 4.1.
Black hole Attack: If the attacker manages to compromise one or more nodes in the
routing path from the source to the destination, then a black hole attack has been launched.
As a result, part of the data (depending on the attack strength) would be discarded.
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Assuming the attack strength (number of black holes) increases linearly, then the black
hole attack can be modeled by a linear equation [28] given by
k  1   k ,

(55)

where k , k and  is the attack strength (number of black holes), percentage of dropped
data, and the network-related coefficient, respectively and it is plotted in Figure 4.2.
Minimum Rate DoS Streams Attack: Instead of continuously injecting data, false
data is periodically injected into the network, in order to avoid router-based mechanisms
that detect high rate flows. In this way, the attacker attempts to minimize their exposure to
detection mechanisms. A typical minimum rate DoS stream attack is described by [29]
n1 , for t   kT , kT  p1 




k  n2 , for t   kT  p1 , kT  p2  ,




0, for t   kT  p2 ,  k  1 T 

(56)

where n1 , n2 , , p1, p2 ,and T is the first attack strength, second attack strength, packet drop
rate, first attack duration, second attack end time, and total attack period, respectively. The
DOS stream attack is plotted in Figure 4.3. Next, an attack detection scheme is introduced.
4.2. ATTACK DETECTION SCHEME
In this section, we will present the attack detectability condition followed by the
detection scheme performance.
Theorem 3 (Attack Detectability Condition): Consider the closed-loop system (20)
with the disturbance bound d M . Let the controller and observer gain matrices be generated
by using Theorem 2. Attacks can be detected if the injected (dropped) traffic flow k into
(from) the link satisfies
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k 1
i 0

  k , i  1W i   



k 1

  k , i  1 Dd M

i 0

,

(57)

 A  m  1 A  n  , if m  n
.
I,
if m  n


where   m, n   

(58)

Proof: The solution for closed-loop system (20) is given by
Xk 



k 1
i 0

  k , i  1  Ddi  W i  ,

(59)

If (57) is satisfied, by using triangle inequality we have
k 1
i 0

k 1

  k , i  1 Dd M
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Figure 4.1. Jamming attack. Figure 4.2. Black hole attack. Figure 4.3. Minimum rate
DoS streams attack.

Note that the inequality (57) presents a sufficient condition under which certain
types of attacks can be detected. However it is not the way how the attack is detected in
practice. Instead, the estimation error or the detection residue is constantly monitored and
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the attack is detected when the residue exceeds the bound given by (44). Moreover, since
the accumulated value of attack function k is used in (57), it is possible that certain attacks
cannot be detected, which will be further demonstrated in Section 6.
Combining Corollary 1 and Theorem 3, we are now ready to introduce the main
results for the proposed attack detection scheme.
Theorem 4: Consider the closed-loop system (20) with the disturbance bound d M
and the controller and observer gain matrices generated by Theorem 2. The attacks can be
detected when the network detection residual exceeds a predefined threshold given by (48)
provided k  M . Upon detecting the attack, consider the observer
xˆk  Axˆk 1  Buk 1  W ˆ k 1  Aek 1 ,

(61)

to estimate the attack flow where ˆ k is the estimated attack flow which is updated using
ˆ k  ˆ k 1  3 Kek 1 AT W   4 1  3W T W ˆ k 1 ,

with 3 ,4 

and A, K 

 m 2 m 2

(62)

are design parameters. Then the network attack

residual ek and the estimation error of the attacking flow k are bounded.
Proof: Select the Lyapunov function candidate as
V  V1  V2

1
3

where V1  ekT ek and V2  31k2

(63)

From (61) we can have the estimation error dynamics given by
ek  A0ek 1  W k 1  Ddk 1 ,

(64)

where A0  A  A . Substitute (61) and (64) into (63), we have
E V1 (k ) | V1  k  1



 





 1 3ekT ek  1 3ekT1ek 1  ekT1 A0T A0ek 1  W T W k21  d kT1DT Dd k 1  1 3ekT1ek 1
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E V2 (k ) | V2  k  1



  31 k2  k21


2

3

k21



6

3



 5k21



3

3

 52



k21

 k21

  3 W
3

,
T

A0 ek 1 K

T

(65)

KekT1 A0T W

where 5  4 1  3W T W ˆ k 1 . Combing (64) and (65) and after manipulation, we have
E V  k  | V  k  1









1
2
    max
 A0  1  33  k  12  ekT1ek 1  31 2  65  352  1 k21  d2 d M2  23152M2
3


.

(66)

Therefore, both the network attack residual ek and the attack flow estimation error
k

are bounded by selecting the appropriate design parameters.
Theorem 5 provides a way to estimate the injected or dropped flow by the attacker,

which can be further utilized to tune the controller parameters of the physical system. Next,
the effect of network attacks on the physical system will be discussed.
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5. PHYSICAL SYSTEM CONTROLLER DESIGN

Consider the physical plant with the system dynamics described by
x p,k 1  Ap x p,k  B p u p,k  Dp d p ,k  Wp p ,k
y p,k  C p x p,k

,

(67)

where x p,k , y p,k , u p,k , d p,k , and  p,k is the system state, output, input, disturbance, and
attack respectively. The subscript " p " , stands for “physical system”, is utilized to
differentiate the network system dynamics variables in (9).
Remark 2: Although it appears from (67) that the attack affects the system state
dynamics, this representation is not limited to the case where the attack targets the states.
For instance, for any actuator attacks, the controller input is manipulated from u p to u ' p
and the dynamics (67) can still be used with the attack term Wp p,k  Bp  u ' p  u p  .
Let  sc , ca 

be the number of sampling cycles to represent the sensor-to-

controller and controller-to-actuator delay information and let  pd be the number of
dropped packets. Assume that if the packets containing control and state information are
delayed or lost, the most recent values will be used. Under this situation, the state feedback
control input and output becomes
u p,k  K p x p,k  sc  ca  pd
y p,k  C p x p,k  sc  pd

.

(68)

Define  p,k  sc   ca   pd and  ' p,k  sc   pd . Then as illustrated in Figure 5.1, this
variable will be used to assess the condition of the communication network, which further
determines the controller gain of the physical system. Suppose that in the absence of any
attacks on the communication networks, the delay and packet losses are bounded by
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 p,k   M 1 . The term  p,k will continue to increase and exceeds  M 1 if the attack has been

launched yet not detected while  p,k will decrease back to normal provided that the attack is
defended successfully or on the other hand, it could keep increasing and finally exceed
 M 2 , which is the maximum allowed value the physical system can tolerate before it can

become unstable.

Communication
Networks

Normal
ε ≤ εM1

Under Attack
εM1 < ε ≤ εM2

Compromised
ε > εM2

Physical
Plant

Stable when
Kp = Kp,1

Stable when
Kp = Kp,2

Unstable

Figure 5.1. Illustration of transitions of the networks and physical states.

For the physical system, the controller gain should be re-configured once an attack
on the networks or an abnormity of  p,k is detected in order to keep the system stable. For
example, suppose K p,1 is the controller gain that stabilizes the system for  p,k   M 1 . Then a
different control gain, K p,2 , needs to be selected once an attack is launched until
 M 1   p,k   M 2 beyond which the system becomes unstable. Next this result is stated in the

Lemma.
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Lemma 5: Let  p,k be the networked induced overall delay and packet loss as
defined by (68). Let  M 1 be the bound of  p,k in the absence of network attacks. The closedloop system (67) in the absence of attacks, i.e.,  p,k  0 , on the physical system is stable
and satisfies the H  performance constraint  k 0


G p x p,k

2

  22




k 0

d p,k

2

for a given

positive scalar  2 , if there exist a real matrix M 3 and PD matrices P5 and P6 satisfying
  P5   M P6


*

*


*


*


0

0

ATp P5T

 P6

0

M 3T

*

 22 I

DTp P5T

*

*

 P5

*

*

*

GTp 

0 

0   0.

0 
 I 

(69)

with  M   M 1 . Moreover, the controller gain K p,1 for the case of  p,k   M 1 is given by
solving
P5 Bp K p,1  M 3 .

(70)

However, the stability of the system for this controller gain K p,1 cannot be
guaranteed if  p,k   M 1 .
Proof: Substituting (68) into (67) yields the closed-loop system dynamics:
x p,k 1  Ap x p,k  Bp K p x p,k  p ,k  Dp d p,k  Wp p .

(71)

Define the Lyapunov function as
Vk  xTp,k P5 x p,k 

 
M1

k 1

i 1

j  k i

xTp, j P6 x p, j ,

(72)

where P5 and P6 are PD matrices with appropriate dimensions. With the absence of
disturbances, the system (71) is stable provided the following inequality holds
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Vk  Vk 1 x p  Vk x p 
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 xTp ,k 
k

T
 x p ,k 1
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T

ATp P5 B p K p ,1

0

*

K Tp ,1 BTp P5 B p K p,1  P6

0

*

*

 P6

*

*

*


0   x p,k


0   x p , k  k

0   x p ,k 1


 P6   x p ,k 

M





0





(73)

Now we consider the closed-loop system with disturbances. Substituting the system
dynamics (71) into (72) yields

 

  

x p,k  k

d p,k

Vk 1 x p  Vk x p  G p x p,k

where

x pa,k   x p,k

 Gp xk    2d Tp,k d p,k  xTpa,k  p1x pa,k
x p,k  M 1 

x p,k 1

 ATp P5 Ap  P5   M 1 P6  GTp G p


*

*
 p1  
*




*

(74)

T

is the augmented states vector and

ATp P5 B p K p ,1

ATp P5 D p

0

K Tp ,1 BTp P5 B p K p ,1  P6

K Tp BTp P5 D p

0

*

DTp P5 D p   22 I

0

*

*

 P6

*

*

0

0 

0 

0 

0 


 P6 

(75)

It is clear that  p1  0 implies that inequality (73) holds thus the system is stable.
Moreover, by Lemma 3,  p1  0 is equivalent to  p 2  0 where

 p2

 ATp P5 Ap  P5   M 1 P6  GTp G p
ATp P5 B p K p,1
ATp P5 D p 



*
K Tp,1 BTp P5 B p K p,1  P6 K Tp BTp P5 D p 


T
2 

*
*
D
P
D


I
p 5 p
2 


(76)

Furthermore,  p 2 can be written as

 p2

  P5   M 1 P6


*

*

 P5 Ap

 G p

0
 P6
*

P5 B p K p,1
0

0 

0 

 22 I 
T

P5 D p   P 1
  5
0  

(77)
  P5 Ap

I   G p

P5 B p K p,1
0

P5 D p 

0 
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With the definition of M 3 P5 Bp K p,1 , we can conclude  p 2  0 (thus  p1  0 ) from
inequality (69) by applying Lemma 3 once again. Next, summing up (74) from 0 to  with
respect to k and considering that the system is stable when  p1  0 , we have




k 0

G p x p,k

2

  22




k 0

d p,k

2

. From (77) it can be seen that  p 2  0 may not hold if

 p,k   M 1 thus the stability of the system cannot be guaranteed.

In Lemma 5, we have shown that the physical system will become unstable once
the network delay and packet losses exceed  M 1 . In the next theorem, we will show that
when the network is experiencing higher delays and packet losses due to network attacks
such that  p,k   M 1 , the controller gain has to be adjusted in order to maintain stability of
the physical system.
Theorem 5: Let  p,k be the networked induced overall delay and packet loss as
defined by (44). For the case of  p,k   M 1 due to the presence of network attacks, the
physical system (71) is stable and satisfies the H  performance constraint if  M 2   M 1 ,
where  M 2 is maximized value of the following convex optimization LMI problem
maximize

M

subject to

P5  0 , P6  0 , and (45)

(78)
Moreover, the controller gain K p,2 for the case of  M 1   p,k   M 2 is given by solving
P5 Bp K p,2  M 3 .

(79)

where M 3 , P5 and P6 are matrices satisfying (78). However, the stability of the system cannot
be guaranteed regardless of the selection of the controller gains if  p,k   M 2 .
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Proof: By solving the optimization LMI problem (78), we get  M 2 , which is the
maximum allowed network delay and packet losses that the physical system can tolerate.
If  M 2   M 1 then the stability cannot be guaranteed as previously explained. On the other
hand, when  M 2   M 1 , the controller gain is derived by solving (69) with  M   M 2 . The
proof of the stability and H  performance in this case is similar to that in the proof of
Lemma 5. Likewise, for  p,k   M 2 , the stability cannot be guaranteed because  p 2  0 in
(77) may not hold. Since  M 2 is already the maximum allowed value, no controller gain L p
could exist to guarantee (78) for  p,k   M 2 .
It is important to note that Theorem 5 gives the maximum network delay and packet
losses that the physical system can tolerate. Appropriate network defense must be launched
once  p,k exceeds this threshold, or the physical system needs to be shut down to prevent
further damages.
Therefore, by combining Theorems 4 and 5, the stability of the physical system
when the network is under attacks can be predicted. To be specific, Theorem 4 gives the
estimated current buffer length ˆ k as well as the transmitting rate ˆk . Thus the current
sensor-to-controller delay can be estimated by
ˆsc  ˆk / ˆk .

(80)

The controller-to-actuator delay ˆca can be estimated in the same way. Furthermore,
it is also given in Theorem 4 that the dropped packets by the attack can be estimated by ˆ k
. Therefore, the overall delays and packet losses can be estimated by
ˆ  ˆsc  ˆca  ˆ k .

(81)
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Next, detection observer is proposed for the physical system in order to detect and
isolate attacks on both networks and physical systems. Define the observer as



xˆ p,k 1  Ap xˆ p,k  B p u p,k  Lp y p,k  yˆ p,k



,

yˆ p,k  C p xˆ p,k  '

Suppose the delay and packet losses increase from

(82)
'

to

 ' 

when the network is

experiencing a higher delay and packet losses due to the network attacks. Define the
estimation error or physical system detection residual as x p,k  x p,k  xˆ p,k , then by combining
(67) and (82) we have the following estimation error dynamics





x p,k 1  Ap x p,k  Lp C p x p,k  '  Lp C p x p,k  '  x p,k  '  Dp d p,k  Wp p,k .

(83)

Let the augmented estimation error vector be
 xTp,k


x pa,k

xTp,k  ' 

xTp,k 1

T

(84)

Then (83) can be rewritten as





x pa,k 1  Apa x pa,k  H pa x p,k  '  x p,k  '  Dpa d p,k  Wpa p,k ,

Apa

where

and

H Tpa   Lp C p

 Ap

I



 0

0

0
0
I
0

,

(85)

 LpC p 

0 
,


0 

DTpa   Dp

0

(86)

0

, and

T
Wpa
 Wp

0

0

. Next the

following lemma is stated to describe the performance of the observer in the absence of
attacks.
Lemma 6: Consider the closed-loop physical system (71) and the observer (85) with
the disturbance bound d p, M and without any attack i.e.  p,k  0 and 

 0 . Select the observer
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gain matrix L such that the observer representation matrix (86) is stable. Then the
estimation error x p,k is bounded by  p,k where
 p,k 



k 1
i 0

k i 1
Apa
Dp d p, M .

(87)
k 1

k i 1
D p d p,k .
Proof: The solution of the differential equation (85) is x pa,k   Apa
i 0

Therefore it follows that
x p,k  x pa,k 



k 1
i 0

k i 1
Apa
Dp d p, M .

(88)

Theorem 6: Consider the closed-loop physical system (71) and the observer (85)
with the disturbance bound d p, M . Attacks on the physical system or on the communication
networks can be detected if  p,k and  satisfies



k 1
i 0





k i 1
Apa
Wpa p  H pa x p,k  '  x p,k  '

   2 p , k .

(89)

Proof: The proof is similar to that of Theorem 3. If (89) holds, we have
k 1

x pa,k 

 A D d
k i 1
pa

p p,k



 W pa p  H pa x p ,k  '  x p ,k  '

i 0

k 1




i 0

k i 1
Apa

W

pa p



 H pa x p ,k  '  x p ,k  '

k 1

  



k i 1
Apa
D p d p ,k

i 0

k 1

 2 p ,k 



. (90)
k i 1
Apa
D p d p ,k

  p ,k

i 0

It is important to note that this theorem shows the detection scheme on the physical
system is able to detect the attacks on the networks due to an increase in the delay and
packet losses. However, detecting the attack by the flow observer will be faster when
compared to on the physical system. Moreover, the location of the attacks can be
determined by applying Theorems 3 and 6 together.
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6. SIMULATION AND HARDWARE IMPLEMENTATION RESULTS

In order to show the effectiveness of the proposed attack detection scheme, several
scenarios involving both the networks and physical systems are considered in the
simulation. On the network side, the first scenario is the simulation for the healthy case
where there is no attack. In the next three scenarios, we show the detection results for the
attacks introduced in the previous section. In the last scenario, we consider a contrived
attack in order to show the limitation of the proposed attack detection scheme.
On the side of the physical plant, we show that the system becomes unstable when
the delays and packet losses exceed a certain threshold. Then it is shown that this
abnormality in the network flow can be detected by the proposed detection scheme and by
reconfiguring the controller gain, the system can be stabilized again. Finally we
demonstrate that the proposed detection scheme is able to detect not only the abnormalities
in the network, but also attacks on the physical system.
Furthermore, the proposed attack detection for the networks has been implemented
in hardware for a wireless sensor network where the results show that both the jamming
attack and the blackhole attack can be detected.
6.1. NETWORK SIMULATION RESULTS
The simulation is performed in MATLAB with the following parameters for the
communication networks: sampling period T  1ms , total simulation time Ts  200T , standard
transmission rate 0  300 packets per T ,the desired flow in the bottleneck node 0  100
packets,

m  3 , l1  1/ 8 , l1  1/ 4 , l1  1/ 2 , the expectation of the delayed measurement   0.1

,the bound for the disturbance dM  10 .
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6.1.1. Scenario A1 (Normal Case). Let   0 and by solving the LMI (45), we get
the following controller and observer gain matrices

K  [0.9971 2.0174 0 0 0]

and

0.0191
0

L  0.0011

0
0

0.9599 -0.9900 0.0564 1.0995 

0
0

0.0024 0.3334 0.3204 0.3250  .

0
1
0
0


0
0
0.6813 0
0.6832 0

The simulation results for the normal case is plotted in Figure 6.1 and Figure 6.2.
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Figure 6.1. Actual flow.

200

50

100
Time (ms)

150

Figure 6.2. Estimation error.

Figure 6.1 shows that the actual flow in the bottle bottleneck node fluctuating
slightly around the desired level. Moreover, the estimation error of the flow in the link
plotted in Figure 6.2 is very close to zero, concluding that the estimated state given by the
observer is fairly accurate. Figure 6.3 shows the input rate while Figure 6.4 shows the
output rate at the bottleneck node.
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Figure 6.3. Input rate at the bottleneck node.
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6.1.2. Scenario A2~A4. In the following three scenarios, jamming attack,
blackhole attack, and minimum rate DoS stream attack has been launch at Ts / 2 ,
respectively. In Scenario A2, the attacker is assumed to increase the number of jammers
in the network linearly along with the time until to the maximum value. As a result, the
packets injected by the attacker increase until to the maximum of 5 packets per millisecond,
as plotted in Figure .6.5. The estimation error of the flow, plotted in Figure 6.6, exceeds
the threshold shortly after the attack is launched and thus it can be detected.
Upon detection, if the new observer introduced in Theorem 4 is applied, then the
attack flow can be estimated as shown in Figure 6.5. Correspondingly, the attack residual
with the new observer decreases after the detection of the attack and eventually becomes
smaller than the threshold. With the estimated attack flow, one can estimate the delay and
packet losses in the link, which can be further utilized to tune the controller parameters of
the physical systems.

135

5

Packets

4
3
2
1
0
90

Attack flow
Est. attack flow
100

110

120

130

140

150

160

170

180

190

200

Time (ms)
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Figure 6.6. Estimation error in Scenario A2.

Similarly, in Scenario A3, we assume the nodes compromised by the black hole
attack increases linearly as displayed in Figure 6.7. Consequently, the estimation error
exceeds the lower bound of the threshold and the attack can be detected after 10 sampling
periods, as shown in Figure 6.8.
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Figure 6.7. Dropped flow by the black hole attacker.
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Figure 6.8. Estimation error in Scenario A3.

In Scenario A4, we launch the minimum rate DoS stream attack as shown in Figure
6.9 with the following parameters n1  5 , n2  1 , p1  2T , p1  5T and T  20T . As shown in
Figure 6.10, although the estimation error increases slower than those in Scenario A2 and
A3, the attack can still be detected as due to the high-data-injecting-rate period of the
attack.
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6.1.3. Scenario A5. In this scenario we consider a type of attack with a special
pattern. We let the attack drop a few packets first and followed by injecting the same
amount of packets, as plotted in Figure 6.11.
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Figure 6.9. Injected flow by the Minimum rate DoS attacker.
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Figure 6.10. Estimation error in Scenario A4.

Note that the number of packets that are injected (dropped) is identical with that
during high-data-injecting-rate period of the Minimum rate DoS stream attack in Scenario
A4. However, as plotted in Figure 6.12, the estimation error never exceeds the threshold
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due to the fact that it is updated in an accumulated way. Due to the delayed measurement
feeding into the observer, the current positive estimation is counteracted with the previous
negative ones, resulting in an insignificant change in the estimation error compared with
the actual variation of the packets in the link. Therefore, this type of attack cannot be
detected by the proposed detection scheme.
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Figure 6.11. Injected and dropped flow in Scenario.
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Figure 6.12. Estimation error in Scenario A5.
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6.2. SIMULATION RESULTS FOR THE PHYSICAL SYSTEMS
The network attack is launched at T=10s and increases its attacking strength at
T=20s. (a): regulation errors when the same controller gain is applied through the
simulation; (b): the estimation error; (c): regulation errors when the controller gain is reconfigured at T=10s, as shown in Figure 6.13
The batch reactor system, which is a benchmark example for studying NCS [30], is
considered in the simulation of the physical system. The continuous system dynamics are
given by
0.2077 6.715
 1.38
 0.5814 4.29
0
x
 1.067
4.273 6.654

0.048
4.273
1.343

 0 0.3
y
0.6 0.3

5.676
0 
 0
5.679

0.675 
0
u
x 
1.136 3.146
5.893 



2.104
0 
1.136
0.3 0 
x
0.6 0.3

(91)

The system is discretized with the sampling period Tp,s  100ms . The disturbance
 p,k follows the uniform distribution within the interval  0.5,0.5 . The total simulation time

is 30 seconds.
1) T  0 10s (  p   M 1 ). For the first 10 seconds, we consider the healthy case where
there are no attacks either on the network or on the physical system. As a result, the
delays and packet losses are bounded by  M 1  2 . Solving the LMI (69) with  2  5
yields the controller gain
K p,1  0.49,0.21,-0.47,-0.38;1.79,0.27, 2.30,0.77 .

The simulation results are shown in Figure 6.13 (a) where the regulation error is fairly
close to zero and thus the system is stable with K  K p,1 .
2) T  10  20s (  M 1   p   M 2 ). Next, we launch the jamming attack introduced in
Scenario A2 on the communication networks at T  10s .
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Figure 6.13. Simulation results for the attack detection on the physical system.

By adjusting the attack strength, we set the delays and packet losses satisfying
3   p  4 , which has exceeded the threshold  M 1  2 . Figure 6.13 (a) shows the simulation

results if the same controller gain K p,1 is applied. It is clear that the regulation errors do not
converge, because the delays and packet losses exceed the threshold and inequality (73)
cannot be satisfied. These results agree with the conclusion from Lemma 5.
However, consider that the physical system is implemented with the observer-based
attack detection scheme (82). Then as shown in Figure 6.13 (b), the estimation error quickly
exceeds the threshold thus the attack can be detected. Since it is shown in Scenario B2 that
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the controller gain K p,1 cannot stabilize the system in this case, we need to compute the
controller gain by solving the optimization LMI problem (78). As a result, we obtain
 M 2  5.8 and K p,2  0.42, 0.52, 0.43, 0.27;1.62,0.20,1.14, 0.64 .

Figure 6.13 (c) shows the convergence of the regulation errors when the new
controller gain K p,2 is applied. Combining Scenario B2 and B3, we can come to the
conclusion that the attacks on the networks can be detected and upon the detection, the
physical plant can be stabilized by selecting the appropriate controller gain.
3) T  20  30s (  p   M 2 ). Suppose that the attacker increases the attack strength at the
time

T  20s

such that  p   M 2 . As shown in Figure 6.13 (a), the system becomes

unstable even if the new controller gain K p,2 is applied, which verifies the conclusion
in Theorem 5.
6.3. PHYSICAL SYSTEM ATTACK DETECTION
It is shown in the previous simulation results that the proposed attack detection
scheme is capable of detecting attacks on the network that leads to an increase in the delays
and packet losses. Next, it is of interest to study the detectability launched on the physical
system directly either through sensor, actuator or other means. Consider an attack launched
at

T  5s

with  p,k

 0.2e0.1k .

As shown in Figure 6.14, the state estimation error increases and exceeds the
threshold shortly after the attack has been launched at the physical system. Therefore, the
attack can be detected, which verifies the correctness of Theorem 6.
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Figure 6.14. Detection of attacks on the physical systems.

6.4. HARDWARE IMPLEMENTATION
The proposed flow based network attack detection scheme is implemented in a
wireless sensor network where the RIFD reader collects the data from the RFID sensors
then sends to the server through a ZigBee network. As shown in Figure 6.15, the links
between the RFID reader and the XBee modules as well as the ZigBee networks are
vulnerable to malicious attacks.
Two types of attacks are considered here: 1) the jamming attack where the attacker
places a transmitter in order to create congestion in the ZigBee network; 2) the blackhole
attack where the attacker blocks the signal of the input node, which causes data losses in
the link.
The proposed flow based attack detection scheme has been implemented on the
source node and for the purpose of demonstration, all the data including the estimation
errors will be sent to the server where a simple user interface has been developed. As shown
in Figure 6.16 (a), the red lines are the lower and higher detection thresholds while the blue
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line is the flow estimation error, which is the difference between the expected and the actual
flow. The estimation error should stay within the bound if there are no attacks launched, as
verified in Figure 6.8.
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Figure 6.15. Diagram of the hardware implementation.

Next, we launch the jamming attack by placing a transmitter which constantly sends
data to the ZigBee network. As a result, more flow is introduced and the attack can be
detected when the estimation error of the traffic flow exceeds the upper threshold, as
verified in Figure 6.16 (b). Similarly, we launch the blackhole attack by blocking the signal
of the input node for some certain time. The attack can be detected when the estimation
error of the traffic flow exceeds the lower threshold, as verified in Figure 6.16 (c). Though
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this hardware implementation does not include the physical system, the effect of the
network within the feedback loop is shown through simulation.

(a)

(b)

(c)
Figure 6.16. Estimation error for (a) the normal scenario; (b) the jamming attack
scenario; (c) the blackhole attack scenario.
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7. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK

The presence of communication links to transmit sensor data and control commands
has brought in vulnerabilities into NCS. A corrupted communication link can introduce
large delays and packet losses, which could lead to the instability of the physical system.
This paper proposes a novel cyber-attack detection scheme that is capable of capturing the
abnormality in those communication links. The detection of the attacks is faster than the
traditional approach where one has to wait for the physical states to be deteriorated. With
the proposed detection scheme, attacks on both the networks and the physical system can
be detected. Upon detection, the physical system can be stabilized by re-configuring the
controller gain. However, the proposed scheme is applicable only to those network attacks
causing delays and packets losses while revealing limitation to sophisticated attacks as
discussed in Section VI. Dealing with sophisticated attacks remains part of the future work.
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IV. AN OPTIMAL Q-LEARNING APPROACH FOR ATTACK DETECTION IN
NETWORKED CONTROL SYSTEMS
Haifeng Niu and S. Jagannathan

In networked control systems, both the communication links and the physical
systems are vulnerable to a variety of attacks. Attacks on the networks may falsify sensitive
data, cause link congestion and/or increase the number of lost packets. As a consequence,
the physical system whose feedback loop relies on these infected networks then becomes
uncertain. Moreover, attacks on the physical systems targeting the sensors or the actuators
may degrade the performance or even lead to the instability of the overall system. In this
paper, we propose a novel attack detection scheme that is capable of detecting attacks on
both the network and the physical system. The network traffic flow is modeled as a linear
system with unknown system dynamics and an optimal Q-learning based controller is
developed to stabilize the flow in the presence of disturbances. An adaptive observer is
proposed to generate the attack residual, which is utilized to determine the onset of an
attack when it exceeds a predefined threshold. For the physical system, we consider a
stochastic system which incorporates network-induced delays and packet losses making
the system dynamics uncertain. The proposed detection scheme includes an optimal Qlearning based event-triggered controller which is capable of detecting attacks on both
sensors and actuators.
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1. INTRODUCTION

Networked control systems (NCS) consists of the system to be controlled, sensors,
actuators, and controllers where different components coordinate through a communication
network. Although after over thirty years’ development NCS are fairly mature with
applications in areas varying from large-scale industrial systems to critical infrastructure,
there are also challenging problems for current research.
Due to the nature of NCS where its components are spatially distributed, the
communication networks between different components can be vulnerable to potential
malicious attacks. For example, the wormhole attacker attracts data traffic by establishing
a link between two geographically distant regions of the network with high-gain antennas
and then delays or drops the attracted data [1]. The jamming attacks over wireless
networks, which are inevitable due to the shared nature of wireless channels, may severely
degrade the performance in terms of message delay and data throughput by broadcasting
radio interferences [2]. The replay attacker maliciously repeats the messages delivered
from the operator to the actuator and causes communication unreliability, which has been
successfully used by the virus attack of Stuxnet [3][4].
Note that none of the attacks mentioned above requires the knowledge of
cryptographic mechanisms. That is to say, the efforts in [5-7] proposing encryption
algorithms that are specially designed for the low-cost and resource-restrained devices for
NCS cannot protect the network security from those attacks. However, one common
attribute shared by these attacks is that they all tend to deviate the amount of traffic flow
in the communication links from the normal value though this traffic flow due to these
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attacks may not be known beforehand. Inspired by this observation, we propose the traffic
flow-based network attack detection scheme.
Flow control has been studied in the literature [8-11]. For example, the authors in
[8] model the high-speed network as fluid-flow queues with a fixed propagation delay for
each channel. As a result, the network is represented by a linear hybrid system, which
allows the design of the flow control on a mathematical basis. In [9], a receiver-based flow
control scheme is proposed that achieves the given optimal utility. The proposed flow
control scheme creates virtual queues at the receivers as a push-back mechanism to
optimize the amount of data delivered to the destinations via back-pressure routing.
Different from [9], the authors in [10] propose a new utility max-min flow control
framework using classic sliding mode control. The framework consists of a source
algorithm and a binary congestion feedback mechanism and is proven to be asymptotically
stable by Lyapunov-based theorem. In [11], a new joint flow control and scheduling
algorithm for multi-hop wireless networks is proposed. Unlike traditional solutions based
on the back-pressure algorithm, the proposed algorithm combines window-based flow
control with a new rate-based distributed scheduling algorithm.
However, to the best of our knowledge, minimal effort has been spent on studying
the flow control from the perspective of network security when the network is attacked by
injecting or dropping traffic flow. Moreover, it is also challenging to regulate the traffic
flow at the desired level in the presence of disturbances and attacks, especially when the
system dynamics that characterize the network parameters are unknown.
On the other hand, the physical system whose feedback loop relies on the
communication networks becomes uncertain in the presence of cyber-attacks. In other
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words, a vulnerable communication network results in larger delays and higher packet loss
ratios, which could further lead to the instability of the physical system [12]. To address
this issue, the authors in [12] incorporate uncertain network-induced delays and packet
losses in the physical system dynamics and propose a stochastic adaptive dynamic
programming (ADP) approach to estimate the value function and solve the optimal
regulation problem. This work is further extended in [13] by adopting the stochastic ADP
technique in an event-driven control scheme, which is reported to significantly reduce the
computation and data transmission. Furthermore, this event-driven control scheme is
improved in [14] by utilizing the interval between the sampling instants for iterative
parameter learning updates. This hybrid Q-learning algorithm renders a higher efficiency
of the optimal regulator.
However, the physical system is also subject to attacks, which is not considered
in the above mentioned effort [12-14]. For instance, an attacker can manipulate the physical
behavior of a system by exploiting the vulnerabilities of the sensors and attempting to
modify or send falsified sensor data to the controller [15]. Similarly, the attacker may also
sabotage the actuator and cause chaos or calamity immediately since the actuator is the
final step in the control chain when the control instructions are made physically real [16].
Therefore, it is critical to take the attack input into account and implement an attack
detection scheme for the physical system.
Therefore, in this paper, we propose a detection scheme that is capable of capturing
the abnormal traffic flow in the networks for certain class of cyber-attacks by modeling the
flow as a linear system with unknown dynamics. Likewise, an attack detection scheme is
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proposed to detect both sensor and actuator attacks on the physical system, whose
dynamics are uncertain due to the networked-induced delays and packet losses.
We begin by introducing the state–space representation of traffic flow in the
presence of disturbances and cyber-attacks. Since the network parameters such as the
service rate are usually unknown, we consider the system dynamics of the traffic flow as
unknown. Next, we derive the optimal controller by using Q-learning technique that
stabilizes the flow during healthy conditions. The network attack detection residual is
generated which in turn is utilized to determine the onset of an attack in the communication
network when the residual exceeds a predefined threshold. Then the detectability condition
is introduced and the performance of the attack estimation scheme is discussed.
Next, we introduce an attack detection scheme for the physical system whose
dynamics are uncertain due to the network-induced delays and packet losses. The eventtriggered optimal control scheme is adopted since it is proven to reduce network traffic
which might help to mitigate congestion in the presence of attacks in the event that attacks
increase traffic flow. Finally the proposed scheme is evaluated though the simulation. The
results verify that the proposed scheme for the networks is able to detect certain types of
attacks and the attacks on the physical system can also be detected.
The contributions of the paper include: 1) the design of the optimal flow controller
in the presence of disturbances and cyber-attacks, where the network parameters are
considered as unknown; 2) the development of novel observer-based network attack
detection and estimation scheme along with detectability condition; 3) the development of
sensor/actuator attack detection scheme with an event-triggered controller for the physical
system with uncertain system dynamics; 4) the derivation of the maximum network-
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induced delays and packet losses that the physical system can tolerate; and 5)
demonstration of the proposed scheme in both simulation in the presence of a class of
attacks with specific adversary models.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the statespace stochastic flow model under cyber-attacks. The observer and controller design is
presented in Section 3, followed by the adversary model and cyber-attack detectability
provided in Section 4. In Section 5 we present the detection scheme and controller design
for the physical system. The simulation as well as the hardware implementation results and
analysis are given in Section 6 and conclusions in Section 7.
The notations used in the paper are briefly introduced. E  x denotes the
expectation of the stochastic variable x , max M  represents the largest eigenvalue of
matrix M , [ M ]ij represents the element in the i th row and j th column of matrix M and

I n denotes the n-dimensional identity matrix.
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2. LINEAR FLOW MODEL WITH UNKNOWN DYNAMICS

Figure 2.1 shows the diagram of a typical NCS, in which both the controller
commands and the sensor data are transmitted through a wired or wireless communication
link. In this section, we propose a stochastic state-space representation in discrete-time for
the traffic flow at the bottleneck link in the presence of attacks, where the network
parameters are considered as unknown.

Actuator

Plant

Sensor

Communication
Network
Bottleneck
Node

Controller

Figure 2.1. Diagram of a typical NCS.

It is verified both theoretically and experimentally [17] that the performance
measures such as the delay and transmission rate are determined by the bottleneck node
and therefore a mild assumption widely reported in the literature [18][19] is asserte.
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Let the input rate at sampling time kT be  k packets per second and uk be the
adjustment from the previous input rate, that is

k  k 1  uk .

(1)

The transmission or service rate  k , which slightly fluctuates around the standard
transmission rate 0 , is modeled by a stable autoregressive–moving-average (ARMA)
process given by [19]

k  0   k ,

(2)

 k  i 1 li k i  dk 1 ,

(3)

where
m

and d k represents a bounded disturbance with d M being its bound while the constant m is
the number of past values used in ARMA model which can be obtained during system
identification and the weights li are unknown constants. Compared with other
transmission rate models such as the random walk model [19], the advantages with the
ARMA process is that it is analytically tractable and capable of capturing a wide range of
possible behavior.
Let the traffic flow in the bottleneck node at time kT be  k . Then we have

k 1  k  T k  Tk  wk ,

(4)

where wk is the number of the packets introduced by the attack flow with wk  0 implies
that the attack has injected data while wk  0 implies that the attack has dropped data. More
detailed representation of the attack models can be found in Section 4. Let the desired flow
at the bottleneck node be  0 and re-write (4) as
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k 1  0  ( k  0 )  T (k  0 )  T k  wk .

(5)

Now define the shifted flow  k and input rate  k as

k  k  0 , k  k 0 .

(6)

Then the flow dynamic in (4) become

k 1  k  T k  T k  wk .
Define the state vector xk   k , k ,  k ,

(7)

,  k m1  [19] and assume that the attack input is
T

a function of the state wk  w  xk  . Then combining (1), (3) and (7) yields

  k 1  1
   0
 k 1  
  k 1  0


  k  0

 

 
 k m  2  0

T

T

0

1

0

0

0

l1

lm1

0

1

0

0

0

1

0    k  0
0
1 







0 
0    k  1 
0 
 
1 
0 
lm    k   0 
    uk    d k    wk .

0    k 1  0 
0 
0 
  

 
 
  

 
 
0   k m 1  0 
0 
0 

(8)

or

xk 1  Axk  Buk  Ddk  Wwk ,

(9)

where A nn , B , D , and W n1 represents the corresponding matrices from (8) with

n m  2 . The attack input wk is unknown but deterministic [1][20][21]. Moreover, the
system output is defined as
   f  xk    v ,k 
yk   k   

 ,
  k   f   xk   v ,k 

(10)

where  k is the link end-to-end delay and  k is the packet loss rate. The functions f and
f  are protocol-dependent functions, which can be either deterministic or stochastic [22].
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The noise sources v ,k and v ,k are immeasurable random values following a certain
distribution [23].
Assumption 1: The network delays and packet losses are primarily determined by
the network protocol and the state xk including the input rate, buffer length, and the service
rate. However, the delays and packet losses become stochastic because they are also affected
by many stochastic factors such as the node processing speed, number of hops in the link
and also measurement noise [22] [23]. For example, the delay in ARQ-enabled slotted radio
networks follows the Poisson distribution with the expected value being
E   

TF
2


TF 1  P  
1 

 1   1  P 2 





where  is the buffer length and other variables are protocol-dependent parameters defined


n  l ,i
 R
in [24]. The Internet time-delay can be modeled as  k   i 0    ti  vL,k  where
 C b 

vL ,k is the noise and other variables are protocol-dependent parameters defined in [25].

Remark 1: Note that matrix A is unknown because the weights l1 , …, lm of the
ARMA process introduced in (3) are unknown . Therefore, an adaptive observer is utilized
in order to estimate the unknown matrix A , which is presented in Section 3.1.
It has been reported in the literature [20] that the network state can be easily
measured when the servers at the output queues are Rate Allocating Servers and the
transport protocol supports the Packet-Pair probing technique. Therefore, in this paper, the
network state in the link is considered accessible. Now we are ready to introduce the flow
observer and controller. Note that controller will be utilized for the system (9) in the
absence of network attacks first.
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3. FLOW OBSERVER AND CONTROLLER DESIGN

In this section, we first introduce the adaptive observer used to estimate the
unknown system dynamics. Then we show the convergence of the estimation error for the
unknown parameters in the absence of attacks. Next, the Q-learning based optimal network
flow controller is introduced along with the stability analysis.
3.1. PARAMETER ESTIMATION
The benefit of the observer is twofold. On one hand, the unknown system dynamics

A needs to be estimated in order to compute the appropriate control input. On the other
hand, by using the measured and estimated states, an estimation error or attack residual is
generated for detection. The observer is described as

xˆk 1  Aˆk xˆk  Am  xk  xˆk   Buk ,

(11)

where xˆk n1 and Aˆk nn is the estimated states and matrix A , respectively. The
matrix Am nn is a stable matrix satisfying a certain condition to be derived later.
Define the estimation error of the matrix A as Ak
of the state vector as xk

A  Aˆk , and the estimation error

xk  xˆk . Then combining (11) and (9) with wk  0 yields the

system state error dynamics, which is given by
xk 1  As xk  Ak xˆk  Ddk ,

where As

(12)

A  Am . The following assumption is needed before we proceed.

Assumption 1: Assume that the attack is launched after the convergence of the
parameter estimation. This assumption is reasonable because in the presence of attacks, it is
impossible to determine whether the state estimation error is caused by the attack input or

160
by the identification error. As a result, the state estimating error and the identification error
may never converge. Next, we show in the following theorem that with the given update
law for the parameter estimation, the estimation error of the matrix A and state vector x
are both ultimately bounded (UB).
Theorem 1 (Parameter Estimation): Consider the network traffic represented as a
flow at the bottleneck node described by (9). Let the adaptive observer be described by (11)
with the following update law

xˆ xT
Aˆk 1  Aˆk  1 k 2k 1 ,
xˆk  1

(13)

where 1  is the design parameter satisfying



 2 1 4 A
s

0  1  min 
As



2

,

xˆk



1  xˆk

2
2





.
2
 1


(14)

Then in the presence of bounded disturbances ( d k  d M ) and in the absence of
network attacks ( wk  0 ), both the parameter estimation error Ak and the state estimation
error xk are UB.
Proof: According to (13), the error dynamics of the unknown system matrix A is
given by

Ak 1  Ak  1

xˆk xkT1
xˆk

2

1

.

(15)



(16)

Select the Lyapunov function as



Lo,k  xkT 1 xk  tr AkT Ak ,

where 1 nn is a positive definite matrix. Then the first difference of Lo ,k is given by
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Lo,k  xkT11 xk 1  tr AkT1 Ak 1  tr AkT Ak .

(17)

Substituting the parameter and state error dynamics (12) and (15) into (17) yields
T

Lo ,k

 A x  Ak xˆk 
 As xk  Ak xˆk  T
 s k
 1 
  xk 1 xk

Dd

Dd
k
k




(18)

T


xˆk xkT1  
xˆk xkT1 


T
tr  Ak  1
  Ak  1
  Ak Ak  .
2
2
xˆk  1  
xˆk  1 



Apply Cauchy-Schwartz (C-S) inequality and (18) becomes



Lo,k  2 As xk  Ak xˆk





T



1 As xk  Ak xˆk  2 DT 1D d M2



ˆkT xˆk xkT1 
AkT xˆk xkT1

2 xk 1 x
 x 1 xk  tr 21
 1
.
2
2 
2
ˆ
x

1

k
xˆk  1 


T
k





(19)

Since we have tr v1v2T   v2T v1 for any vectors v1 , v2 n1 , inequality (19) then becomes



Lo,k  1 1  4 As

2



2

2
M



2
1

1

2

xˆk

2

 4 1 Ak

xˆkT Ak xk 1

2 D 1D d  21
T

xk

1

xk

2

 xˆ

xˆk

xˆk

2



1

2

k

2

(20)

.
2

Now, substituting the state error dynamics into (20) and applying C-S inequality yields



Lo,k  1  4 As
21

xˆkT Ak Dd k
xˆk

2

1

2



1

 2

2
1

xk
xˆk

2

2

 4 1 Ak

A x

s k

 Ak xˆk

2

2

xˆk

 2 D 1 D d  21
T

 A x
T



s k

xˆk

2

2
M



 Ak xˆk  xˆk



1

2

2

xˆkT Ak As xk 1

DT Dd M2

xˆk

2

1
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1  1  1 xˆk

2
xk  21  1  1
2

 1  xˆk

2
 
 1  1 As  4 As  1
2



2



 Ak



2

(21)


12  2 2
  2 1  21 
 D dM .
2 

If (14) is satisfied, we have 1 

1

1
2

As  4 As

2



2 1  4 As

2



As

, which is equivalent to

 0 . On the other hand, (14) also implies that 1 

xˆk

1  xˆ 

2 2

k

which can be expanded as 1  1  1 xˆk

2



1  1
1  xˆk

2

2

1

,

 0 . Therefore, by selecting the

appropriate design parameter 1 such that (14) is satisfied, we then can ensure the
2

coefficients of xk and Ak

2

be negative. According to the standard Lyapunov theorem

[27], the parameter estimation error, Ak , and state estimation error given by the observer

xk are bounded within a small subset.
Remark 2: From (21) it can be seen that in the absence of disturbances, the
parameter estimation error and the state estimation error will eventually converge to zero.
3.2. CONTROLLER DESIGN
Define the instant cost function as
r  xk , uk , k   xkT Pk xk  ukT Rk uk ,

(22)

where Pk nn is a positive semi-definite symmetric time-varying weighting matrix and
Rk  stands for the weighting matrix of the control input. The objective of the controller
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design is to determine a feedback control policy to minimize the following time-varying
value function

J k  xTN S N xN  i k r  xi , ui , i .
N 1

(23)

with N being the final time instant. It is known [28] that the finite-horizon optimal control
input, uk* , can be obtained by solving the Riccati equation (RE)





Sk  AT Sk 1  Sk 1B  BT Sk 1B  Rk  BT Sk 1 A  Pk .
1

(24)

Accordingly, the optimal input is given by

uk*   Kk* xk    BT Sk 1B  Rk  BT Sk 1 Axk .
1

(25)

However, the RE cannot be solved in this case since the system dynamics are
unknown. To address this issue, we will use a Q-learning adaptive approach to estimate the
value function and further to compute the controller gain.
Define the optimal action dependent value function as

Q  xk , uk , N  k 
 r  xk , uk , k   J k 1

T

 xk 
 xk 
u  Gk u  .
 k
 k

(26)

Rewrite the Bellman equation as
r  xk , uk , k   J k 1
T

x  P
 k  k
uk   0

0   xk 
T
  Axk  Buk  Sk 1  Axk  Buk 



Rk  uk 
T

AT Sk 1B   xk 
 x   P  AT Sk 1 A
 k  k T
  .
Rk  BT Sk 1B  uk 
uk   B Sk 1 A

(27)
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Combining (26) and (27) yields

 P  AT Sk 1 A
AT Sk 1B 
Gk   k T

Rk  BT Sk 1B 
 B Sk 1 A

Gkxx
 ux
Gk

Gkxu 
.
Gkuu 

(28)

Therefore the optimal control input can be derived from (25) and (28), which is

 

given by uk*  Gkuu

1

Gkux xk .

(29)

It is important to note that one can compute the control input immediately from the
matrix Gk , even though the system dynamics are unknown. Before proceeding, the
following assumption is required.
Assumption 2 [29]: The slowly time-varying Q-function Q  xk , uk , N  k  can be
expressed as the linear-in-the-unknown parameters (LIP).
With 02, we express Q  xk , uk , N  k  in the following form
Q  xk , uk , N  k   zkT Gk zk

where zk

 xkT

gkT zk ,

(30)

T

ukT  , zk is the Kronecker product quadratic polynomial basis vector of

zk and g k is a vector generated by stacking the columns of Gk into a one-column vector
with the summed off-diagonal elements. Now the smooth and uniformly piecewisecontinuous function g k can be represented as
gk   T   N  k  ,

(31)

where  LL with L  n  n  1 / 2 is the target parameter vector and   N  k  is the



basis function matrix defined as   N  k  i , j  exp  tanh  N  k 
estimated value of target parameter is given by gˆ k  ˆkT   N  k  ,

L 1 j

.

Then the
(32)
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where ˆk is the estimated value of target parameter vector  . Combine (30) with (32) and
then the estimated value function is given by

Qˆ  xk , uk , N  k   ˆkT   N  k  zk
where zk

ˆkT zk ,

(33)

  N  k  zk is the regression function satisfying zk  0 for zk  0 .

Accordingly, the control input using the estimated value function becomes

 

uk  Gˆ kuu

1

Gˆ kux xk .

(34)

Note that if Gˆ kuu is singular then it is replaced by Rk . Then by using the adaptive
observer (11), the Bellman error is given by
T
T
 xˆk   Pk  Aˆ k Sˆk 1 Aˆk
eb ,k 1    
uk   BT Sˆk 1 Aˆ k



 xˆkT Sˆk xˆk  2 Aˆk xˆk  Buk



T

AˆkT Sˆk 1B   xˆk 
 
Rk  BT Sˆk 1B  uk 





Sˆk 1 Am xk  xkT AmT Sˆk 1 Am xk  ˆkT   0   g N I v

(35)

 ˆkT zk  r  xˆk , uk , k    kT   0  I v ,
where zk

zk  zk 1 and I v

Let  k

1,...,1 1L .

zk    0  I v and   xk 

kron  xk , uk  and   xˆk 

kron  xˆk , uk 

with kron   being the quadratic polynomial of the Kronecker product, then (35) can be
rewritten as

eb,k 1  kT k   T   xk     xˆk    r  xk , uk , k   r  xˆk , uk , k  .

(36)

The update law for the value function estimator is given by

ˆk 1  ˆk   2
where  2  0 is the tuning rate.

 k eb,k 1
 k 1
2

,

(37)

166
Then the error dynamics for ˆk becomes

 k eb,k 1

k 1   k   2

 k 1
2

.

(38)

Now we are ready to introduce the boundedness of the closed-loop system.
Theorem 2 (Closed-loop System Stability): Consider the network traffic represented
as a flow at the bottleneck node described by (9). Let the adaptive observer be described by
(11) with the update law given by (13). Let the control input be given by (34) with the
estimated value function tuned by (37) with 0  2  1 5. Then in the presence of bounded
disturbances ( d k  d M ) and in the absence of network attacks ( wk  0 ), the parameter
estimation error Ak , the state estimation error xk , the value function estimation error  k ,
and the system state vector xk are all UB.
Proof: Define the Lyapunov function as





Ls ,k  xkT xk  1tr kTk   2 Lo,k

(39)

where Lo ,k is defined in (16). Then the first difference of the Lyapunov function is given by
2

Ls ,k  Axk  Buk*  Buk*  Buk  Dd k

 xk

2

  2 Lo,k

T

 k eb ,k 1  
 k eb ,k 1  T 

1tr   k   2





  k k .
2
2
2

  k



1


1


k
k
 


(40)

Applying C-S inequality and expand the last term in (40), we have
2

Ls ,k  2 Axk  Buk*  4 B

2

uk*  uk

2

 4 D d M2  xk
2



T
T
 kT  k eb ,k 1

2 eb , k 1 k  k eb , k 1 
1tr 2 2
 2
   2 Lo,k ,
2
2


1


1


k
k





2

(41)
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Note that uk*  uk  Kk* xk  Kˆ k xk

Kk xk and K k   K k where  K is the positive

Lipschitz constant. Then (41) becomes
2

Ls ,k  2 Axk  Buk*  4 B  K2  k
2

2

xk

2

 4 D d M2  xk
2

2



T
T
 kT  k eb,k 1

2 eb , k 1 k  k eb , k 1 
1tr 2 2
 2
   2 Lo,k ,
2
2


1


1


k
k



(42)



Since the closed loop system (9) with the optimal control input u * satisfies

Axk  Buk*   xk

2

with 0    1 2 [1], we then have

Ls ,k   1  2   xk

2


211 1  1  1 xˆk



where 1

2

 4 B  k
2

2
c

2

1  1 
2

 Ak
2
1  xˆk 

 21 22 M2  2   r2 

 4 B 2 K M2
2

 k 1

2

2

(43)

 d .



1
, d
8B  /  2 1 

5


2
2




1
k


2


 xk



2
K


12  2 2
 4  2 1  21 
 D dM
2 


 41 22 M2  2   r2  

   1

2
2
As  4 As  1  , and   and  r are Lipschitz

 /  1 
 k 1
2



  
2
2

8
B
K

M


constants such that   xk     xˆk     xk and

r  xk , uk , k 
r  xˆk , uk , k 

  r xk .

Therefore, the parameter estimation error, Ak , state estimation error given by the
observer xk , the value function estimation error  k , and the system state vector xk are
bounded within a small subset.
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4. NETWORK FLOW ATTACK DETECTION SCHEME

In this section, we first introduce the adversary models of three typical flowtargeted network attacks. Next, we develop the network attack scheme based on the
observer designed in the previous section. The detectability condition is also given under
which certain types of attacks can be detected. After attack detecting, an observer is
proposed to estimate its flow.
4.1. ADVERSARY MODEL
Cyber-attacks are multifarious but they all target at one or more of the three
fundamental properties of information and services: confidentiality, integrity, and
availability, often known as CIA [26]. Confidentiality-targeted attacks are usually
defended by encryption techniques and therefore in this paper, we only concern about
attacks that impair the integrity and availability. Specifically, in the context of flow
management, this paper deals with attacks that either inject false data or drop/block
authentic data. Three types of such attacks are considered as examples.
Jamming Attack: The jamming attacker aims at creating traffic congestion by
placing jammers that consistently inject data into the link. Assuming the attacking strength
(number of jammers) increases linearly, then this type of attack can be modeled by [27]
wk  1  e  k ,

(44)

where k , k and  is the time, percentage of injected data, and the network-related
coefficient, respectively. Jamming attack is plotted in Figure 4.1.
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Black hole Attack: If the attacker manages to compromise one or more nodes in the
routing path from the source to the destination, then a black hole attack has been launched.
As a result, part of the data (depending on the attack strength) would be discarded.
Assuming the attack strength (number of black holes) increases linearly, then the black
hole attack can be modeled by a linear equation [28] given by

wk  1   k ,

(45)

where k , k and  is the attack strength (number of black holes), percentage of dropped
data, and the network-related coefficient, respectively and it is plotted in Figure 4.2.
Minimum Rate DoS Streams Attack: Instead of continuously injecting data, false
data is periodically injected into the network, in order to avoid router-based mechanisms
that detect high rate flows. In this way, the attacker attempts to minimize their exposure to
detection mechanisms. A typical minimum rate DoS stream attack is described by [29]
n1 , for t   kT , kT  p1  ;




wk  n2 , for t   kT  p1 , kT  p2  ;

0, for t   kT  p2 ,  k  1 T  ,

(46)

where n1 , n2 , , p1, p2 ,and T is the first attack strength, second attack strength, packet drop
rate, first attack duration, second attack end time, and total attack period, respectively. The
DOS stream attack is plotted in Figure 4.3. Next, an attack detection scheme is introduced.
4.2. ATTACK DETECTION AND ESTIMATION SCHEME
In this section, we will present the attack detectability condition followed by the
detection scheme performance. Theorem 2 shows that without the presence of the attacks,
the system is stable and the estimation error (or the detection residue) is UB. In the next
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theorem, the attack is introduced and a theoretic condition is derived under which the attack

1

1

0.9

0.9

0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0

0.8

Percentage of dropped data

Percentage of dropped data

Percentage of injected data

can be detected.

0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

Attack strength (num. of jammers)

40

0

0.5

0.4

0.3

0.2

0.1

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Time

20

Attack strength (num. of blackholes)

Figure 4.1. Jamming attack. Figure 4.2. Black hole attack. Figure 4.3. Minimum rate
DoS streams attack.

Theorem 3 (Network Attack Detectability Condition): Consider the network traffic
represented as a flow at the bottleneck node described by (9). Let the adaptive observer be
described by (11) with the update law given by (13). Let the control input be given by (34)
with the estimated value function tuned by (37). Assume the attack is launched at t  k0  0
, after the convergence of the system state xk , matrix A estimation error Ak , and state
estimation error xk . Then the attack is detectable at time t  k  k0  1 if the injected
(dropped) traffic flow w  xk  into (from) the link satisfies


where k



k 1
i  k0

Amk k0 i 1Ww  xi   k  Amk k0 xk0  i k Amk k0 i 1 Ai xi ,
0
k 1



 d / 2122 M2  2   r2  /  k

2





 1  4 B 2 K M2 with  d defined in (43).

(47)
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Proof: According to (43) derived in Theorem 2, the estimation error of the system
state under healthy condition is bounded by
xk  k .

(48)

With the presence of attacks, the error dynamic of the system states becomes

xk 1  Am xk  Ak xk  Ww  xk  .

(49)

The solution of xk 1 with the initial condition of xk0 is given by

xk  Amk k0 xk0  i k Amk k0 i 1 Ai xi  i k Amk k0 i 1Ww  xi .
k 1

k 1

0

0

(50)

Therefore, if the attack input w  xk  is large enough such that (36) is satisfied, by
using triangle inequality we have

Amk  k0 xk0   i  k Amk  k0 i 1 Ai xi
k 1

xk 

0

 i k A
k 1

0





k 1
i  k0

Ww  xi 

k  k0 i 1
m

Amk  k0 i 1Ww  xi  

Amk  k0 xk0 



k 1
i  k0

Amk k0 i 1 Ai xi

(51)

 k .

Note that the inequality (47) presents a sufficient condition under which certain
types of attacks can be detected. However it is not the way how the attack is detected in
practice. Instead, the estimation error or the detection residue is constantly monitored and
the attack is detected when the residue exceeds the bound given by (48).
Upon detecting the attack, it is of interest to know how much flow has been injected
or dropped by the attacker. For this purpose, we propose to add an adaptive term to the
observer (11) to estimate the attack input. Before we proceed, the following assumption
that is widely used in adaptive control [35] is made.
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Assumption 3: Assume the attack input w  xk  is bounded by w  xk   wM and it
T
can be expressed as w  xk    w w  xk  , where  w n1 is an unknown constant vector

bounded by  w   w,M and the regression function w : n1  n1 is known and bounded
by w  xk   w,M .
In the presence of bounded attacks, the system states dynamic becomes
xk 1  Ak xk  As xk  Ddk  Wwk .

(52)

Define the new observer with attack estimation as

xˆk 1  Aˆk xˆk  Am  xk  xˆk   Buk  Wwˆ k ,
where wˆ k

(53)

ˆwT,kw  xk  with ˆw being the estimation of the unknown parameter  w is the

estimated attack input. Combining (53) with (52) yields the state estimation error dynamics
with attack estimation
xk 1  As xk  Ak xˆk  Ddk  Wwk ,

where wk

(54)

ˆ k is the estimation error of the unknown attack input.
wk  w

The next theorem introduces the adaptive update law for the estimation of attack
input such the parameter estimation error of attack input  w,k , the system state xk , matrix

A estimation error Ak , and state estimation error given by the observer xk are all UB.
Theorem 4 (Network Attack Estimation): Consider the network traffic represented
as a flow at the bottleneck node described by (9) in the presence of bounded attacks. Attacks
can be detected when the network detection residual exceeds a predefined threshold given
by (48).
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Upon detecting the attack, consider the observer (53) with the following adaptive
update law for the estimation of unknown attack flow input

ˆk 1  ˆk  4 xkT AˆkT w  xk   3 1  4wT  xk w  xk  ˆk ,

(55)

where 3 , 4  and K nn are design parameters. Then by selecting the appropriate
design parameters, the parameter estimation error of attack input  w,k , states estimation
error xk , and matrix A estimation error Ak are all UB.
Proof: According to (55) with the fact that W TW  1 , the estimation error dynamic
of wk is given by





 w,k  1  3 1   4wT  xk  w  xk   w,k
  4 xkT AˆkT w  xk   3 1   4wT  xk  w  xk   w .

(56)

Now select the Lyapunov function as
Lk  Lo,k  La ,k

where Vo ,k is defined in (16) and La ,k

(57)

 wT,kw,k .

Substituting estimation error dynamics of the system parameters and states (15) and
(54) into Lo ,k , we then have
Lo ,k
T

 A x  Ak xˆk 
 As xk  Ak xˆk  T
 s k
 1 
  xk 1 xk

Dd

Ww

Dd

Ww
k
k 
k
k 



xˆ xT 

tr  Ak  1 k 2k 1 

xˆk  1 



T



xˆk xkT1 

T
 Ak  1
  Ak Ak  .
2

xˆk  1 




Applying C-S inequality and expanding the last term we have

(58)
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Lo,k  2 As xk  Ak xˆk
21

xˆkT Ak xk 1
xˆk

2

 1  4 As

2



21
2

2
1





1

2

xˆk

1

2

1

A x

 xˆ



2

s k

2

xˆk



1

2

2

2

 4 1 Ak

2

xk



1 As xk  Ak xˆk  4 DT 1D d M2  4wkTW T 1Wwk  xkT 1 xk

k

xˆkT Ak As xk 1
xˆk

T

xk

2
1

1



2

xˆk

 4 DT 1 D d M2  4max W T 1W  wk2

xˆkT Ak  Dd k  Wwk 

 21

2

xˆk

 A x
T

 Ak xˆk



s k

xˆk

1



 Ak xˆk  2 xˆk
2



1

2

d

2
M

2

1  1  1 xˆk

2
xk  21  1  1
2

 1  xˆk



 1 
As  4 As  1
2


2

 wM2 

2

  4 1  21  12  d M2   21  12  wM2 .



 Ak



2

(59)

Now substituting the error dynamics of the wˆ k into La ,k yields



La ,k  1  5  w,k   4 xkT AˆkT w  xk   5 w



 1  5  w,k
where 5





T

(60)

  x AˆkT w  xk   5 w  wkT wk .
T
4 k

3 1  4wT  xk  w  xk  ˆw,k .

Apply C-S inequality yields





 3 

 As 

La ,k  2 w2,k  65 w2,k  352  w2,k   w2  3 42  KxkT AsT w  xk  
   2  65  3 
2
5

2
w, k

2 2
4 max

T

2
w, M

K

2

xk

2

 2 

 Kx

2 2
5 w, M

T
k

AsT w  xk  

(61)

.

Therefore, combining (59) and (60) yields the total first difference of the Lyapunov
function, which is given by
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Lk  Lo ,k  La ,k
 
 1  1 As  4 As
2


21 1  1  1 xˆk



2

2

2
 3 42 max
 As w2 ,M K



1  1 
 Ak
2
1  xˆk 

2

2

1

1


 1 xk


  2  65  352  w2,k



2

(62)



  4 1  21  12  d M2   21  12   w2 , M  252  w2, M .

Therefore, by selecting the appropriate parameters such that (14) and
1  3 3  5  1  3 3 hold, the estimation error of attack input wk , states estimation

error xk , and matrix A estimation error Ak are all UB.
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5. ATTACK DETECTION FOR THE PHYSICAL SYSTEM

In this section, we first revisit a stochastic event-triggered optimal control scheme
[14] for a class of linear systems in the presence network-induced delays and packet losses.
An event triggered control scheme is proven to reduce network traffic which might help to
mitigate congestion in the presence of attacks in the event that attacks increase traffic flow.
Next, since a large delay and packet loss rate could lead to the instability of the system, the
maximum overall delay and packet loss that the physical system can tolerate is derived. At
last, we present the proposed a detection scheme for sensor/actuator attacks on the physical
system.
5.1. PHYSICAL SYSTEM DYNAMICS
Consider the stochastic linear continuous-time system with network-induced delays
and packet losses described by
x p (t )  Ap x p (t )  ca  t  Bpu p (t   (t ))  ca'  t  wp t   ' t   ,

(63)

where x p (t ) n , u p (t ) m , and wp  t  n is the system state, controller input, and
attack flow input vector, respectively. The system matrices Ap nn and Bp nm are
considered as unknown. The subscript “ p ” standing for “physical system” is utilized to
differentiate the variable used to denote the network. In particular, the notation  (t ) and

 ' (t ) stand for the network-induced sensor-to-controller delay which is bounded by

 (t )   M and  ca  t  and ca'  t  nn are the packet loss indicators which equal to the
identity matrix I n when the packet is received and the null matrix when the packet is lost.
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Remark 3: The term wp  t  is used to characterize the change in system states caused
by attacks on the sensors or actuators [34]. From the diagram of NCS in 0, it can be seen
that if wp  t  is the sensor attack input, then we have ' (t )   (t ) and ca'  t   ca  t  . On
the other hand, if wp  t  is the actuator attack input, we will have ' (t )  0 and ca'  I n since
the actuator-plant link does not rely on the networks.
Remark 4: It is important to note that although it appears from (63) that the attack
affects the system states, this representation is not limited to the case where the attack targets
at the states [34]. For instance, for any actuator attacks where the controller input is
manipulated from u p to u p  u p , the attack input term in (63) then becomes Bp u p .
Likewise, for any sensor attack where the state in the feedback loop is manipulated from



x p ,k to x p ,k  x p ,k , then the system dynamics becomes x p ,k 1  Ap x p ,k  Bp K p ,k x p ,k  x p ,k



. In this case, the attack input becomes wp,k  Bp K p,k x p,k . Attacks on the physical systems
can be detected if wp  t  satisfies certain condition. This will be discussed later in Section
5.2 after the healthy case, i.e., wp  t   0 .
Let the augmented state be defined as x p,k  [ x pT,k

u pT,k 1

u pT,k  M ]T n M m

and discretizing system (42) within the sampling period  kTs ,  k  1 Ts  yields the
simplified system dynamics
x p,k 1  Ap x p ,k  Bpu p,k  Wp wp ,k ,

(64)

where u p ,k and wp ,k are the discretized control input and attack input respectively and
matrices Ap , B p and W p are defined in [12]. The following assumption is needed in order

178
to proceed.
Assumption 4: Let assumptions (1-4) presented [14] hold.
The event-triggered control (ETC) from [14] is adopted in this paper due to benefits
mentioned before. Furthermore, unlike traditional event-triggered control schemes, the
proposed approach in [14] utilizes the time-driven Q-learning along with the iterative
parameter learning updates within the event-sampled instants to both improved efficiency
of the optimal regulator and obtain a more generalized online Q-learning framework.
For the system dynamics(64), define the instant cost function as
rp  x p,k , u p ,k , k   xTp ,k Pp ,k x p ,k  uTp ,k Rp ,k u p ,k ,

(65)

where Pp ,k is a positive semi-definite matrix and R p ,k is a positive define matrix. The
objective of the controller design is to determine a feedback control policy to minimize the
following value function
1 

J p ,k  E   i k rp  x p ,i , u p ,i , i  .
 , 2



(66)

Define the action-dependent Q-function as



Q  x p ,k , u p ,k   E r  x p ,k , u p ,k   J p ,k 1
 ,



  x p ,k T
 x p ,k  
 E 
G
 p , k u   .
 ,
u
p
,
k


 p ,k  


(67)

From the Bellman equation, we have
T
T
T 
E  ATp S p ,k 1Bp    x 
 x p ,k 
 x p ,k   x p ,k   Pp ,k  E,  Ap S p ,k 1 Ap 
 ,
 p ,k .
u  E, G p ,k  u   u  


T
T
Rp ,k  E Bp S p ,k 1B p  u p ,k 
 p ,k 
 p ,k   p ,k   E, Bp S p ,k 1 A
 ,



(68)
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where E G p ,k
 ,



 E G pxx,k  E G pxu,k 
 ,
 ,
 . The control input is given by
 E G ux  E G uu 
 , p ,k  , p ,k 





ux
u p ,k  E  Guu
p ,k  G p ,k x p ,k .

 ,

1

(69)

The Q-function in parametric form is given by

Q  x p,k , u p ,k   E zTp ,k Gp ,k z p ,k   E Tk k  ,
 ,

where z p ,k

 x T
 k p ,k

(70)

 ,

T

uTp ,k  ,  k is the Kronecker product quadratic polynomial basis


vector of z p ,k , and  k is a vector generated by stacking the columns of G p ,k into a onecolumn vector with the summed off-diagonal elements. The estimation of the optimal Qfunction is given by









ˆ T ,
Qˆ  x p ,k , u p ,k   E zTp ,k Gˆ p ,k z p ,k  E 
k k
 ,
 ,

(71)

ˆ is the estimation of the unknown expected target parameter  . In eventwhere 
k
k

triggered control systems, the state vector is sent to the controller only when the trigger
condition is violated. Let kl  with l 

and k0  0 denote the sequence of event-trigger

instants.
The state vector is held at the controller until the next sampling instant and it is
expressed as xep ,k  x p ,k for kl  k  kl 1 . The event-sampled error is then given by
l

eET ,k  x p ,k  xep ,k

.

(72)

Accordingly, the estimated Q-function using x ep ,k becomes









ˆ T e .
Qˆ  xep ,k , u p ,k   E z ep,,Tk Gˆ p ,k z ep ,k  E 
k k
 ,
 ,

(73)
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where z ep ,k

 xe T
 k p ,k

T

uTp ,k  and  ke is the Kronecker product quadratic polynomial


basis vector of z ep ,k . Then the Bellman error with the event-sampled states is given by





ˆ T   
eB,k  E r  x p ,k , u p ,k   
k
k
s ,k ,
 ,

where  s ,k

(74)

e
ˆ T  k   .
r  x p ,k  eET ,k , u p ,k   r  x p ,k , u p ,k   
k
 k 

It can be seen from (74) that the Bellman error also depends on the event-sampled
error eET ,k . Therefore, the estimation of the optimal Q-function depends on the frequency
of the event-sapling instants. With the event-sampled states, the estimated optimal control
input is given by



u p ,k   Gˆ uu
p ,k



1

e
.
Gˆ ux
p ,k x p ,k

(75)

ˆ
At the event-sampled event, the Q-function estimator (QFE) parameter vector 
k

is tuned by using the history data of the Bellman error (74) for a faster convergence. Define
the auxiliary Bellman error as

ˆ T Z e , for k  kl ,
 ek  
k k

eB,k
Z ke

where

ek



 r x p ,k , u p ,k
l
l


 r x

p , kl 1

, u p ,kl1

kl

kl1



r x p ,klv1 , u p ,klv1 


(76)

klv1 





and
with

v  being the

ˆ is
number of past values. At the event-sampled instants, The QFE parameter vector 
k

tuned with the following update law [V, 29]:
k 2 Z ke1 eB ,k 1
ˆ
ˆ
k  k 1 
, for k  kl ,
T
1  Z ke1k 2 Z ke1
T

(77)
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where

k 1Z ke1Z ke1k 1
T

k  k 1 

, for k  kl ,

1  Z ke1k 1Z ke1
T

(78)

with 0  0 I , 0  0 , a large positive value.
Within the time between two event-sampled event, parameters are updated
iteratively in order to minimize the error calculated after previous event sampling instant.
The update law for the QFE parameters is selected as
ˆ j 
ˆ j1 

k
k
l

l

k j2 Z k j1 TB ,k j1
l 2

1 Z

k j  k j1 
l

l 1

l 1

T
kl j11

l 1

and

k j1 Z k j1
l 2

k j1 Z k j1 Z kTj1 k j1
l 1

l 1

l 1

l 1

1  Z kTj1 k j1 Z k j1
l 1

(79)

l 1

l 1

,

(80)

l 1

where the superscript “ j ” denotes the iteration index.



and then the error


kj Z kj ,e  Bj ,,ek 


0
 E kj 
 , k  kl and
T
j
,
e
j
j
,
e
 ,
1  Z k k Z k 




(81)


kj Z kj ,e  Bj ,,ek 

 0
 E kj 
, kl  k  kl01 .
j ,eT
j
j ,e 
 ,
1  Z k k Z k 




(82)

Define the QFE estimation error as E k 
 ,



ˆ
E k  
k

 ,

dynamics can be derived by using (77) and (79), which is given by



E 

 ,



E 

 ,

0
kl 1

j 1
kl





T

T

The event-trigger condition design is critical because on one hand, excessive
triggering clearly deviates from the original intention of reducing the data transmission. On
the other hand, insufficient triggering will result in a regulation error, thus degrading the
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performance and even leading to the instability of the system. Here, the event-trigger
condition is given by [14]:
f  k    f  kl  1 , k   kl  1, kl 1  ,

where f  k 

(83)

xTp ,k x p ,k is a quadratic function with   0 and   1 . Now we are ready to

introduce the QFE performance as well as the closed-loop system stability under healthy
case where there are no attacks on the physical system.
Theorem 5 (Parameter Estimation and Stability) [14]: Consider the closed-loop
system (64) in the absence of attacks on the physical system and the network. Let the control
input be given by (75) with u0 being an initial admissible control input. Suppose the QFE
estimator vector is updated by using (77) at the event-sampled instants and (79) during the
inter-sampling period. Select the event-trigger condition given by (83). Assume the
regression vector  kj satisfies the persistently exciting (PE) condition. Then there exists a
l

constant  min  0 such that both the state vector x pj ,k and the QFE estimation error converge
l

to zero asymptotically in the mean square. Moreover, the estimated Q-function





 

*
Qˆ  x p ,k , u p ,k   E Q*  x p ,k , u p ,k  and the estimated control input u p ,k  E u p ,k with the

 ,

 ,

event-sampled instants kl   .
In the above analysis, we consider the case where the communication network is in
healthy condition, i.e., the delays and packet losses are bounded by a small value. However,
the delays and packet losses increase in the presence of attacks on the network and lead to
instability of the physical system. Therefore, it is of interest to determine the maximum
delays and packet losses that the physical system can tolerate.
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Let  kl , kl   p ,k  be the interval during which there is no sensor data received at
the controller. Then the value of  p ,k depends on the following three factors: the eventtrigger error, network-induced delays and packet losses. This can be explained with the
following simplified example.
Suppose the event is triggered at kl  0 and the controller received the event with
no delay. The next event is triggered at k  3 however the packet containing this event is
lost. Then the event will be triggered again at k  4 since the control input has not been
changed and the trigger error keeps increasing. Suppose that the network-induced delay is

  2Ts , then the time that the controller receives the event will be k  6 . Therefore, in this
case we have  p ,k  6Ts . The following theorem gives the maximum timespan  p ,k that the
physical system can tolerate.
Theorem 6 (Maximum Delay and Packet Loss): Consider the closed-loop system
(64) without physical attacks and the control input is given by (75). Suppose the QFE
estimator vector is updated by using (77) at the event-sampled instants and (79) during the
inter-sampling period.
Theorem 7: Assume the communication network is under attacks such that the
timespan  p ,k is always greater than  m . Then the physical system becomes unstable if  m
satisfies
kl  m 1

m
min  E  Ap x p ,kl   Apkl  m i 1B pu p ,i
 ,
i  kl




 max  E x p ,kl
 ,

2





  min E kl
 ,

2



2



 .

(84)
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Proof: Let the last event triggered time be kl . Then if the timespan  p ,k is always
greater than  m , there will be no control updates during the interval  kl , kl   m  . Select the
Lyapunov function as
Lp1,k  L  kl j   Lx p  k  ,

where L,k



E Tk j k1j k j

 ,

l

l 1

l



and Lx p  k 

(85)

E xTp ,k x p ,k  . Then by using the error

 ,

dynamics (79), one can get the first difference of L,k , which is given by

L,k

 Tk j1 Z kTj1 Z k j1 k j1 
  E  l1 T l1 l1 l1  .
 ,
 1  Z klj11 klj22 Z klj11 

(86)

Since the regression vector satisfies the persistently exciting (PE) condition



Z k j1 Z kTj1
l 1
l 1
0 E
  1,
 , 1  Z T 
Z

kl j11 kl j22 kl j11 


(87)

we then have



L  kl    min E kl1
 ,

2

.

(88)

Furthermore, the first difference of Lx p  k  is given by



Lx p  k   E xTp ,kl  m x p ,kl  m  xTp ,kl x p ,kl
 ,

 min  x p ,kl  m

2

 max  x p ,kl .
2


(89)

Therefore if the event is not triggered for enough long time, the difference of the
second term in the Lyapunov function, Lx p  k  , will keep increasing and become the
dominant one in (85) and thus Lp ,k . To be specific, if (84) is satisfied, by combining (88)
and (89) we have
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Lp1,k  L  kl j   Lx p  k 
 min  x p ,kl  m



  min E kl
 ,

2

2

 max  x p ,kl

  L  k   0.

2

 L  kl j 

j



l

Hence the stability of the physical system cannot be guaranteed if  p ,k   m always holds.
Remark 5: Theorem 6 gives the maximum network delay and packet losses that the
physical system can tolerate. Appropriate network defense must be launched once  p ,k
exceeds this threshold, or the physical system needs to be shut down to prevent further
damages.
5.2. ATTACK DETECTION FOR THE PHYSICAL SYSTEM
It is shown in the previous section that in the absence of attacks on the networks
and the physical system, the system is asymptotically stable. If the network is under attacks
such that (84) is satisfied, the physical system then becomes unstable. In this section, we
examine the scenario where the network is in the healthy condition whereas the physical
system suffers from attacks. To be specific, the detectability condition is derived under
which the attacks on the physical system can be detected.
Consider the system described by (64) in the presence of physical attacks. Suppose
that the attack input wp ,k is considered as a disturbance and no defenses will be launched,
if it is smaller than a given threshold, i.e., wp ,k  wp ,M . Then the following theorem shows
the boundedness of the system state vector for the case that wp ,k  wp ,M .
Theorem 8 (Physical Attack Detection): Consider the closed-loop system (64) in the
absence of attacks on the network and let the control input be given by (75) with u0 being
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an initial admissible control input. Suppose the QFE estimator vector is updated by using
(77) at the event-sampled instants and (79) during the inter-sampling period. Select the
event-trigger condition given by (83). Assume the regression vector  kjl satisfies the PE
condition. Let wp , M be the threshold below which the attack input wp , M is considered as a
disturbance. Then the attack can be detected when the system states vector satisfies



E x p ,kl

 ,



p

where  p ,k is defined in the proof.

Proof: Consider the following Lyapunov function:
Lp 2,k  L  kl j   Lx p  kl  ,

(90)

where L  kl j  and Lx p  kl  are defined in (85) and  13 0 with1  1 and 3 defined
later in the proof. First, we consider case at the aperiodic event-sampled instants. Substitute
the system dynamics (64) into Lx p  k  and one can get the first difference of Lx p  kl  ,
which is given by





Lx p  kl   E xTp ,kl x p ,kl  xTp ,kl 1x p ,kl 1 
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 Ax
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(91)

Applying C-S inequality yields
Lx p  kl  



E 2 Ap x p ,kl 1  B pu p ,kl 1
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  A x
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 B pu p ,kl 1  2wTp ,kl 1W p wp ,kl 1  xTp ,kl 1x p ,kl 1



187





T
2
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 min  x p ,kl 1  4 x p ,kl 1 Bp K p ,kl 1  

 E
,
 ,
 Ap x p ,k 1  2  Bp K p ,k 1 x p ,k 1  2wTp ,k 1Wp wp ,k 1 
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l
l
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where 

2 ATp Ap   and Wp

(92)

WpT Wp .

Applying Young’s inequality, we have
2
2
  x

 2 1 Ap x p ,kl 1 
min
p , kl 1




2
Lx p  kl   E  
,
2 
 ,
2     Bp , M u p ,kl 1  2max Wp w2p , M 
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(93)

where  1 is a positive constant and Bp , M is the bound of B p .
Since the estimation error of the control input, u p ,k 1 , satisfies [14]
l



E u p ,kl 1

 ,

2







2
2
1
 4G
 2 2 x p ,kl 1 
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4
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 E 

2
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R
2
 ,
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2



2

x p ,kl 1




,
2




(94)

where G p , M is the bound of G ux
p , k and  2 is a positive constant.
Substituting (94) into (93) yields
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(95)

188
Combining (88) and (95), we have the total first difference of the Lyapunov
function, which is given by







Lp 2,k   min   2 E x p ,kl 1



 ,

    0 3   min E kl 1
 ,

2



2


 

 2max Wp w2p , M .

(96)

Therefore, the first term in (96) is negative by selecting the appropriate min . Recalling
the definition of  in the beginning of the proof, one can conclude that the second term is
also negative.
For the interval between two event-sampled instants, we have Lp 2,k  0 because
the trigger condition (83) guarantees Lx p  kl   0 while (88) guarantees L  kl j   0 .
Combining these two cases, we conclude that in the presence of physical attacks bounded
by wp ,k  wp ,M , the system state vector is bounded in the mean by



      w

E x p ,kl 1 

 ,

2max Wp
min

p,M

p .

(97)

2



That is to say, if the state vector satisfies E x p ,kl
 ,



p

, it implies that the attack

input exceeds the threshold (i.e., wp ,k  wp ,M ), thus is considered as an attack.
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6. SIMULATION AND HARDWARE IMPLEMENTATION RESULTS

In order to show the effectiveness of the proposed attack detection scheme, several
scenarios involving both the networks and physical systems are considered in the
simulation.
6.1. NETWORK SIMULATION RESULTS
On the network side, the first scenario is the simulation for the healthy case where
there is no attack. In the second scenarios, we pick the jamming attack introduced in the
previous section as an example to show the attack detection and estimation results.
The simulation is performed in MATLAB with the following parameters for the
communication networks: sampling period T  100ms , total simulation time Ts  500T ,
standard transmission rate 0  300 packets per T ,the desired flow in the bottleneck node

0  300 packets, m  3 , l1  1/ 8 , l1  1/ 4 , l1  1/ 2 , Pk and Rk are identity matrices with
appropriate dimensions.
6.1.1. Scenario A1 (Normal Case). Figure 6.1 shows that in the absence of attacks,
the QFE error becomes very close to zero, which verifies the result given in Theorem 1.
Moreover, Figure 6.2 shows the actual and desired number of packets in the bottleneck
node and the actual number of packets fluctuates around the desired value, which agrees
with the conclusions of Theorem 2.
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Figure 6.1. QFE error converges in the absence of attacks.
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Figure 6.2. Actual and desired number of packets in the bottleneck node.

6.1.2. Scenario A2 (Under Attack). In this scenario, the jamming attack is
introduced at t  250T . As depicted in Figure 6.2, the attacker is assumed to increase the
s
number of jammers in the network linearly along with the time until to the maximum value.
As a result, the packets injected by the attacker will increase to the maximum of 500
packets per sampling period. The estimation error of the flow, plotted in Figure 6.3,
exceeds the threshold shortly after the attack is launched and thus it can be detected, which
confirms Theorem 3.
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Figure 6.3. Injected flow by the jamming attack with estimation.
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Figure 6.4. Estimation error exceeds the threshold in Scenario A2.

Upon detection, if the observer introduced in Theorem 4 is applied, then the attack
flow can be estimated. As shown in Figure 6.2, the estimated attack input given by the
observer is able to track the actual attack input after only a few seconds. With the estimated
attack flow, one can estimate the delay and packet losses in the link, which can be further
utilized to tune the controller parameters of the physical systems.
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6.2. SIMULATION RESULTS FOR THE PHYSICAL SYSTEMS
On the side of the physical plant, we first evaluate the performance of the hybrid
event-sampled controller in the absence of physical and network attacks. Then we show
that the system becomes unstable when the delays and packet losses exceed a certain
threshold due to attacks on the network. Finally we demonstrate that the proposed detection
scheme is able to detect the attacks on the physical system.
The inverted pendulum system is considered in the simulation of the physical
system. The continuous system dynamics are given by
 0
x t    g
  k2
 l ml

1
 0 
 x t    1  u t 
 2
0

 ml 

(98)

with l  2 , g  10 , m  1 and k  5 . The system is discretized with the sampling period
Tp , s  100ms . The penalty matrices Pp ,k and R p ,k are identity matrices with appropriate

dimensions. The system state is initialized with x0   2, 3 and the total simulation time
is 500 seconds.
6.2.1. Scenario B1 (Normal Case). In this scenario, the network in assumed be in
the healthy condition. To be specific, the maximum delay is 150ms and the packet loss rate
is 0.1, as shown in Figure 6.5.
As shown in Figure 6.6, the system states converge to close to zero after about eight
seconds, although the initial states are fairly far from their target values. Figure 6.7 shows
the comparison of the evolution of the parameter estimation error between a traditional
time-driven Q-learning and the hybrid event-triggered learning approach.
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Figure 6.5. Delay and packet loss in Scenario B1.
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Figure 6.6. Convergence of system states in Scenario B1.
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Figure 6.7. Estimation error comparison between the time-driven Q-learning and the
hybrid event-trigger learning algorithm.

194
It can be observed that the convergence time for the hybrid learning algorithm is
much faster than the time-driven approach. Therefore, Figure 6.6 and Figure 6.7 confirm
Theorem 5.
6.2.2. Scenario B2 (Network under Attack). In this scenario, we suppose the
network is under attack such that the maximum delay is 250ms and the packet loss rate is
0.2, as shown in Figure 6.8. As a result, the overall delay exceeds the maximum value that
the system can tolerate. Therefore, as depicted in Figure 6.9, the physical system becomes
unstable, which confirms Theorem 6.
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Figure 6.8. Delay and packet loss in Scenario B2.
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Figure 6.9. System becomes unstable in Scenario B2.

195
6.2.3. Scenario B3 (Physical System under Attack). In this scenario, we first
introduce an actuator attack on the physical system at ta  250Tp ,s where the input is
manipulated from u p ,k to u p,k  u p,k with u p ,k  1.2  k  250  as shown in Figure 6.10.
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Figure 6.10. Attack on the physical system in Scenario B3.

As a result, the magnitude of the states increases after the launch of the attack and
exceeds the detection threshold shortly, as shown in Figure 6.11.
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Figure 6.11. Actuator attack detection for the physical system.
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Next, a sensor attack is introduced where the measured state is manipulated from
x p ,k to x p ,k  x p ,k with x p ,k   20 20T , as shown in Figure 6.10. Figure 6.12 shows the

detection results, where it can be seen that right after the attack is launched, the magnitude
of the states exceeds the threshold. Therefore, the attack can be detected, which verifies the
conclusion of Theorem 7.

15
||x||
Detection threshold

||x||

10

5

0
220

225

230

235

240
Time (second)

245

250

255

260

Figure 6.12. Actuator attack detection for the physical system.
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7. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK

Many cyber-attacks on the networked control systems target at the availability
rather than the secrecy of the data. For such attacks, even the most complicated encryption
algorithm cannot defend them. To address this issue, in this paper, we proposes a novel
cyber-attack detection scheme that is capable of capturing the vulnerable communication
links, which is challenging because the system dynamics are unknown. The detection of
the attacks is faster than the traditional approach where one has to wait for the physical
states to be deteriorated. The proposed detection scheme for the physical system is able to
detect both sensor and actuator attacks. Moreover, the knowledge of the maximum delays
and packet losses that the system can tolerate helps the operator protect the plant from
further damages based on the ongoing network condition. The limitation of proposed
scheme is that it is applicable only to those network attacks causing delays and packets
losses.

198
8. REFERENCES

[1]

P. Lee, A. Clark, L. Bushnell, and R. Poovendran, “A passivity framework for
modeling and mitigating wormhole attacks on networked control systems,”
Automatic Control, IEEE Transactions on 59, no. 12, pp. 3224-3237, 2014.

[2]

Z. Lu, W. Wang, and C. Wang, “Modeling, evaluation and detection of jamming
attacks in time-critical wireless applications,” Mobile Computing, IEEE
Transactions on 13, no. 8, pp. 1746-1759, 2014.

[3]

M, Zhu, and S. Martinez, “On the performance analysis of resilient networked
control systems under replay attacks,” Automatic Control, IEEE Transactions on
59, no. 3, pp. 804-808, 2014.

[4]

N. Falliere, L. O. Murchu, and E. Chien, W32.Stuxnet Dossier Symantec
Corporation, 2011.

[5]

A. Teixeira, I. Shames, H. Sandberg, and K. H. Johansson, “A secure control
framework for resource-limited adversaries,” Automatica, vol. 51, pp. 135-148,
2015.

[6]

H. Sandberg, S. Amin, and K. H. Johansson, “Cyber-physical security in networked
control systems: an introduction to the issue,” IEEE Control Systems, vol. 35, no.
1, pp. 20-23, 2015.

[7]

M. Mozaffari-Kermani, K. Tian, R. Azarderakhsh, and S. Bayat-Sarmadi, “Faultresilient lightweight cryptographic block ciphers for secure embedded systems,”
Embedded Systems Letters, IEEE 6, no. 4, pp. 89-92, 2014.

[8]

D. Browning, “Flow control in high-speed communication networks,”
Communications, IEEE Transactions on 42, no. 7 pp. 2480-2489, 1994.

[9]

C. Li, and E. Modiano, “Receiver-based flow control for networks in overload,”
Networking, IEEE/ACM Transactions on 23, no. 2, pp. 616-630, 2015.

[10]

J. Jin, W. Wang, and M. Palaniswami, “A simple framework of utility max-min
flow control using sliding mode approach,” Communications Letters, IEEE 13, no.
5, pp. 360-362, 2009.

[11]

P. Huang, X. Lin, and C. Wang, “A low-complexity congestion control and
scheduling algorithm for multihop wireless networks with order-optimal per-flow
delay,” IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON) 21, no. 2, pp. 495-508,
2013.

199
[12]

H. Xu , S. Jagannathan, and F.L. Lewis, “Stochastic optimal control of unknown
linear networked control system in the presence of random delays and packet losses,”
Automatica 48, no. 6, pp. 1017-1030, 2012.

[13]

A. Sahoo, H. Xu, and S. Jagannathan, “Adaptive neural network-based eventtriggered control of single-input single-output nonlinear discrete-time systems,”
IEEE Transactions on Neural Networks and Learning Systems, vol. 27, no. 1, 2016.

[14]

V. Narayanan and S. Jagannathan, “Distributed adaptive optimal regulation of
uncertain large-scale interconnected systems using hybrid q-learning approach,”
IET Control Theory & Applications, 2016.

[15]

Y. Chen, S. Kar, and J. Moura, “Cyber-physical systems: Dynamic sensor attacks
and strong observability,” In Acoustics, Speech and Signal Processing (ICASSP),
IEEE International Conference on, pp. 1752-1756, April 2015.

[16]

G. Tao, S. Chen, X. Tang, and S.M. Joshi, Adaptive Control of Systems with
Actuator Failures, Springer Science & Business Media, 2013.

[17]

J. C. Bolot, “End-to-end packet delay and loss behavior in the Internet,” In ACM
SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review, vol. 23, no. 4, pp. 289-298, 1993.

[18]

Y. T. Hou, S. S. Panwar, and H. Tzeng, “On generalized max-min rate allocation
and distributed convergence algorithm for packet networks,” Parallel and
Distributed Systems, IEEE Transactions on 15, no. 5, pp. 401-416, 2014.

[19]

E. Altman, and T. Basar, “Optimal rate control for high speed telecommunication
networks,” In Decision and Control, Proceedings of the 34th IEEE Conference on,
vol. 2, pp. 1389-1394, December 1995.

[20]

J. Luo, X. Yang, J. Wang, J. Xu, J. Sun, and K. Long, “On a mathematical model
for low-rate shrew DDoS,” Information Forensics and Security, IEEE Transactions
on 9, no. 7, pp. 1069-1083, 2014.

[21]

P. Tague, D. Slater, R. Poovendran, and G. Noubir, “Linear programming models
for jamming attacks on network traffic flows,” In Modeling and Optimization in
Mobile, Ad Hoc, and Wireless Networks and Workshops, IEEE 6th International
Symposium on, pp. 207-216, April 2008.

[22]

Y. Ge, Q. Chen, M. Jiang, and Y. Huang, “Modeling of random delays in networked
control systems,” Journal of Control Science and Engineering, vol. 2013, Article
ID 383415, 9 pages, 2013.

[23]

W. Zhang, and J. He, “Statistical modeling and correlation analysis of end-to-end
delay in wide area networks,” Software Engineering, Artificial Intelligence,
Networking, and Parallel/ Distributed Computing, IEEE Eighth ACIS International
Conference on 3, pp. 968-973, 2007.

200
[24]

I. Cerutti, A. Fumagalli, and P. Gupta, “Delay models of single-source single-relay
cooperative ARQ protocols in slotted radio networks with Poisson frame arrivals,”
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON) 16, no. 2, pp. 371-382, 2008.

[25]

K. Han, S. Kim, Y. Kim, and J. Kim, “Internet control architecture for internetbased personal robot,” Autonomous robots 10, no. 2, pp. 135-147, 2001.

[26]

S. Keshav, “A control-theoretic approach to flow control,” ACM, vol. 21, no. 4, pp.
3-15, 1991.

[27]

S. Jagannathan, Neural Network Control of Nonlinear Discrete-time Systems, CRC
Press, Boca Raton, RL, 2006.

[28]

F.L. Lewis and V.L. Syrmos, Optimal Control, 2nd. Wiley, New York, 1995.

[29]

K.S., Narendra, and S. Mukhopadhyay, “To communicate or not to communicate:
a decision-theoretic approach to decentralized adaptive control,” Proceeding of
American Control Conference (ACC), pp. 6369-6376, July 2010.

[30]

M. Bishop, Computer Security: Art and Science, vol. 200. Addison-Wesley, 2012.

[31]

P. Tague, D. Slater, R. Poovendran, and G. Noubir, “Linear programming models
for jamming attacks on network traffic flows,” In Modeling and Optimization in
Mobile, Ad Hoc, and Wireless Networks and Workshops, IEEE 6th International
Symposium on, pp. 207-216, May 2008.

[32]

P. Raj, and P. B. Swadas, “Dpraodv: A dyanamic learning system against blackhole
attack in AODV based manet,” arXiv preprint: 0909.2371, 2009.

[33]

A. Kuzmanovic and E. W. Knightly, “Low-rate TCP-targeted denial of service
attacks: the shrew vs. the mice and elephants,” In Proceedings of the conference on
Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer
communications, pp. 75-86. ACM, August 2003.

[34]

F. Pasqualetti, F. Dorfler, and F. Bullo, “Attack detection and identification in
cyber-physical systems,” Automatic Control, IEEE Transactions on 58, no. 11, pp.
2715-2729, 2013.

[35]

K. S. Narendra and A. M., ANnaswamy, Stable Adaptive Systems, New York, NY,
USA: Dover, 2015.

201
V. ATTACK DETECTION AND APPROXIMATION IN NONLINEAR
NETWORKED CONTROL SYSTEMS USING NEURAL NETWORKS
Haifeng Niu and S. Jagannathan

In networked control systems, the communication links, sensors and actuators are
vulnerable to a variety of potential malicious attacks. Certain class of attacks on the
communication network is known to raise traffic flows causing delays and packet losses to
increase. In this paper, we propose a novel attack detection and estimation scheme that is
capable of capturing the abnormal traffic flow as a result of a class of attacks on the
communication links within the feedback loop of a control system. The network flow at
the bottleneck node is modeled as a nonlinear system with unknown dynamics. By using
an observer, network attack detection residual is generated which in turn is utilized to
determine the onset of an attack in the communication network when the residual exceeds
a predefined threshold. For the physical system, we develop an attack detection scheme by
using an optimal or approximate dynamic programming-based event-triggered controller
in the presence of network delays and packet losses. Moreover, attacks on the sensor or
actuators of the physical system can be detected and further estimated with the proposed
attack detection scheme.
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1. INTRODUCTION

Networked Control Systems (NCS) are feedback systems with control loops closed
by using a communication network [1]. In NCS, the digital controllers receive measured
data from sensors and transmit control commands to the actuators through a
communication network. This communication network is vulnerable to adversaries due to
two reasons [2]: 1) the components are resource-constrained and low-cost embedded
devices and it is difficult to deploy advanced security algorithms; and 2) in a few
applications such as smart grid, the networks are distributed geographically.
The defense methodology, therefore, for NCS has received significant attention. A
vast literature focusing on the development of light-weight encryption methods was
summarized in [3][4]. However, unlike the traditional information technology (IT)
systems, the protection of data confidentiality and integrity alone is far from enough in
NCS because the physical system can be affected by the network attacks through the
feedback actuation. One example is that the network delay induced by jamming attacks
could lead to control system performance degradation which may potentially lead to
instability [5].
Besides encryption methods, there is also significant effort aiming at protecting the
information security of the networks, but from a different perspective [6-8]. For instance,
in [1], the denial of service (DoS) flooding attacks by a continuous-time Markov chain to
compute security measures is introduced using state space approach. The authors in [7]
study the cyber defense by modeling the actions of the attacker and the defender as a
stochastic zero-sum game. A similar game-theoretic approach has been adopted in [8]
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where the authors generate expected probabilities of the attacks and build a transition
model to access the network security.
In [3-8], the communication network security is considered whereas others [9-12]
concentrate on the detection of state abnormality in the physical system due to attacks on
the network, sensor and actuator devices. For instance, the authors in [9] study attacks on
control system components compromising of measurement and actuator data integrity and
availability, and model their effect on the physical system dynamics. In [10], the state of
the physical system under false data injection attack is represented with an additive term.
In [11], the estimation and control of linear systems when sensors or actuators are corrupted
by an attack is provided, together with a secure local control loop that can improve the
resilience of the system. The authors in [12] analyze the stealthy attacks and propose
methods to approximate the reachable set of states for such stealthy adversaries.
However, these research efforts [9-12] assume the system dynamics to be linear
and known whereas in real application they may become uncertain under network
conditions [5]. Although this issue has been addressed in [5][13] with Q-learning and zerosum game theoretic formulation, there is another major concern that has not been covered
yet. To be specific, the communications networks are probably already compromised when
a significant deviation is observed in the physical system state vector. For this reason, it is
crucial to monitor not only the state vector of the physical system, but also the condition in
the communication links. Therefore, in this paper, we propose a detection scheme that is
capable of capturing the abnormal traffic flow in the communication links for certain class
of cyber-attacks.
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Flow control has been studied in the literature [2][20-22]. For example, authors in
[20] use a Kalman state estimator in discrete-time for reactive flow control in networks that
do not reserve bandwidth. An optimal rate-based flow controllers is derived in [21] by
using the decentralized Linear Quadratic Gaussian theory. The authors in [22] proposed a
distributed algorithm using a feedback-based flow control mechanism which converges to
the generalized max-min rate allocation.
However, to the best of our knowledge, minimal effort has been spent on studying
the flow control from the perspective of network security when the network is attacked by
injecting traffic flow. In particular, the authors in [2] present a control-theoretic framework
for modeling and analyzing defense against the jamming attacks on cyber-physical
systems. However, the assumption that the system representation is linear and known in
[2][20][21], which may not be realistic since physical systems are invariably nonlinear.
In this paper, we begin by introducing the nonlinear representation of the traffic
flow under cyber-attacks for the communication network. Next, we derive the neural
network (NN)-based controller that stabilizes the flow within a desired level during healthy
conditions and without attacks. By using an adaptive observer, network attack detection
residual is generated which in turn is utilized to determine the onset of an attack in the
communication network when the residual exceeds a predefined threshold. Then we give
the detectability condition which is a mathematical inequality that determines whether an
attack is detectable or not.
Next, the performance of the attack detection scheme is discussed. Upon detecting
attacks, a novel observer is proposed in order to estimate the flow that has been injected by
the malicious attacker. For the physical system, we introduce an event-triggered control
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scheme in the presence of network delays and packet losses resulting of network attacks.
Moreover, attacks on the sensor or actuator of the physical system can be detected and
further estimated with the proposed attack detection scheme.
The contributions of the paper include: 1) the development of novel observer-based
network attack detection and estimation scheme along with detectability condition for
nonlinear NCS with unknown system dynamics; 2) demonstration of the proposed scheme
in the presence of a class of attacks with specific adversary models; 3) development of
event-triggered controller in the presence of network delays and packet losses and physical
attacks on the sensor and the actuator; and 4) the development of the attack detection and
estimation for attacks on the physical system.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the
nonlinear flow model under cyber-attacks, followed by the observer and controller design.
The observer-based network attack detection and estimation scheme along with
detectability condition for the networks is presented in Section 3. The event-trigger control
scheme, the attack detection and estimation for the physical system are presented in Section
4. The simulation results and analysis are given in Section 5 and conclusions in Section 6.
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2. CONTROLLER AND OBSERVER DESIGN FOR THE NONLINEAR FLOW
MODEL
2.1. NONLINEAR FLOW MODEL
In this section, first the communication network in a NCS is modeled and a
nonlinear flow controller is designed. Figure 2.1 shows the block diagram of a NCS, where
both the controller commands and the sensor data are transmitted through a wired or
wireless communication link. In this section, we propose a nonlinear model in discretetime for the traffic flow at the bottleneck link in the presence of attacks. It is verified both
theoretically and experimentally [23] that the performance measures such as the delay and
transmission rate are determined by the bottleneck node and therefore a mild assumption
that is widely reported in the literature [24][25] is asserted.
The buffer length at the bottleneck node can be described by the following
nonlinear discrete time mode:
xk 1  f  xk   Tuk  d k  wk
 y1,k   h1  xk  
yk  


 y2,k   h2  xk  

where xk , uk , d k , wk 

n

,

(1)

is the buffer length, input rate, disturbances, and attacker input at

the bottleneck node at instant time k , respectively, T being the sampling interval, and
nonlinear function f  represents the uncertain actual traffic accumulation and is a
function of buffer length and service capacity. yk is the system output where y1,k and y2,k
stands for the delay and packet loss, respectively. The relationship between the delay
(packet loss) and current buffer length is described by the stochastic function h1 ( h2 ).
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Figure 2.1. Diagram of a typical NCS.

Let the desired buffer length at instant time k be xd ,k and define the tracking error
of the buffer length as
ek  xk  xd ,k .

(2)

The objective is to derive the appropriate input flow rate uk such that the difference
between the desired and actual buffer length can be minimized. Substituting the system
dynamics (2) into (1), we have the tracking error dynamics
ek 1  f  xk   Tuk  dk  wk  xd ,k 1 .

(3)

Since the nonlinear function f  is unknown, a one-layer neural network (NN)
will be utilized to estimate f  . Let
f  xk    T   xk    k ,

(4)

where  T is a vector of constant weights bounded by    M and   is the activation
function bounded by    M .  k is the NN functional construction error vector. Define
the output of the NN as
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fˆ  xk   ˆkT   xk  .

(5)

Now define the input uk as





uk   fˆ  xk   xd ,k 1  Kek / T ,

(6)

where K is a diagonal feedback gain matrix. Substituting (6) back into (3) yields the
closed-loop tracking error dynamics
ek 1  Kek  kT   xk    k  dk  wk ,

(7)

where kT   T  ˆkT is the parameter error during the estimation. From (7) it can be seen that
the tracking error in the buffer length is driven by the modeling parameter error as well as
the disturbances and the attacker input.
Assumption 1: (1) The desired buffer length xd ,k is bounded [26]. (2) The NN
reconstruction error  k is bounded by  M , a known constant. [26]. (3) The disturbance and
the attack flow are bounded by known constants d M and wM respectively. (4)Next, a
controller design that stabilizes the buffer length to the desired level is revisited [26]. After
that, we will present the proposed observer and show that the estimation error of the buffer
length and the modeling parameter error converge to a small subset.
It has been reported in the literature [27] that the network state can be easily
measured when the servers at the output queues are Rate Allocating Servers and the
transport protocol supports the Packet-Pair probing technique. Therefore, in this paper, the
network state described by input rate and the current buffer length in the link are considered
accessible. Next, a nonlinear NN controller design that stabilizes the buffer length to the
desired level is revisited [26]. After that, we will present the proposed observer and show
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that the estimation error of the buffer length and the modeling parameter error converge to
a small subset in the absence of attack input first and with attack input.
2.2. CONTROLLER DESIGN
First the following definition and Theorem 1 are needed before presenting the
observer.
Definition 1: Consider the following nonlinear system
xk 1  f  xk , uk 

(8)

where xk and uk is the state vector and input vector, respectively. The solution is said to be
uniformly ultimately bounded (UUB) if for all xk0  x0 , there exist a  
N   , x0  





and an

such that xk   for all k  k0  N .

Theorem 1 [26]: Consider the flow model at the bottleneck node described by (1).
Select the flow input rate (6) with the parameter update law provided by
ˆk 1  ˆk    xk  ekT1   I    xk  T  xk  ˆk ,

(9)

where   0 is a design parameter. Then the tracking error of the buffer length ek , and the
modeling parameter error ˆk are UUB, if the following conditions are satisfied:
   xk   1
2

0   1

,

(10)

K M  1/ 

where K M is the maximum singular value of the gain matrix K and  is given by


2   xk 

2

1     x    1  

1     xk 

2

k

2

2

1     x   .
2

k

(11)
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Next the observer is introduced to generate the estimated buffer length even though
it is measured. The purpose of the observer is to generate the attack detection residual.
2.3. OBSERVER DESIGN
Let xˆk be the estimated buffer length and the observer is described as
xˆk 1  ˆkT   xk   Tuk  L  xk  xˆk  ,

where L 

(12)

is the observer feedback gain matrix. Define the estimation error as xk  xk  xˆk .

Combing (12) and (1) yields the estimation error dynamics
xk 1  Lxk  kT   xk    k  dk  wk .

(13)

Theorem 2: Consider the flow model at the bottleneck node described by (1) and
the observer described by (12). Select the flow input rate (6) with the parameter update law
provided by
ˆk 1  ˆk    xk  xkT1   I    xk  T  xk  ˆk .

(14)

Then the estimation error of the buffer length, xk , and the modeling parameter error,
 k , are UUB, provided the design parameters are selected as follows
   xk   1
2

0   1

,

(15)

LM  1/ 

where LM is the maximum singular value of the gain matrix L and  is given by (11).
Proof: The proof is similar to that of Theorem 1 and is briefly presented below.
Select the Lyapunov function as





Vk  V1  V2 , where V1  xkT xk and V2   1tr kT k .

(16)
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Then substituting the tracking error dynamics (7) into V1 yields the difference
V1  xkT1 xk 1  xkT xk





 xkT LT L  I xk   T  xk  k  kT   xk   1,Tk 1,k ,

(17)

2 xkT LT  kT   xk   2 xkT LT 1,k  2  xk  k 1,k

where 1,k   k  dk  wk . Substituting the modeling parameter error update law (9) into V2
yields the first difference



V2   1tr  kT1 k 1   kT  k



 kT  2,T k  2,k k   kT  k   2  xk   T  xk  1,k 1,Tk



  tr 

2 T
2
2
T
T T
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
  2, k  k  k  21, k   xk   2, k  k  2 k  2, k  2, k  k 


1

(18)

where 2,k  I    xk T  xk  .
Combining (17) and (18) and completing the squares for  k , one obtains



V   1   L2M

x

2

k

 2 1 LM  M xk   2







 3, k  kT   xk   3,1k Kxk  1  3,k    2,k
2

 1  2, k

1  2 

  2     k 
M 
2



2

,

M

(19)

2

where



  1       ,




   1        
     2     1   

2
 1  1  1  M

 2  1  M2  1  M2




2
2 1  M

M M

1

1

2
M

2
M

2

2
M

2
M

1

M

2
M

2
M

,
2
M

3,k  1   T  xk   xk  , and M   M  dM  wM .

Therefore we have V  0 as long as (10) and
xk  1 ,

(20)
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where 1 



 1 LM  M   12 L2M  M2   2 1   L2M



. Similarly, combining (17) and (18) and

1   L2M

completing the squares for xk , one obtains

V   1   L2M  xk







1



 2,k

where  3   2 M2 

2

2



 1 LM  M
1   L2M

 2   
 k
 


2

2


T
1
  3,k  k   xk   3,k Lxk  1  3,k    2,k




 2 1    M  k

1   
2
M

2
M

, (21)

 L2M  12  M2

2
 2 1  M
M  M  M


2
 1   LM

2 
.
2
1


2
2
2
2
2
   1    1  
 1  M  M  
M
M
 M

 






  3 








  





Then we have V  0 as long as (10) and the following condition for  k hold
 1    M   2 1     M2    2     3
2

k 

 2  

.

(22)

Therefore, V becomes less than zero once the estimation error exceeds the
threshold in (20) or the parameter error exceeds the threshold in (22). That means that the
estimation error of the buffer length and the modeling parameter error converge to a small
subset with the proposed update law (14).
2.4. ATTACK DETECTION AND ESTIMATION
In the previous section, we have shown that the estimation error of the buffer length
and the modeling parameter error converge to a small compact subset. Based on the results,
the attack detectability condition is derived. Upon the detection of the attacks, another NN
is deployed in order to estimate the flow injected by the attacker. It is shown that the
modeling parameter error of the attack flow also converges to a small compact subset.
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Theorem 3 (Attack Detectability Condition): Consider the flow model at the
bottleneck node described by (1) and the observer described by (12). Attacks can be
detected if the injected (dropped) flow wk satisfies



k 1
i 0

K k i 1wk  1 



k 1
i 0



K k i 1 kT   xk    k  dk



.

(23)

Proof: The solution of the error dynamics (13) is given by



xk 

k 1
i 0





K k i 1 kT   xk    k  dk  wk .

(24)

If (23) is satisfied, by triangle inequality we have
xk 



k 1
i 0

 1 

K k i 1wk 



k 1
i 0





k 1
i 0



K k i 1  kT   xk    k  d k

K k i 1  kT   xk    k  d k



k 1
i 0




K k i 1  kT   xk    k  d k



.

(25)

 1

Remark 1: The detectability condition proposed in Theorem 3 is a theoretical
condition under which class of attack flows can be detected. However, this is not the way
how the attack is detected in practice. Instead, the network detection residual is constantly
monitored and the attack is detected once the residual exceeds the bound given by (20) due
to attack input and as shown in the first part of Theorem 4.
Upon detecting the attack given in terms of bounded traffic flow input, this theorem
also shows that the buffer flow estimation error and parameter estimation error are
bounded.
Theorem 4 (Attack Estimation): Consider the flow model at the bottleneck node
described by (1) and the observer described by (12). Assume that the attack flow can be
modeled as wk  wT,kw  xk    w,k where  w,k , w  and  w,k is the weight vector, activation
function and the modeling error of the attack flow respectively. Then attacks can be
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detected when the network detection residual exceeds a predefined threshold given by (20).
Upon detecting the attack, apply the following observer given by
xˆk 1  ˆkT   xk   Tuk  Lw  xk  xˆk   ˆwT,k w  xk  ,

(26)

where Lw is the feedback gain matrix. ˆk is the estimation of the weights vector for the
unknown nonlinear function f which is updated by
ˆk 1  ˆk  1  xk  xkT1  1 I  1  xk  T  xk  ˆk .

(27)

Similarly, ˆw,k is the estimation of the weights vector for the attack flow and it is
tuned using
ˆw,k 1  ˆw,k   2w  xk  xkT1  2 I   2w  xk wT  xk  ˆw,k

(28)

Then the estimation error of the buffer length xk , the modeling parameter error  k ,
and the modeling parameter error of the attack flow  w,k are UUB, if the following
conditions are satisfied:
0  



2
1
min   xk  , w  xk 
12

0  1 
0  2 

1  1/ 15
I  1  xk  

T

 xk 

1
15
1
15

I   2 w  xk   wT  xk 

Lw, M 

,

(29)

  xk  w  xk 
  xk  w  xk 

 1 

1  1/ 15

2

,

(30)

1
I  1  xk   T  xk 

,

1

 2 

(31)

I   2 w  xk   wT  xk 


4  51   xk   5 2 w  xk 
2

where  , 1 ,  2 , 1 , and  2 are design parameters.

2

,

(32)
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Proof: Select the Lyapunov function as
Vk  V1  V2  V3 ,

(33)

where V1   tr xkT xk  , V2  tr kT k  , and V3  tr wT,kw,k  . Substituting (26) into (1) yields
the state estimation error dynamics
xk 1  Lw xk  kT   xk   wT,kw  xk   4,k ,

where 4,k

(34)

dk   k   w,k

Applying the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, we have
V1   xk



 

2

4 xkT LTw Lw xk  4 T  xk  kT   xk 

  tr 

T
T
T
4w  xk  w,k w,k w  xk   4 4,k  4, k 

 4 L2w, M

x

2

k

 4   xk 

2

k

2

 4 w  xk 

2

(35)
 w, k

2

 4  4,k

2

where Lw, M is the maximum eigenvalue of the gain matrix Lw .
Combining the update law (27) and the state estimation error dynamics (26) yields



 k 1   k  1  xk  Lw xk   kT   xk    wT,k  w  xk    4,k







T

 1 I  1  xk   T  xk  ˆk

 1  I  1  xk   T  xk   k  1  xk  xkT LTw  1  xk   wT  xk  w,k  1  xk   4,T k

(36)

1 I  1  xk   T  xk   k

Applying the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality yields
V2    k

2

512   xk 

 512  k
2

 4,T k

2

2

 5L2w, M 12   xk 

2

2

xk

 512   xk 

2

w  xk 

2

 w,k

2

2

 512 I  1  xk   T  xk   M2

,

(37)

T
where 1 1  1 I  1  xk   xk  .

Similarly, we have
V3    w,k

2

5 22 w  xk 

 5 22  w,k
2

 4,T k

2

2

 5L2w, M  22 w  xk 

2

xk
2

2

 5 22 w  xk 

 522 I   2w  xk  wT  xk   w2, M

2

  xk 

2

k

2

(38)
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where  2 1  2 I  2w  xk wT  xk  .Combining (35), (37) and (38), one obtains
V  V1  V2  V3
2
2
     4 L2w, M  5L2w, M 12   xk   5L2w, M  22  w  xk   xk





 1  4   xk   512  5 22  w  xk 

2

 1  4  w  xk   5 22  512   xk 


2

2

2

 4  4



where

2
1

  xk   4 22  w  xk 
2

2



  xk 

2



2

,

2

(39)

k

2
w  xk    w,k

2





2
4, k

2

.

2

512 I  1  xk   T  xk   M2  5 22 I   2w  xk  wT  xk   w2, M

If inequality (32) is satisfied, then the first term in (39) is negative. If inequalities
(29) through (31) are satisfied, we have
4   xk 

2

4 w  xk 

1
1
 , 512  , 5 22 w  xk 
3
3
2
1
1
 , 5 22  , 512   xk 
3
3

1
3

2

  xk  

2

w  xk  

2

2

(40)

1
3

Then the second and the third terms in (39) are also negative. Furthermore, since
  xk  , w  xk  ,  4,k , 1 and  2 are all bounded, the last term in (39),  , is also bounded, i.e.,
   M . Thus, we have V  0 in a compact set as long as inequalities (29) though (32)

hold, and the following conditions are satisfied:

xk

2

   4 L2  5L2  2   x 
w, M
w, M 1
k

 /
2
 5L2w, M  22 w  xk 


or  w,k

2

2



 or  k



2

1  4   x  2  5 2
k
1
 /
2

2
 5 2 w  xk    xk 

1  4   x  2  5 2
w
k
2

 /
2
 512   xk  w  xk 




2.





2



(41)

Therefore, the modeling parameter error  k , and the modeling parameter error of
the attack flow  w,k are UUB.
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3. ATTACK DETECTION FOR PHYSICAL SYSTEMS

In this section, we first revisit a stochastic event-triggered optimal control scheme
[29] for a class of nonlinear systems in the presence network-induced delays and packet
losses. An event triggered control scheme is proven to reduce network traffic which might
help to mitigate congestion in the presence of attacks in the event that attacks increase
traffic flow. Next, since a large delay could lead to the instability of the system, the
maximum overall delay that the physical system can tolerate is derived. At last, we present
the proposed a detection scheme for attacks on the physical system.
3.1. PHYSICAL SYSTEM DYNAMICS
Consider the stochastic nonlinear continuous-time system described by
x p (t )  f p ( x p (t ))   (t ) g ( x p (t ))u p (t   (t ))  wp ( x p (t )) ,

(42)

where x p (t ) n , u p (t ) m , and wp ( x p (t )) n is the system state, controller input, and
attack input vector, respectively. The subscript “ p ” standing for “physical system” is
utilized to differentiate the variable used to denote the network. The nonlinear functions
f p ( x(t )) n and g p ( x(t )) nm are considered as unknown with f p (0)  0 and x  0 being

the unique equilibrium point. In particular, the notation  (t ) stands for the network-induced
sensor-to-controller delay and  (t ) nn is the packet loss indicator which equals to the
identity matrix when the packet is received and the null matrix when the packet is lost.
Remark 2: The term wp ( x p (t )) is used to characterize the change in system states
caused by attacks on the sensors or actuators. Attacks on the physical systems can be
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detected if wp ( x p (t )) satisfies certain condition. This will be discussed later in Section 3.3
after the healthy case, i.e., wp ( x p (t ))  0 .
Assumption 2: Let assumptions (1-7) presented in [29] hold.
Let the augmented state be defined as

zk  [ xTp, k

discretizing system (42) within the sampling period

uTp ,k 1

 kTs ,  k  1 Ts 

uTp, k  d ]T n  dm

and

yields the simplified

system dynamics
zk 1  F ( zk )  G( zk )u p, k  Wp  zk  ,

where F ( zk ) dm n and

 dm  nm

G( zk ) 

(43)

are the discretized system dynamics defined in [16]

and Wp  zk  dm n is the discretized attack input function matrix.
The event-triggered control (ETC) from [29] is adopted in this paper due to benefits
mentioned before. As illustrated in Figure 3.1, an NN-based adaptive model is utilized to
estimate the state vector and to approximate the unknown system dynamics.

Controller
uk

u’k

x^k
Identifier
Critic NN
Actor NN

Plant

xk

Sensor
x’k

Attacks
xki

Network

xki

Trigger
Condition

Figure 3.1. Structure of MBETC with attacks on the controller and sensor.
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The sensor data will be sent to the controller only when the trigger condition is
violated. Let xk be the state vector held at the controller, which is given by
xk  x p, ki , for ki  k  ki 1 ,

(44)

with the event-triggered instant ki i1 being the subsequence of sampling instants k  .
Then the augmented event sampled state vector becomes zk  zk with zk  [ xkT uTp,k 1
i

uTp, k  d ]T

and zk  [ xTp,k uTp,k 1 uTp,k d ]T . The error between zk and zk can be expressed as
i

i

i

i

eET ,k  zk  zk

,

(45)

where eET , k is referred to as event sampling error. Let the infinite horizon stochastic value
function in terms of the augmented state vector be given by
Vk  E
 ,




j k



zTj Qz z j  uTp , j Rz u p , j , k  0,1, 2,... ,

(46)

where Qz and Rz are positive definite (PD) penalty matrices. However, the optimal control
input is usually difficult to obtain because: 1) it is very challenging to solve discrete time
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation; 2) the nonlinear matrix function G  zk  is
unknown. Therefore, an NN-based solution [29] is adopted.
3.2. STOCHASTIC ETC DESIGN
The dynamics of system (43) can be written as
zk 1  [ F ( zk ) G( zk )][1 ukT ]T  Wp  zk   E{IT I ( zk )uk   e, I ( zk , eET ,k )},
 ,

where

 I  [ FT

GT ]T ( m1)l

I

( dm  n )

(47)

is the constant target NN weights vector with  F and G

being the targets for the respective functions F and

G . The activation function are selected

as I ( zk )  diag F ( zk ) G ( zk ) and F ( zk ) l , G ( zk ) ml m with lI being the number of
I

I
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neurons.

The

vector

uk  [1 uTp, k ]T

is

the

augmented

 e, I ( zk , eET ,k )  IT [I ( zk  eET ,k )  I ( zk )]uk   I ( zk  eET ,k ) Wp  zk 

is

control
the

event

input

and

sampled

reconstruction error where  I ( zk  eET ,k )   I uk with  I  [ F ( zk )  G ( zk )] being the NN
reconstruction error.
Let the event-based identifier dynamics be defined as
zˆk 1  Fˆ ( zk )  Gˆ ( zk )u p, k  E{ˆIT I ( zk )uk } ,
 ,

(48)

with ˆI being the NN weights of the identifier. Let the estimation error of the identifier be
E{zk }  E{zk  zˆk } and

 ,

 ,

then one can get the error dynamics as
 IT, k I ( zk )uk  ˆIT [I ( zk )   I ( zk )]uk 
E{zk 1}  E 
.
 ,
 ,
 I ( zk )  Wp , k  zk 


(49)

The NN weights update law for the identifier is given by
 k II ( zk 1 )uk 1zIT, k


E {ˆI , k }  E ˆI , k 1 
,
T
 ,
 ,
(I ( zk 1 )uk 1 ) (I ( zk 1 )uk 1 )  1 


(50)

with  I  0 being the learning rate and  k being the event-trigger indicator which equals to
one if the event is triggered and zero otherwise.
Similar to the previous subsection, define the critic NN estimation of the value
function and the weights update law as
Vˆk  E{ˆVT, k V ( zk )} ,

(51)

 k V V  zk  eV , k 


E{ˆV , k }  E ˆV , k 1 
,
 ,
 ,
VT  zk  V  zk   1




(52)

 ,

where V

0

is the learning rate and V  zk  V  zk 1   V  zk  . The estimated optimal

control input and the NN weight update law are defined as

221
uk  E{ˆuT, ku ( zk )} ,

(53)



   ( z )eT


E {ˆu , k }  E ˆu , k 1  Tk u u k 1 u ,k 1  .
 ,
 ,
u ( zk 1 )u ( zk 1 )  1



(54)

 ,

where u  0 is the learning rate. The event-trigger condition design is critical because on
one hand, excessive triggering clearly deviates from the original intention of reducing the
data transmission. On the other hand, insufficient triggering will result in a regulation error,
thus degrading the performance and even leading to the instability of the system. Here, the
adaptive event-trigger condition is given by [29]



 ET , k D E, {eET , k }

where

2

 ET , k  12GM2 C2u E, {ˆu ,k }  CI E, {ˆI ,k }

2

2



E {z k }

p  ,

2

,

(55)

with, 0    1 ,  p  2(1  2 p ) , 0   p  1/ 2 and GM is

the upper bound of the matrix function G( zk ) . The function D  is the dead zone operator
defined as D  x   0 when E {zk }  Bz and D  x   x otherwise with Bz being the UB of the
 ,

system state. Now the boundedness of the system under healthy case when there are no
attacks on the network and physical system are shown.
Theorem 5 [29]: Consider the system (43) with the event-trigger condition (45),
NN identifier (48) with the weight update law (50), the critic NN (38) with the weights
update law (52), and the actor NN (53) with the weights update law (54). Assume that there
is no attack on the network and/or the physical system. Then there exist three constants
0  I 

1

2

, 0  V  1 2 , 0  u  1 4 , and positive integer N such that E, {zk } , E,  I , k  , E, V , k  ,

and E, u , k  are ultimately bounded in the mean for all ki  k0  N . Further, the estimated
optimal value function and control input converge close to their respective optimal values.
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In the above analysis, we consider the case where the communication network is in
healthy condition, i.e., the delays and packet losses are bounded by a small value. However,
the delays and packet losses increase in the presence of attacks on the network and lead to
instability of the physical system. Therefore, it is of interest to determine the maximum
delays and packet losses that the physical system can tolerate.
Let

k , k   p,k 

be the interval during which there is no sensor data received at the

controller. Then the value of  p,k depends on the following three factors: the event-trigger
error, network-induced delays and packet losses. This can be explained with the following
simplified example. Suppose the event is triggered at
event with no delay. The next event is triggered at

k 0

k 3

event is lost. Then the event will be triggered again at

and the controller received the

however the packet containing this
k  4 since

the control input has not

been changed and the trigger error keeps increasing. Suppose that the network-induced
delay is   2Ts , then the time that the controller receives the event will be

k  6 . Therefore,

in this case we have  p,k  6Ts . The following theorem gives the maximum timespan  p,k that
the physical system can tolerate.
Theorem 6: Consider the nonlinear discrete-time system (43) without physical
attacks i.e. Wp  zk   0 . Assume the communication network is under attack such that the
timespan  p,k is always greater than  m . Then the physical system becomes unstable if  m
satisfies
rE

 ,

where

z

 m  ki

2

 zki
2

2

T
2
r  6GM
C2u E {ˆu ,k }  CI E {ˆI ,k } / 2 ,

 ,

 ,

  E HZ  B
k

c2

 ,k

,

(56)
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2

2

2

Bc,2k  6GM2 u2, M E, {u , k }  (1 2)I , M E, { I , k }  (I , M  CI )u , M E, {u , k } 

  E  z 

(1 2)(I , M  CI )  I , M u , M u2, M , H  (1  2 ) I  , and Z k   E zk


2

2

T

.

k

Proof: Let the last event triggered time be ki . Then if the timespan  p,k is always
greater than  m , there will be no NN weights updates nor control updates during the interval

 ki , ki   m  . Select the Lyapunov function as

V  zk   E {zkT zk }  E, {zk } . By substituting the
 ,

system dynamics (47) and the estimation error dynamics (49) into the Lyapunov function
and using the result from Theorem 5, one can get
2

V  zk   r E, {eET ,k }  HZ k  Bc ,2k ,

(57)

Therefore if the event is not triggered for enough long time, the trigger error eET ,k
will keep increasing and become the dominant one in (57) and thus V  zk  . If (56) is
satisfied, we have
2

r E, {eET ,k }  HZ k  Bc ,2k  r E

 ,

z

 m  ki

 zki

2

  HZ  B
k

c2

 ,k

0

Hence the stability of the physical system cannot be guaranteed if  p,k   m always
holds.
3.3. PHYSICAL ATTACK DETECTION
In this section, we introduce the attack detection scheme on the physical system.
The idea is to monitor the state estimation error of the physical system, which is the
difference between the measured and the estimated physical system state generated by the
identifier. Since it is shown in Theorem 5 that the expected estimation error is UB under
healthy condition, it will exceed the bound in the presence of an attack and thus the attack
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can be detected. Similar to Theorem 3, the following theorem gives the detectability
condition for attacks on the physical system.
Theorem 7: Consider the nonlinear discrete-time system (43). Let the identifier be
defined as (48) with the NN weights update law shown in (50). Then attacks on the physical
system can be detected at if Wp , k satisfies





E  IT, k I ( zk )uk  ˆIT [I ( zk )  I ( zk )]uk   I ( zk )  Wp  zk   Bzc,2k ,

 ,

(58)

Proof: Let the Lyapunov function be defined as
V  zk   E {zkT zk }  E, {zk } .
 ,

(59)

Substitute the system dynamics (47) and the estimation error dynamics (49) into (59) and
after some manipulation, one can get
V  zk   (1  2 )(1  ) E, {zk }  E, {zk }  Bc,2k   I , M  6GM2  u2, M .
2

(60)

Thus we have V  zk   0 , as long as
E{zk }  Bzc,2k .

(61)

 ,

As a result, the estimation error in the absence of attacks is bounded by Bzc,2k . If (58) is
satisfied, we have





E  IT,k I ( zk )uk  ˆIT [I ( zk )  I ( zk )]uk   I ( zk )  Wp  zk   E {zka }  Bzc,2k .

 ,

 ,

Therefore the expected estimation error exceeds the bound and thus the attack can
be detected.
Next, upon detecting the attack on the physical systems, it is of interest to estimate
the attacker input Wp  zk  . In order to do this, we rewrite the system dynamics (47) as
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T
zk 1   F ( zk ) Wp  zk  G( zk )  1 1 ukT   E{ Iw
I ( zk )uw,k   e, Iw ( zk , eET ,k )},
 ,
T

where

 Iw   FT

WT

GT 

T

(62)

is the constant target NN parameter vector and uw,k  1 1 ukT 

T

is the augmented control input vector. The event sampled reconstruction error  e, Iw ( zk , eET ,k )
is then given by
T
 e, Iw ( zk , eET ,k )  Iw
I ( zk  eET ,k )  I ( zk )  uw,k   Iw ( zk  eET ,k ),

(63)

 Iw ( zk  eET ,k )   Iwuw,k with  Iw   F ( zk ) W ( zk )  G ( zk ) being the NN reconstruction error

vector.
Accordingly, an NN-based approximator is added to (48) such that the dynamics of
the identifier becomes
T
zˆk 1  Fˆ ( zk )  Wˆ ( zk )  Gˆ ( zk )u p , k  E{ˆIw
I ( zk )uw,k } ,

(64)

 ,

where ˆIw being the NN weights of the identifier. Then the error dynamics of the identifier
can be computed as





T
ˆT
E{zk 1}  E  Iw
, k  I ( zk )uw, k   Iw [ I ( zk )   I ( zk )]uw, k   Iw ( zk ) .

 ,

 ,

(65)

The following theorem shows that the expected value of the estimation error of the
bounded attacker input Wp  zk  is UB.
Theorem 8: Consider the nonlinear discrete-time system (43) in the presence of the
attack. Assume the attack is launched after the convergence of identifier (48) and is
bounded by

W p  zk   W p , M

. Suppose the vector  Iw,k uw,k satisfies the PE condition [29]. Then

an attack can be detected when (61) is satisfied. Upon detecting the attack, apply the
identifier given in (64) with the following update law
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 k IwI ( zk 1 )uw, k 1zIT, k


E {ˆIw, k }  E ˆIw, k 1 
,
T
 ,
 ,
(

(
z
)
u
)
(

(
z
)
u
)

1


I
k 1
w, k 1
I
k 1
w, k 1



where

0   Iw  1 2

(66)

is the learning rate. Then, for a positive integer N w the identifier NN

weights estimation error E,  Iw, k  is UB in the mean for all ki  k0  Nw .





T
Proof: Select the Lyapunov function LIw,k  tr E, { Iw,k Iw,k } . For the case of event

sampled instants, we have

zk  zk

,

 k  1 and k  ki

. Then the identifier estimation error

dynamics becomes


 IwI ( zk )uw, k zIT, k 1


E { Iw, k 1}  E  Iw, k 
.
T
 ,
 ,
(

(
z
)
u
)
(

(
z
)
u
)

1


I
k
w, k
I
k
w, k



(67)

zk 1  wIT ,k I ( zk )uw,k   wI ,k .

(68)

with

Substituting (67) into the Lyapunov function and computing the first difference
yields
  2 wI  wIT , k  I ( zk )uw, k zIT, k 1  
LI , k  tr  E 

  ,  ( I ( zk )uw, k )T ( I ( zk )uw, k )  1  




  2 z
( ( z )u )T ( I ( zk )uw, k ) zIT, k 1  
tr  E  wI I , k 1 I k Tw, k
  .
  , 
(( I ( zk )uw, k ) ( I ( zk )uw, k )  1) 2
 
 

(69)

Substituting (68) into (69) and applying Cauchy-Schwartz inequality yields
2

LI , k  I2,m wI (1  2 wI ) E, { wI , k }  (1  2 wI ) wI  wI2 , M ,

(70)

 (I ( zk )uw,k )(I ( zk )uw,k )T 
 is satisfied due to the PE condition [29].
T
 (I ( zk )uw,k ) (I ( zk )uw,k )  1

where 0  I2,m  min

k

Therefore, we have

LI , k  0 as

long as

E{ wI , k }  (1  2 wI ) wI2 , M I2, m (1  2 wI )

 ,

wI
Bub
.

(71)
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Therefore, E,  Iw, k  is bounded at the event sampled instants. Now consider the
case of the intervals between the event instants. Since the weights are not updated during
the event instants, we have



 



T
T
LI , k  tr E, { wI , k 1 wI , k 1}  tr E, { wI , k wI , k }  0 .

(72)

Therefore, we have E, { wI ,k 1}  E, {wI ,k } held for both cases. As a result, there exists
i

i

a positive integer N w such that for all ki  k0  Nw we have E, { wI ,k }  Bub . Therefore, the
wI

identifier NN weights estimation error E,  Iw, k  is UB in the mean.
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4. SIMULATION RESULTS

In order to show the effectiveness of the proposed attack detection scheme,
simulations are performed in MATLAB with the following parameters for the
communication network: sampling period T  1ms , total simulation time Ts  200T . Without
the loss of generosity, let the desired number of packets in the bottleneck node be
xd ,k  200  100sin  k / 25 , the unknown nonlinear function be f  xk   xk , and the maximum

modeling error or disturbance be dM  5 . Past three values are used as the input to the onelayer NN as a tradeoff between approximation and computation. The logsig activation
function is selected and all NN weights are initialized to zero.
In order to make the inequalities in (10) and (15) hold, the feedback gain K is
selected as 0.05 and the coefficient of the adaptive term  is selected as 0.5. The initial
adaptation gain  is taken as 0.1 and is updated using the projection algorithm as





 k  0.5 / 0.1   T  xk   xk  .

A jamming attack in introduced at

t  100ms

and it aims at creating traffic congestion

by placing jammers that consistently inject data into the link. Assuming the attacking
strength (number of jammers) increases linearly, then the number of packets injected by
the attacker can be modeled by k   w  k  k0  where  w is the attacking strength and k0 is
the attack launch time. In the simulation, we choose  w  20 and k0  100.
4.1. NETWORK SIMULATION
Figure 4.1 shows the actual and desired number of packets in the bottleneck node.
Before the attack is launched, the actual number of packets fluctuates around the desired
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value. Moreover, as shown in Figure 4.2, the modeling parameter error becomes very close
to zero, which verifies the result given in Theorem 1.
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Figure 4.1. Actual and desired number of packets in the bottleneck node.

Figure 4.3 shows the estimation error and the attacker injected packets, when the
observer given in Theorem 2 is applied.
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Figure 4.2. Parameter error for the number of packets before the attack is launched.
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Figure 4.3. The estimation error and the attacker injected packets, when the observer
given in Theorem 2 is applied.

Before the attack is launched, the estimation error is very close to zero, concluding
that the estimated state given by the observer in Theorem 2 is fairly accurate. Once the
attack is launched, the actual number of packets in the bottleneck node starts increasing
and deviating from the desired value, as shown in Figure 4.1. As a result, the estimation
error of the flow, plotted in Figure 4.3, exceeds the threshold shortly after the attack is
launched and thus it can be detected, which proves the correctness of Theorem 3.
Next, we apply the new observer proposed in Theorem 4 in order to estimate the
number of packets injected by the attacker. As plotted in Figure 4.4, the estimated number
of packets injected by the attacker with the new observer converges to the actual value,
which agrees with the conclusion of Theorem 4. With the estimated attack flow, one can
estimate the delay and packet losses in the link, which can be further utilized to tune the
controller parameters of the physical systems.
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Figure 4.4. Estimated and actual number of packets injected by the attacker.

4.2. PHYSICAL SYSTEM
The following second-order nonlinear discrete system [29] is considered during the
simulation
x1,k 1  x2, k ;
x2,k 1 

x2,k
1

x1,2k





 2  sin  x1,k  uk .

(73)

The initial states are selected as  2, 2T and the NN weights are initialized with
random numbers in the interval  0,1 with 15 neurons each in the hidden layer. The learning
rate are selected as   0.24 and   105 . Based on the dynamics described in (73), we
choose gmin  1 and   0.99 . The sampling period Ts is 0.01 second and the total simulation
time is 15 seconds. The time varying delay bound is d  2 , the mean value of the delay is
E    12ms . The packet losses follow a Bernoulli distribution with the probability of

 ,

dropping packets being p  0.1 .
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First we consider the scenario where there are no attacks on either the physical
system or the networks. As shown in Figure 4.5, the system states converge to close to zero
after about seven seconds, although the initial states and the NN weights are fairly far from
their target values.
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Figure 4.5. The convergence of the states when the network is healthy.

Figure 4.6 shows the evolution of the trigger condition threshold and the state
estimation error. The state estimation error oscillates between zero and the trigger threshold
due to the fact that in the event-trigger control scheme, the estimation error is set to zero
once it becomes equal or greater than the trigger threshold. It can also be observed that
state estimation error converges to close to zero after about 10 seconds and eventually stops
satisfying the trigger condition due to the dead zone function. Therefore, Figure 4.5 and
Figure 4.6 confirm Theorem 5.
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Figure 4.6. The evolution of trigger threshold and state estimation error.

Next, in order to verify that ETC scheme help reduce the network packet losses,
black hole attack is introduced to the network. To be specific, we assume at each sampling
instant, the attack drops the sensor-to-controller packet with the probability of 0.3. Figure
4.7 shows the comparison of the accumulated number of dropped packets between the
event-triggered and time-driven control systems in the presence of black hole attack on the
network. It can be observed that for the ETC, the number of dropped packets by the attack

# of Dropped Packets

is much fewer than that of the time-driven system.
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Figure 4.7. Number of dropped packets with and without ETC.
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Especially when the event-trigger error is small enough (after 11s in this example)
and the event is no longer triggered, there will be no data loss at all. Therefore, it is
confirmed by Figure 4.7 that the ETC scheme reduces the packet losses in the presence of
attacks.
At last, the jamming attack is introduced in the network and as a result, the overall
delay exceeds the maximum value that the system can tolerate. In the simulation, we select
 m  6Ts such the inequality (56) holds. Consequently, as shown in Figure 4.8, the system

states do not converge to the origin, which is consistent with the analysis of Theorem 6.
Now, we introduce an attack on the physical system provided the network is in the
normal condition. Assume the attack is launched at tatt  10s after the convergence of the
system states. The attack targets by the modifying the sensor and the state x2 such that
x2,k 1 

x2,k
1  x1,2k





 2  sin  x1,k  uk  att  k  tatt 

where  att is the attacking strength and is selected as 0.1 in the simulation.
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Figure 4.8. The system states when overall delay exceeds the threshold.
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As shown in Figure 4.9, the estimation error increases after the launch of the attack
and exceeds the detection threshold shortly. As a result, the attack can be detected, which
verifies the conclusion of Theorem 7.
After the detection of the attack, the new observer proposed in Theorem 8 is
applied. As shown in Figure 4.10, the estimated attack magnitude given by the new
observer converges to the actual attack magnitude about one second after the attack is
launched, which agrees with the conclusion of Theorem 8.
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Figure 4.9. Attack detection results for the physical system.
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Figure 4.10. Attack estimation of the physical system.
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5. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK

The presence of communication links to transmit sensor data and control commands
has brought in vulnerabilities into NCS. A corrupted communication link can introduce
large delays and packet losses, which could lead to the instability of the physical system.
This paper proposes a novel cyber-attack detection scheme that is capable of capturing the
abnormality in those communication links. The detection of the attacks is faster than the
traditional approach where one has to wait for the physical states to be deteriorated. To
reduce the data transmissions, an optimal event-trigger control scheme with the presence
of network delays and packet losses are revisited. However, the proposed scheme is
applicable only to those network attacks causing delays and packets losses while revealing
limitation to sophisticated attacks.
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2. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this dissertation, several novel defense methodologies for CPS have been
proposed. First, a special type of cyber-physical system, the RFID system, is considered
for which a lightweight mutual authentication and ownership management protocol is
proposed in order to protect the data confidentiality and integrity. Then considering the fact
that the protection of the data confidentiality and integrity is insufficient to guarantee the
security in CPS, we then propose a general framework for developing security schemes for
CPS wherein the cyber system states affect the physical system and vice versa. After that,
we apply this general framework by selecting the traffic flow as the cyber system state
vector and a novel attack detection scheme that is capable of capturing the abnormal traffic
flow in the communication links due to a class of attacks. Further, we develop the attack
detection and estimation scheme for the traffic flow system when the network parameters
are unknown. Finally, this attack detection scheme has been further extended to the case
where the network traffic flow is modeled as a nonlinear system with unknown system
dynamics. Meanwhile, sensor/actuator attack detection schemes are developed for the
physical system where the system dynamics are uncertain due to the network-induced
delays and packet losses.
2.1. CONCLUSIONS
In the first paper, a new EPC Gen2v2 compatible protocol by using limited
cryptographic functionality was presented for mutual authentication and ownership
management. This was done by employing the ultra-lightweight permutation operation
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and the PRNG function. Such use of a simple operation adds a minimal level of
computation and energy consumption while, at the same time, supports the cryptographic
goals of the protocol. The protocol was examined both from a security point of view as
well as with a hardware implementation. The analysis indicated that the transactions in the
protocol do not expose the secret key information nor does the protocol depend on
previously used secret keys, thus guaranteeing that replay or disclosure attacks are not
possible. The comparison with previous work shows that the proposed protocol not only
conforms to the EPC standards, but also satisfies the security requirements. The hardware
implementation supports our initial goal of adding security to the existing EPC Gen2v2
based tags such that the system would be secure both in the case of being used by a single
owner or in the more practical cases of having multiple owners during the lifetime of a
tagged item.
Next, in the second paper, we have proposed a representation that captures the
interrelationship between the cyber and physical systems such that the states in the physical
system affect the decision made on the cyber systems and vice versa. Based on this
representation, the optimal defense and attacks are given to gain the greatest payoff. Since
the proposed representation is in a general form, it can be used in a variety of applications
including autonomous systems. In particular, the cyber defender is able to make thorough
decisions by selecting appropriate cyber state vector and output and customizing the payoff
function that is of interest.
After that, in the third paper, a novel cyber-attack detection scheme that is capable
of capturing the abnormality in the communication links is proposed. The detection of the
attacks is faster than the traditional approach where one has to wait for the physical states
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to be deteriorated. With the proposed detection scheme, attacks on both the networks and
the physical plants can be detected. Upon detection, the physical system can be stabilized
by re-configuring the controller gain. However, the proposed scheme is applicable only to
those network attacks causing delays and packets losses while revealing limitation to
sophisticated attacks.
In the fourth paper, we propose a novel cyber-attack detection scheme that is
capable of capturing the vulnerable communication links, which is challenging because the
system dynamics are considered unknown. The proposed detection scheme for the physical
system is able to detect both sensor and actuator attacks. Moreover, the knowledge of the
maximum delays and packet losses that the system can tolerate helps the operator protect
the plant from further damages based on the ongoing network condition.
Finally, the fifth paper extends the previous work to the case where the network
flow dynamics are modeled as a nonlinear system with unknown dynamics. The detection
of the attacks is faster than the traditional approach where one has to wait for the physical
states to be deteriorated. To reduce the data transmissions, an optimal event-trigger control
scheme with the presence of network delays and packet losses are revisited. A
sensor/actuator attack detection scheme is developed where the physical system dynamics
are uncertain due to the network-induced delays and packet losses. However, the proposed
scheme is applicable only to those network attacks causing delays and packets losses while
revealing limitation to sophisticated attacks.
2.2. FUTURE WORK
As part of the future work, the proposed general framework in Paper II for the
security scheme development can be refined by studying the impact of different attacks on
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the network performance to generate a more accurate model for the cyber system dynamics.
Furthermore, the adversary model needs not only to be accurate, but also realistic that can
reflect the behavior of the attacker in the real world rather than the imagined opponent in
the simulation.
Moreover, the proposed attack detection schemes proposed in Papers III through V
are applicable only to those network attacks causing delays and packets losses while
revealing limitation to sophisticated attacks. In many occasions, as a matter of fact, the
adversaries are more intelligent than the defenders. These attackers could learn from the
past and know how to maximize the damage while protecting them from being detected.
Dealing with sophisticated attacks remains part of the future work.

244
3. REFERENCES

[1]

Y. Zhou and J. Baras, “CPS modeling integration hub and design space exploration
with application to microrobotics,” In Control of Cyber-Physical Systems, pp. 2342. Springer International Publishing, 2013.

[2]

R. Poovendran, “Cyber–physical systems: close encounters between two parallel
worlds,” Proceedings of IEEE, vol. 98, no. 8, pp. 1363-1366, 2010.

[3]

V. Gunes1, S. Peter1, T. Givargis1, and F. Vahid, “A survey on concepts,
applications, and challenges in cyber-physical systems,” KSII Transactions on
Internet and Information Systems vol. 8, no. 12, pp. 4242-4268, Dec. 2014.

[4]

E. Lee, “Cyber physical systems: Design challenges,” In Object Oriented RealTime Distributed Computing (ISORC), 11th IEEE International Symposium on,
pp. 363-369, 2008.

[5]

A. Teixeira, I. Shames, H. Sandberg, and K. H. Johansson, “A secure control
framework for resource-limited adversaries,” Automatica, vol. 51, pp. 135-148,
2015.

[6]

H. Sandberg, S. Amin, and K. H. Johansson, “Cyber-physical security in networked
control systems: an introduction to the issue,” IEEE Control Systems, vol. 35, no.
1, pp. 20-23, 2015.

[7]

A. Juels, “RFID security and privacy: A research survey,” IEEE Journal on Selected
Areas in Commun, vol. 24, no. 2, pp. 381-394, Feb. 2006.

[8]

P. Lee, A. Clark, L. Bushnell, and R. Poovendran, “A passivity framework for
modeling and mitigating wormhole attacks on networked control systems,”
Automatic Control, IEEE Transactions on 59, no. 12, pp. 3224-3237, 2014.

[9]

Z. Lu, W. Wang, and C. Wang, “Modeling, evaluation and detection of jamming
attacks in time-critical wireless applications,” Mobile Computing, IEEE
Transactions on 13, no. 8, pp. 1746-1759, 2014.

[10]

M, Zhu, and S. Martinez, “On the performance analysis of resilient networked
control systems under replay attacks,” Automatic Control, IEEE Transactions on
59, no. 3, pp. 804-808, 2014.

[11]

N. Falliere, L. O. Murchu, and E. Chien, W32.Stuxnet Dossier Symantec
Corporation, 2011.

245
[12]

H. Baumman and W. Sandmann, “Markovian modeling and security measure
analysis for networks under flooding DoS attacks,” 20th Euromicro International
Conferences on the Parallel, Distributed and Network-based Processing, pp. 298302, March 2012.

[13]

Q. Zhu and T. Basar, “Robust and resilient control design for cyber-physical
systems with an application to power systems,” 50th IEEE Conference on Decision
and Control and European Control Conference, pp. 4066-4071, December 2011.

[14]

C.W. Ten, G. Manimaran, and C.C. Liu, “Cybersecurity for critical infrastructures:
attack and defense modeling,” IEEE Transactions on Systems, Management, and
Cybernetics, vol. 40, no. 4, pp. 853-865, July 2010.

[15]

K. Sallhammar, B.E. Helvik, and S.J. Knapskog, “Towards a stochastic model for
integrated security and dependability evaluation,” IEEE Conference on
Availability, reliability and Security, pp. 1-8, September 2006.

[16]

D. Browning, “Flow control in high-speed communication networks,”
Communications, IEEE Transactions on 42, no. 7 pp. 2480-2489, 1994.

[17]

C. Li, and E. Modiano, “Receiver-based flow control for networks in overload,”
Networking, IEEE/ACM Transactions on 23, no. 2, pp. 616-630, 2015.

[18]

J. Jin, W. Wang, and M. Palaniswami, “A simple framework of utility max-min
flow control using sliding mode approach,” Communications Letters, IEEE 13, no.
5, pp. 360-362, 2009.

[19]

A. Aenes, K. Salhammar, K. Haslum, T. Brekne, M. Moe, and S. J. Knapskog,
“Realtime risk assessment with network sensors and intrusion detection systems,”
International Conference on Computational Intellengence and Security, pp. 388397, December 2005.

[20]

C. Kwon, W. Liu, and I. Hwang, “Security analysis for cyber-physical systems
against stealthy deception attacks,” American Control Conference (ACC), pp.
3344-3349, June 2013.

[21]

L. Liu, M., Esmalifalak, Q. Ding, V. Emesih, and Z. Han, “Detecting false data
injection attacks on power grid by sparse optimization,” IEEE Transaction on Smart
Grid, vol. 5, no. 2, pp. 612-621, 2014.

[22]

A. Teixeira, S. Amin, H. Sandberg, K. H. Johansson, and S. Sastry, “Cyber security
analysis of state estimators in electric power systems,” IEEE Conference on
Decision Control, pp. 5991-5998, December 2010.

[23]

H. Fawzi, P. Tabuada, and S. Diggavi, “Secure estimation and control for cyberphysical systems under adversarial attacks,” IEEE Transactions on Automatic
Control, vol. 59, no. 6, pp. 1454-1467, 2014.

246
[24]

H. Xu, S. Jagannathan, and F. L. Lewis, “Stochastic optimal control of unknown
linear networked control system in the presence of random delays and packet
losses,” Automatica vol. 48, no. 6, pp. 1017-1030, 2012.

247
VITA

Haifeng Niu was born on June 14th, 1989, in Tengzhou, Shandong Province, China.
He received the Bachelor’s degree in Electrical Engineering from Northeastern University,
Shenyang, China, in 2010. He was a master student from 2010 to 2012 in Department of
Control and Engineering in Zhejiang University, Hangzhou, China. He received his PhD
in July 2016 in Department of Electrical Engineering, at Missouri University of Science
and Technology under supervision of Professors Jagannathan Sarangapani.
His research interests include adaptive control theorems, RFID networks, wireless
networking security, and control-theoretic approach for security of cyber-physical systems.

